1. 3417048.429827
    A number of authors (Morgan, 1999; Boumans, 2005; Morrison, 2009; Massimi and Bhimji, 2015; Parker, 2017) have argued that models can be quite literally thought of as measuring instruments. I here challenge this view by reconstructing three arguments from the literature and rebutting them. Further, I argue that models should be seen as cognitive rather than measuring instruments, and that the distinction is important for understanding scientific change: Both yield two distinct sources of insight that mutually depend on each other, and should not be equated. In particular, we may perform the exact same actions in the laboratory but conceive of them entirely differently by virtue of the models we endorse at different points in time.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on PhilSci Archive
  2. 3417068.429985
    The gravitational Aharonov-Bohm (AB) effect, where quantum particles acquire phase shifts in curvature-free regions due to a gauge-fixed metric perturbation hµν , highlights the intriguing gauge dependence of spacetime. This study explores whether Loop Quantum Gravity (LQG), which views spacetime as emerging from SU(2)- and diffeomorphism-invariant spin networks, can accommodate this effect. The AB effect suggests that LQG should incorporate gauge dependence at the quantum level, which appears challenging within its relational, gauge-invariant framework. Potential modifications to LQG, such as introducing gauge-fixing constraints or effective fields, may require assumptions aligned with substantivalism, potentially diverging from its emergent paradigm. These results invite a thoughtful reconsideration of spacetime’s ontological status, encouraging a dialogue between relational and substantivalist perspectives in quantum gravity.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on PhilSci Archive
  3. 3417086.430009
    In a recent reply to my criticisms (Found. Phys. 55:5, 2025), Carcassi, Oldofredi, and Aidala (COA) admitted that their no-go result for ψ-ontic models is based on the implicit assumption that all states are equally distinguishable, but insisted that this assumption is a part of the ψ-ontic models defined by Harrigan and Spekkens, thus maintaining their result’s validity. In this note, I refute their argument again, emphasizing that the ontological models framework (OMF) does not entail this assumption. I clarify the distinction between ontological distinctness and experimental distinguishability, showing that the latter depends on dynamics absent from OMF, and address COA’s broader claims about quantum statistical mechanics and Bohmian mechanics.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on PhilSci Archive
  4. 3417108.430026
    Measuring diversity in microbial ecology and microbiome studies is fraught with challenges, rendering the assessment of its ”real-world” value nearly impossible. The instability of taxonomic classification, difficulty in isolating individuals, and reliance on DNA-based methods and statistical tools all contribute to the complexity of measuring diversity reliably. This manuscript explores the underlying philosophical issues, relating them to the measurement problem in philosophy. I argue that traditional philosophical accounts of measurement, including representational, operationalist, and realist approaches, are insufficient to address these issues. Instead, I examine these challenges through the lens of a model-based perspective on measurement, which can remain agnostic about entities and property ontologies, clarify the role of assumptions in diversity measurement, and provide solutions for justifying measurement procedures. This work emphasizes the importance of calibration and clearly defining measurement purposes, providing avenues for scientists to improve their measurement procedures. Ultimately, I contribute to a deeper understanding of the challenges and opportunities in measuring microbial diversity by bridging the gap between philosophy and scientific practice.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on PhilSci Archive
  5. 3417133.430042
    There has been considerable discussion in the philosophical literature of the past decade or so of a view that has come to be known as “wave function realism,” which I will abbreviate as WFR. The basic claim of this view is that quantum theory gives us motivation to think that quantum wave functions should be thought of as fields on a space of very high (or perhaps infinite) dimension, and that this space is in some important sense more fundamental than familiar three-dimensional space or four-dimensional spacetime. Note that this is much stronger than the mere claim that quantum states represent something physically real, a claim that I myself have defended (Myrvold 2020a, 2020b).
