1. 12446.416116
    Suppose a man has already murdered most of your family, including several of your children, for no other reason than that he believes your kind doesn’t deserve to exist on earth. The murderer was never seriously punished for this, because most of your hometown actually shared his feelings about your family. …
    Found 3 hours, 27 minutes ago on Scott Aaronson's blog
  2. 95857.416174
    I specialize in trillion-dollar ideas: policy reforms which, if implemented, would generate trillions of dollars of net social benefits. Ideas like open borders, educational austerity, and by-right construction. …
    Found 1 day, 2 hours ago on Bet On It
  3. 182249.416182
    In 2015, Amy Finkelstein, Nathaniel Hendren, and Erzo Luttmer released an NBER working paper called “The Value of Medicaid: Interpreting Results from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment.” The paper’s results were a slap in the face of Social Desirability Bias — and the authors boldly advertised them right in the abstract: Our baseline estimates of Medicaid's welfare benefit to recipients per dollar of government spending range from about $0.2 to $0.4, depending on the framework, with at least two-fifths – and as much as four-fifths – of the value of Medicaid coming from a transfer component, as opposed to its ability to move resources across states of the world. …
    Found 2 days, 2 hours ago on Bet On It
  4. 186245.416189
    Interactions between agents are supported through a continuous process of detecting and responding to behaviors that are contingent upon the other agent’s behavior. Here, we explore the temporal dependence of these mechanisms, focusing on the role of timescale compatibility in inter-agent interactions. Using continuous-time recurrent neural networks (CTRNNs) to control embodied agents in a minimal social interaction task, we demonstrate that effective interactions require agents to operate on compatible timescales. Our results indicate that time scale mismatches disrupt agents’ ability to distinguish other agents from non-social entities, revealing a timescale threshold beyond which agents begin mis-classifying slower agents as static objects and faster agents as non-social animate objects.
    Found 2 days, 3 hours ago on Ann-Sophie Barwich's site
  5. 353742.416194
    Economists have long scoffed at know-it-all business and financial gurus with the rhetorical question, “If you’re so smart, why aren’t you rich?” And sometimes the gurus use the same question to scoff at know-it-all economists. …
    Found 4 days, 2 hours ago on Bet On It
  6. 356819.4162
    When thinking about big social problems like climate change or factory farming, there are two especially common failure modes worth avoiding: Neglecting small numbers that incrementally contribute to significant aggregate harms. …
    Found 4 days, 3 hours ago on Good Thoughts
  7. 356820.416206
    As part of the summer break, I’m publishing old essays that may be of interest for new subscribers. This post has been originally published January 13, 2023. If not already the case, do not hesitate to subscribe to receive free essays on economics, philosophy, and liberal politics in your mailbox! …
    Found 4 days, 3 hours ago on The Archimedean Point
  8. 428963.416211
    An important feature of theoretical projects that aim to promote social justice is their commitment to empowering those in oppressive circumstances so that they can solve their own problems. There are two reasons to take this approach. First, the oppressed have situated knowledge of the circumstances that others lack. But situated knowledge may not be enough to prompt critique. The second is that because both knowledge and values are shaped by social practices, a collective engagement with historically and materially grounded practices can provide a new frame for agency that enables a creative and potentially emancipatory restructuring of social relations. I argue that such path dependency of values is compatible with social justice being objective, but not to be discovered by theory alone.
    Found 4 days, 23 hours ago on Sally Haslanger's site
  9. 444379.416217
    Reminder: everyone is welcome here, but paid subscriptions are what enable me to devote the necessary time to researching and writing this newsletter, including pieces like this one on Katie Johnson, the woman who alleged Trump sexually assaulted her at the age of thirteen at a party of Jeffrey Epstein’s. …
    Found 5 days, 3 hours ago on More to Hate
  10. 529670.416223
    This paper critically analyses the “attention economy” within the framework of cognitive science and techno-political economics, as applied to both human and machine interactions. We explore how current business models, particularly in digital platform capitalism, harness user engagement by strategically shaping attentional patterns. These platforms utilize advanced AI and massive data analytics to enhance user engagement, creating a cycle of attention capture and data extraction. We review contemporary (neuro)cognitive theories of attention and platform engagement design techniques and criticize classical cognitivist and behaviourist theories for their inadequacies in addressing the potential harms of such engagement on user autonomy and wellbeing. 4E approaches to cognitive science, instead, emphasizing the embodied, extended, enactive, and ecological aspects of cognition, offer us an intrinsic normative standpoint and a more integrated understanding of how attentional patterns are actively constituted by adaptive digital environments. By examining the precarious nature of habit formation in digital contexts, we reveal the techno-economic underpinnings that threaten personal autonomy by disaggregating habits away from the individual, into an AI managed collection of behavioural patterns. Our current predicament suggests the necessity of a paradigm shift towards an ecology of attention. This shift aims to foster environments that respect and preserve human cognitive and social capacities, countering the exploitative tendencies of cognitive capitalism.