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on PhilSci Archive
  6. 3417155.430058
    Philosophers of physics, when engaged in matters they regard as fundamental, tend to focus their analyses on fictitious systems that are wholly isolated from their environments. When pressed, they retreat to the fiction of treating the universe as a whole as an object of scientific study. This is nothing at all like the way science is practiced. Even if a system can be insulated in such a way that its interactions with its surroundings are negligible, one only ever explicitly models a minute fraction of the degrees of freedom of the system, and, as the degrees of freedom explicitly considered interact with those that are not, those degrees of freedom that are treated in the model constitute what is, in effect, an open system.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on PhilSci Archive
  7. 3518684.430073
    The work of George Eliot (1819–1880) challenges any strong disjunction between philosophy and art. Her deepest philosophical interests were in ethics, aesthetics, and the relation between them. Indebted above all to Spinozism and Romanticism, she developed her thinking in sustained dialogue with the European philosophical tradition, both before and after she began to write fiction under the pseudonym “George Eliot” in 1857. She wrote novels, shorter stories, poetry, and review essays, and throughout her career she experimented with literary form. Through her bestselling novels, her engagements with philosophy and with contemporary questions about morality, art, politics, feminism, religion and science reached wide readerships.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  8. 3548079.430088
    This paper proposes a theory-neutral formal framework designed to accommodate data that implicates consciousness in anomalous observer-linked phenomena, including structured accounts sometimes interpreted as involving alleged non-human intelligence. Motivated by growing empirical reports in which observer phenomenology appears coupled to system behavior, the paper introduces an explanatory workspace that expands the standard quantum state space to include a phenomenal dimension.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on PhilSci Archive
  9. 3548135.430103
    I introduce Inevitable Actualization (IA), an ontological modality: if (1) the universe’s future time involves an unbounded sequence of causal trials (H) and (2) a state S has a non-zero physical probability Pn > in trial n such that the sum n=1 Pn diverges, then S is guaranteed to occur with probability one. IA is developed through a rigorous measure-theoretic foundation, probabilistic modeling with dependence (under standard mixing conditions) and absorbing-state exceptions, contrasting IA with classical modalities and modern multiverse theories. Positioned as a distinct third category alongside necessity and contingency, IA’s unique grounding rests on temporal structure and probability. I address objections (Boltzmann brains, the measure problem, and identity duplication) and illustrate IA’s implications for ethics, cosmology, and personal identity, acknowledging formal challenges.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on PhilSci Archive
  10. 3563371.430118
    This is another attempt at an argument against inferentialism about logical constants. Given a world w, let w* be a world just like w except that it has added to it an extra spatiotemporally disconnected island universe containing exactly one hydrogen atom with a precisely specified wavefunction ψ0. …
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  11. 3573974.430133
    Suppose we have a backwards-infinite sequence of asexually reproducing chickens, ..., c−3, c−2, c−1, c0 with cn having a chance pn of producing a new chicken cn + 1 (chicken c0 may or may not have succeeded; the earlier ones have succeeded). …
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  12. 3578162.430149
    In the topic-sensitive theory of the logic of imagination due to Berto [3], the topic of the imaginative output must be contained within the imaginative input. That is, imaginative episodes can never expand what they are about. We argue, with Badura [2], that this constraint is implausible from a psychological point of view, and it wrongly predicts the falsehood of true reports of imagination. Thus the constraint should be relaxed; but how? A number of direct approaches to relaxing the controversial content-inclusion constraint are explored in this paper. The core idea is to consider adding an expansion operator to the mereology of topics. The logic that results depends on the formal constraints placed on topic expansion, the choice of which are subject to philosophical dispute. The first semantics we explore is a topological approach using a closure operator, and we show that the resulting logic is the same as Berto’s own system. The second approach uses an inclusive and monotone increasing operator, and we give a sound and complete axiomatiation for its logic. The third approach uses an inclusive and additive operator, and we show that the associated logic is strictly weaker than the previous two systems, and additivity is not definable in the language. The latter result suggests that involved techniques or a more expressive language is required for a complete axiomatization of the system, which is left as an open question. All three systems are simple tweaks on Berto’s system in that the language remains propositional, and the underlying theory of topics is unchanged.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Aybüke Özgün's site
  13. 3585138.430183
    The Quinean criterion for existential commitment is that we incur existential commitment precisely by affirming existentially quantified sentences. But what’s an existential quantifier? The inferentialist answer is that an existential quantifier is anything that behaves logically like an existential quantifier by obeying the rules of inference associated with quantifiers in classical logic. …
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  14. 3645040.430198
    Eliminative structuralist philosophers of mathematics insist that what mathematicians study is structures rather than specific realizations of these structures, like a privileged natural number system would be. …