    Found 6 days, 3 hours ago on Xabier Barandiaran's site
  11. 687630.416229
    In the first lecture, I argued that societies are complex dynamic systems and that in order to promote social change we must attend to material meso-level systems, e.g., heath care systems, education systems, criminal justice systems, and the like, and their patriarchal, White supremacist, and capitalist dynamics. This complex systems approach – together with attention to the social formation of subjects within practices – helps us capture the phenomenon of intersectional oppression and is suited to the strategic thinking needed for social transformation.
    Found 1 week ago on Sally Haslanger's site
  12. 851738.416235
    It is a stark truth that the prison system in the United States is a moral catastrophe. Many of those who go to prison are routinely subject to battery, assault, and rape, or live in constant fear thereof. Incarcerated individuals are forced to align with gangs to protect themselves. They are treated by guards and other prison officials in deeply dehumanizing ways, subjected to psychological torture through solitary confinement and other measures, and sometimes inhabit literally unlivable conditions.
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on Alex Worsnip's site
  13. 959908.416241
    This paper assesses the prospects for an externalist perspective for somatic medicine—the view that health and disease of the body might sometimes be constitutively dependent on factors external to the organism. After briefly reviewing the grounds for psychiatric externalism, I argue that similar considerations are already implicit in somatic medical practice, particularly in immunology, public/population health, and occupational therapy. I then argue that the interactionist and population-minded externalist approach to biomedicine represents an important practical application of more general trends in biological theory; namely, the growing rejection of individualistic and reductionistic thinking.
    Found 1 week, 4 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  14. 1060561.416246
    As part of the summer break, I’m publishing old essays that may be of interest for new subscribers. This post has been originally published March 29, 2023. If not already the case, do not hesitate to subscribe to receive free essays on economics, philosophy, and liberal politics in your mailbox! …
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on The Archimedean Point
  15. 1190730.416252
    Relevance has become a central concept in the discussion of academic knowledge production, used in the strategies and guidelines of various research-oriented institutions. This article analyses some of the key contemporary tenets in this area. Having conducted a systematic literature review of 113 academic articles, I distinguish eight main ways of referring to relevance in the context of knowledge production. Some accounts focus on how existing knowledge institutions do or could provide users with relevant knowledge, whereas others take a more dynamic approach reflecting on how stakeholder needs should influence knowledge production and what types of institutional structures allow them to do so. This difference corresponds with the characterisation of the science-policy interface either as a two-world (linear) relationship or as one-world intertwined. It is also worth considering how social and policy relevance, for example, stand against each other. These nuances should be recognised given that the concept of relevance is widely used in institutional design and in discussions about the future of academic knowledge production.
    Found 1 week, 6 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  16. 1295056.41626
    Generally speaking, it is seriously wrong to do harm to others. It is also often seriously wrong to allow harm to others. Some nonetheless hold that doing and allowing harm are morally inequivalent. They endorse the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing (DDA): the view that it is harder to justify doing harm than merely allowing harm, all else being equal. For example, it seems wrong to deflect a lethal threat onto an innocent in order to save oneself, but permissible to allow a lethal threat to reach an innocent in order to save oneself. The DDA naturally accounts for this. But others deny that there is any morally significant difference, arguing that when all else is equalized, doing harm is no worse (nor harder to justify) than allowing harm.
    Found 2 weeks ago on Philosopher's Imprint
  17. 1295106.416266
    Blame abounds in our everyday lives, perhaps no more so than on social media. With the rise of social networking platforms, we now have access to more information about others’ blameworthy behaviour and larger audiences to whom we can express our blame. But these audiences, while large, are not typically diverse. Just as we tend to gather and share information within online social networks made up of like-minded individuals, much of the moral criticism found on the internet is expressed within groups of agents with similar values and worldviews. Like these epistemic practices, the blaming practices found on social media have also received criticism. Many argue that the blame expressed on the internet is unfitting, excessive, and counterproductive. What accounts for the perniciousness of online blame? And what should be done to address it?