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  15. 3651437.430214
    A seminal controversy in statistical inference is whether error probabilities associated with an inference method are evidentially relevant once the data are in hand. Frequentist error statisticians say yes; Bayesians say no. …
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on D. G. Mayo's blog
  16. 3662108.430232
    This post is free to read, so please ‘like’ it via the heart below and share it widely. The best way to support my work is with a paid subscription. It’s the most predictable thing imaginable: the Trump administration, co-helmed by the rabid pro-natalist Elon Musk and the sadsack pallbearer of patriarchy, J.D. …
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on More to Hate
  17. 3709327.430247
    Anne Bradstreet was born in England, and raised near Old England’s Boston. In 1630, when she was eighteen, her family crossed the Atlantic on the Arbella, and helped John Winthrop found Puritan New England. …
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Mostly Aesthetics
  18. 3719203.430262
    Quarrels and wisecracks are essential features of interpersonal life. Quarrels are conflicts that typically take place only between friends, family, and those with whom we are personally engaged and whose attitudes toward us matter. Wisecracks are bits of improvised wit—banter, teasing, mockery, and ball busting—that also typically take place only in interpersonal life (note the following odd but revealing comment: “I can’t tease her like that; I barely even know her!”). Quarrels and cracks are, though, mutually exclusive. People know their quarrel is basically over once they start being amused by each others’ wisecracks again, and if you’re enjoying wisecracks with each other, it’s very hard, if not impossible, to quarrel at the same time. Why is this and what does it mean for interpersonal conflict? In this paper, I attempt to answer this question via a deep dive into the nature of wisecracking humor to explore the unrecognized—and valuable—role it plays in our interpersonal lives. In particular, there is a type of wisecracking humor that has a distinctive sort of interpersonal power, the power to dissolve the anger in quarrels in a surprising and productive way.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on David Shoemaker's site
  19. 3721283.430279
    Novel tools have allowed researchers to intervene into circuits at the mesoscale. The results of these interventions are often explained by appeal to functions. How are functions ascribed to circuit parts experimentally? I identify two kinds of function ascription practices in circuit interventions. Analysis of these practices shows us that function ascriptions are challenging due to a lack of interventive control and insufficient constraints on the class of candidate functions to discriminate in practice. One kind of function ascription practice— subtractive analysis—fares better at addressing these challenges.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on PhilSci Archive
  20. 3834227.430301
    It has been argued that adult humans are absolutely time biased towards the future, at least as far as purely hedonic experiences (pain/pleasure) are concerned. What this means is that they assign zero value to them once they are in the past. Recent empirical studies have cast doubt on this claim, suggesting that while adults hold asymmetrical hedonic preferences – preferring painful experiences to be in the past and pleasurable experiences to lie in the future – these preferences are not absolute and are often abandoned when the quantity of pain or pleasure under consideration is greater in the past than in the future. Research has also examined whether such preferences might be affected by the utility people assign to experiential memories, since the recollection of past events can itself be pleasurable or aversive. We extend this line of research, investigating the utility people assign to experiential memories regardless of tense, and provide – to our knowledge – the first quantitative attempt at directly comparing the relative subjective weightings given to ‘primary’ experiences (i.e., living through the event first-hand) and ‘secondary’ (i.e., recollective or anticipatory) experiences. We find that when painful events are located in the past, the importance of the memory of the pain appears to be enhanced relative to its importance when they are located in the future. We also find extensive individual differences in hedonic preferences, reasons to adopt them, and willingness to trade them off. This research allows for a clearer picture of the utility people assign to the consumption of recollective experiences and of how this contributes to, or perhaps masks, time biases.
    Found 1 month, 2 weeks ago on None
  21. 3836620.430316
    The interpretation of quantum measurements presents a fundamental challenge in quantum mechanics, with concepts such as the Copenhagen Interpretation (CI), Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI), and Bohmian Mechanics (BM) offering distinct perspectives. We propose the Branched Hilbert Subspace Interpretation (BHSI), which describes measurement as branching the local Hilbert space of a system into parallel subspaces. We formalize the mathematical framework of BHSI using branching and the engaging and disengaging unitary operators to relationally and causally update the states of observers. Unlike the MWI, BHSI avoids the ontological proliferation of worlds and copies of observers, realizing the Born rule based on branch weights. Unlike the CI, BHSI retains the essential features of the MWI: unitary evolution and no wavefunction collapse. Unlike the BM, BHSI does not depend on a nonlocal structure, which may conflict with relativity. We apply BHSI to examples such as the double-slit experiment, the Bell test, Wigner and his friend, and the black hole information paradox. In addition, we explore whether recohering branches can be achieved in BHSI. Compared to the CI and MWI, BHSI provides a minimalist, unitarity-preserving, collapse-free, and probabilistically inherent alternative interpretation of quantum measurements.
    Found 1 month, 2 weeks ago on PhilSci Archive
  22. 3836641.43033
    Recent results have shown that singularities can be avoided from the general relativistic standpoint in Lorentzian-Euclidean black holes by means of the transition from a Lorentzian to an Euclidean region where time loses its physical meaning and becomes imaginary. This dynamical mechanism, dubbed “atemporality”, prevents the emergence of black hole singularities and the violation of conservation laws. In this paper, the notion of atemporality together with a detailed discussion of its implications is presented from a philosophical perspective. The main result consists in showing that atemporality is naturally related to conservation laws.
    Found 1 month, 2 weeks ago on PhilSci Archive
  23. 3836697.430347
    This chapter addresses the development of tests for consciousness (C-tests), defined as any protocol or methodology devised to detect specific properties that, if present, would justify higher credence in the belief that the system under test is phenomenally conscious. Though inherently defeasible, C-tests are vital for reducing epistemic uncertainty, balancing ethical and practical considerations regarding the attribution of consciousness to systems like patients with disorders of consciousness, non-human animals, and artificial systems. In this chapter, we first present a taxonomy of current available C-tests, describing how they rely on specific neural and/or psychological properties to reduce uncertainty about the presence of consciousness in various target systems. Second, we clarify the notion of phenomenal consciousness as the target of C-tests, delineating the limits of C- tests in being able to capture it. Third, we address the question of whether a well-established theory of consciousness and/or pre-theoretical intuitions are necessary for validation of C-tests. Fourth, we evaluate several inferential strategies to justify extrapolations of consciousness from consensus to non-consensus cases. Finally, we conclude by describing the iterative natural kind approach as a multidimensional method that integrates multiple tests with weighted evidence. This model would provide probabilistic assessments of consciousness across different populations, offering a more reliable framework for addressing non-consensus cases and providing a valuable aid for practical decision-making.
    Found 1 month, 2 weeks ago on PhilSci Archive
  24. 3836721.430363
    This paper aims to offer an alternative account for understanding scientific models based on metaphors. To accomplish this, we analyze Darwin’s use of metaphors, such as the notion of powerful Being and Struggle for Existence, in order to represent part of the process taking place in natural selection. The proposal emerges from two provocative issues. First, that the use of metaphors in philosophical and scientific literature is a form of approach that together with other “linguistic tropes in science dies hard” (Bailer-Jones 2002a; Keller 2002, p.117). Second, there are still unsolved problems in the literature of scientific models and debates using metaphors in science as the main epistemological approach.
    Found 1 month, 2 weeks ago on PhilSci Archive
  25. 3894404.430386
    Marletto and Vedral [Phys. Rev. Lett. 125, 040401 (2020)] propose that the Aharonov-Bohm (AB) phase is locally mediated by entanglement between a charged particle and the quantized electromagnetic field, asserting gauge independence for non-closed paths. Using quantum electrodynamics (QED), we critically analyze their model and demonstrate that the AB phase arises from the interaction with the vector potential A, not from entanglement, which is merely a byproduct of the QED framework. We show that their field-based energy formulation, intended to reflect local electromagnetic interactions, is mathematically flawed due to an incorrect prefactor and involves fields inside the solenoid, failing to support local mediation of the phase. Its equivalence to qv · A holds only in the Coulomb gauge, undermining their claim of a gauge-independent local mechanism. Furthermore, we confirm that the AB phase is gauge-dependent for non-closed paths, contradicting their assertion. Our analysis reaffirms the semi-classical interpretation, where the AB phase is driven by the vector potential A, with entanglement playing no causal role in its generation.