    Found 2 weeks ago on Philosopher's Imprint
  18. 1295462.416271
    robbery is a far more serious crime than larceny, drawing much longer prison sentences. Force is an element of many other crimes. Often, when the realization of a set of conditions that does not include force constitutes a crime, as with larceny, to realize those same conditions with force is to commit a more serious crime. In many jurisdictions, for instance, and controversially, force is what distinguishes rape from lesser forms of sexual assault. Even when a forcibly committed crime is not a more serious crime, it draws greater punishment because force is frequently treated as an aggravating condition for sentencing purposes.
    Found 2 weeks ago on Philosopher's Imprint
  19. 1295545.416277
    at “trolling.” Trolls often post deliberately inflammatory content with the goal of provoking emotional responses. They aim to trick their targets into mistaking them for good faith interlocutors, thereby “baiting” them into responding in an emotional manner. This is typically done for the troll’s own entertainment, as well as the entertainment of anyone who happens to witness the exchange and recognize it as trolling. Some instances of trolling seem mostly harmless, such as when their contents aren’t ethically problematic and no one takes the bait. However, trolling can also be dangerous. For one thing, empirical studies show that racist and misogynistic trolling can be part of a gradual radicalization into extremist or hateful ideologies (Munn 2019; Hoffman et al. 2020; Rauf 2021; Thorleifsson 2022). Furthermore, when problematic trolls are allowed to run amok, online platforms can gradually become cesspools of hateful speech. So, trolling can contribute to the degradation of both individual trolls’ belief systems and broader online environments.
    Found 2 weeks ago on Philosopher's Imprint
  20. 1363659.416283
    I present a heretofore untheorised form of lay science, called extitutional science, whereby lay scientists, by virtue of their collective experience, are able to detect errors committed by institutional scientists and attempt to have them corrected. I argue that the epistemic success of institutional science is enhanced to the extent that it takes up this extitutional criticism. Since this uptake does not occur spontaneously, extitutional interference in the conduct of institutional science is required. I make a proposal for how to secure this epistemically beneficial form of lay interference.
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on PhilSci Archive
  21. 1367821.416288
    I often find myself thinking that the conventional wisdom in moral philosophy gets a lot of things backwards. For example, I’ve previously discussed how deontology is much more deeply self-effacing (making objectively right actions, and not just bungled attempts to act rightly, lamentable) than consequentialism. …
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on Good Thoughts
  22. 1479255.416294
    In a recent paper, Harriet Fagerberg argues that the disease debate in the philosophy of medicine makes little sense as conceptual analysis but instead should proceed on the assumption that disease is a real kind. I propose an alternative view. The history and practice of medicine give us reasons to doubt that the category of disease forms a real kind. Instead, drawing on work by Quill R. Kukla, I argue that the disease debate makes good sense on an understanding of disease as an institutional kind. As well as explaining key features of the disease debate, this can facilitate a philosophical understanding of disease that captures the eclectic scope of medicine and the complex reasons why conditions get classified as diseases.
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  23. 1537002.416299
    That science is value-dependent has been taken to raise problems for the democratic legitimacy of scientifically-informed public policy. An increasingly common solution is to propose that science itself ought to be ‘democratised.’ Of the literature aiming to provide principled means of facilitating such, most has been largely concerned with developing accounts of how public values might be identified in order to resolve scientific valuejudgements. Through a case-study of the World Health Organisation’s 2009 redefinition of ‘pandemic’ in response to H1N1, this paper proposes that this emphasis might be unhelpfully pre-emptive, pending more thorough consideration of the question of whose values different varieties of epistemic risk ought to be negotiated in reference to. A choice of pandemic definition inevitably involves the consideration of a particular variety of epistemic risk, described here as ontic risk. In analogy with legislative versus judicial contexts, I argue that the democratisation of ontic risk assessments could bring inductive risk assessments within the scope of democratic control without necessitating that those inductive risk assessments be independently subject to democratic processes. This possibility is emblematic of a novel strategy for mitigating the opportunity costs that successful democratisation would incur for scientists: careful attention to the different normative stakes of different epistemic risks can provide principled grounds on which to propose that the democratisation of science need only be partial.