    Found 1 month, 2 weeks ago on PhilSci Archive
  26. 3894433.430392
    This paper reconsiders the metaphysical implication of Einstein algebras, prompted by the recent objections of Chen (2024) on Rosenstock et al. (2015)’s conclusion. Rosenstock et al.’s duality theorem of smooth manifolds and smooth algebras supports a conventional wisdom which states that the Einstein algebra formalism is not more “relationalist” than the standard manifold formalism. Nevertheless, as Chen points out, smooth algebras are different from the relevant algebraic structure of an Einstein algebra. It is therefore questionable if Rosenstock et al.’s duality theorem can support the conventional wisdom. After a re-visit of John Earman’s classic works on the program of Leibniz algebras, I formalize the program in category theory and propose a new formal criterion to determine whether an algebraic formalism is more “relationalist” than the standard manifold formalism or not. Based on the new formal criterion, I show that the conventional wisdom is still true, though supported by a new technical result. I also show that Rosenstock et al. (2015)’s insight can be re-casted as a corollary of the new result. Finally, I provide a justification of the new formal criterion with a discussion of Sikorski algebras and differential spaces. The paper therefore provides a new perspective for formally investigating the metaphysical implication of an algebraic formalism for the theory of space and time.
    Found 1 month, 2 weeks ago on PhilSci Archive
  27. 3894450.430398
    This dissertation defends Causal Decision Theory(CDT) against a recent (alleged) counterexample. In Dicing with Death (2014), Arif Ahmed devises a decision scenario where the recommendation given by CDT apparently contradicts our intuitive course of action. Similar to many other alleged counterexamples to CDT, Ahmed’s story features an adversary with fantastic predictive power—Death himself, in this story. Unlike many other alleged counterexamples, however, Ahmed explicitly includes the use of a costly randomization device as a possible action for the agent. I critically assess these two features of Ahmed’s story. I argue that Death’s fantastic predictive power cannot be readily reconciled with the use of randomization device. In order to sustain Dicing with Death as a coherent decision scenario, background explanations must be given about the nature of Death’s fantastic predictive power. After considering a few such explanations, however, it becomes unclear if the initial intuition which CDT apparently contradicts still holds up. Finally, I consider two contrasting decision scenarios to illustrate why Ahmed’s intuition in this case is ultimately false. I conclude that biting the bullet can perhaps be a legitimate response from CDT to many similar cases where evidentially correlated but causally isolated acts seem to force CDT to give counterintuitive recommendations.
    Found 1 month, 2 weeks ago on PhilSci Archive
  28. 3894469.430404
    This paper critically examines Ian Hacking’s account of looping effects and human kinds, focusing on three related arguments defended by Hacking: (1) the looping effects of human science classifications render their objects of classification inherently unstable, (2) looping effects preclude the possibility of generating stable projectable inferences (i.e., reliable predictions) based on human kind terms, and (3) looping effects can demarcate human science classifications from natural science classifications. Contra-Hacking, I argue that: (1) some objects of human science classifications (viz., biological kinds) remain stable despite the feedback generated by their classifications, (2), human science classifications that individuate biological kinds yield stable projectable inferences, and (3) looping effects are a problematic criterion for distinguishing human science classifications from natural science classifications.
    Found 1 month, 2 weeks ago on PhilSci Archive
  29. 3894490.430411
    This paper aims to resolve the incompatibility between two extant gauge-invariant accounts of the Abelian Higgs mechanism: the first account uses global gauge symmetry breaking, and the second eliminates spontaneous symmetry breaking entirely. We resolve this incompatibility by using the constrained Hamiltonian formalism in symplectic geometry. First we argue that, unlike their local counterparts, global gauge symmetries are physical. The symmetries that are spontaneously broken by the Higgs mechanism are then the global ones. Second, we explain how the dressing field method singles out the Coulomb gauge as a preferred gauge for a gauge-invariant account of the Abelian Higgs mechanism. Based on the existence of this group of global gauge symmetries that are physical, we resolve the incompatibility between the two accounts by arguing that the correct way to carry out the second method is to eliminate only the redundant gauge symmetries, i.e. those local gauge symmetries which are not global. We extend our analysis to quantum field theory, where we show that the Abelian Higgs mechanism can be understood as spontaneous global U(1) symmetry breaking in the C -algebraic sense.
    Found 1 month, 2 weeks ago on PhilSci Archive
  30. 3946668.430418
    Some authors maintain that we can use causal Bayes nets to infer whether X → Y or X ← Y by consulting a probability distribution defined over some exogenous source of variation for X or Y . We raise a problem for this approach. Specifically, we point out that there are cases where an exogenous cause of X (Ex) has no probabilistic influence on Y no matter the direction of causation — namely, cases where Ex → X → Y and Ex → X ← Y are probabilistically indistinguishable. We then assess the philosophical significance of this problem and discuss some potential solutions.
    Found 1 month, 2 weeks ago on Reuben Stern's site