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  24. 1583480.416305
    The self represents a multifactorial entity made up of several interrelated constructs. It is suggested that self-talk orchestrates interactions between most self-processes—especially those entailing self-reflection. A review of the literature is performed, specifically looking for representative studies (n = 12) presenting correlations between self-report measures of self-talk and self-reflective processes. Self-talk questionnaires include the Self-Talk Scale, the Varieties of Inner Speech Questionnaire, the General Inner Speech Questionnaire, and the Inner Speech Scale. The main self-reflection measures are the Rumination and Reflection Questionnaire, the Self-Consciousness Scale, and the Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale. Most measures comprise subscales which are also discussed. Findings include: (1) positive significant correlations between self-talk used for self-management/assessment and self-reflection, arguably because the latter entails self-regulation, which itself relies on self-directed speech; (2) positive significant correlations between critical self-talk and self-rumination, as both may recruit negative, repetitive, and uncontrollable self-thoughts; (3) negative associations between self-talk and the self-acceptance aspect of mindfulness, likely because thinking about oneself in the present in a non-judgmental way is best achieved by repressing one’s inner voice. Limitations are discussed, including the selective nature of the reported correlations. Experimentally manipulating self-talk would make it possible to further explore causal associations with self-processes.
    Found 2 weeks, 4 days ago on Alain Morin's site
  25. 1756521.41631
    As part of the summer break, I’m publishing old essays that may be of interest for new subscribers. This post has been originally published March 27, 2024. If not already the case, do not hesitate to subscribe to receive free essays on economics, philosophy, and liberal politics in your mailbox! …
    Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on The Archimedean Point
  26. 1861586.416316
    We say we believe that all children can learn, but few of us really believe it.” Lisa Delpit Teachers are expected to believe in the potential of every student in front of them. To believe otherwise is to give up on a central premise of the educational mission, that students can be taught. However, the people who come into the classroom have different levels of knowledge, skills, and motivations. To deny that what the student brings to the classroom matters to their potential progress is to deny empirical reality. Teachers face a tension between cultivating high expectations for student success and recognizing the limitations that a student and their circumstances impose.
    Found 3 weeks ago on Jennifer M. Morton's site
  27. 1943679.416321
    Emotions can get things right and serve us in many productive ways. They can also get things wrong and harm our epistemic or practical endeavors. Resenting somebody for having insulted your friend gets it wrong when your friend well understood that the remark was a joke. On the other hand, if your friend is not familiar with the given cultural context and hence couldn’t quite grasp the subtly sexist nature of the joke, your resentment might not only be appropriate but also help her navigate the new social context. Hoping that your meeting with your supervisor will be productive might motivate you to prepare better but will be inappropriate if all your previous meetings were failures.
    Found 3 weeks, 1 day ago on Ergo
  28. 1943707.416327
    Besides disagreeing about how much one should donate to charity, moral theories also disagree about where one should donate. In many cases, one intuitively attractive option is to split your donations across all of the charities that are recommended by theories in which you have positive credence, with each charity’s share being proportional to your credence in the theories that recommend it. Despite the fact that something like this approach is already widely used by real-world philanthropists to distribute billions of dollars, it is not supported by any account of handling decisions under moral uncertainty that has been proposed thus far in the literature. This paper develops a new bargaining-based approach that honors the proportionality intuition. We also show how this approach has several advantages over the best alternative proposals.
    Found 3 weeks, 1 day ago on Ergo
  29. 1943781.416332
    Contractual inflationists claim that contractual relationships are a source of noninstrumental value in our lives, to be engaged with for their own sake. Some inflationists take this to be the value of “personal detachment.” I argue that though personal detachment can indeed be valuable, that value is not plausibly considered noninstru-mental. Even on the most charitable reading of personal detachment—its potential to emancipate us from traditional social relations—these inflationists overlook that it may just as much lead to domination as traditional society does, only this time, due to alienation under market conditions. To salvage our intuitive sense of the emancipatory potential of contract, we can consider the detachment it makes possible to be a form of technology, casting the value of contract in a “merely” instrumental role. I conclude that if we are to reinvigorate the politics of the appeal to personal detachment in contract theory, we have to deflate its value.
    Found 3 weeks, 1 day ago on Ergo
  30. 1943884.416338
    Commemorative artefacts purportedly speak—they communicate messages to their audience, even if no words are uttered. Sometimes, such artefacts purportedly communicate demeaning or pejorative messages about some members of society. The characteristics of such speech are, however, under-examined. I present an account of the paradigmatic characteristics of the speech of commemorative artefacts (or, “commemorative artefactual speech”), as a distinct form of political speech. According to my account, commemorative artefactual speech paradigmatically involves the use of an artefact by an authorised member of a group to declare the importance of remembering a subject, in virtue of some feature of the subject. Then, I outline a variety of ways that commemorative artefactual speech can go awry. Such speech can be unauthorised, involve unfair exclusion or incorrect identification, be aesthetically inadequate, invoke clandestine explanations, and be directed at inappropriate subjects. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of my account for resisting problematic commemorative artefactual speech.
    Found 3 weeks, 1 day ago on Ergo