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546051.287236
A nameless delivery boy in a nameless city, a refugee from a nameless country, fleeing a nameless Strongman, indentured to a nameless Supervisor, dispatched to nameless customers with unmarked packages, not knowing, yet, the rules of the system, and the language, in which he is trapped—a story told, though we do not know it yet, by a nameless narrator in a nameless city, a refugee from a nameless country, fleeing a nameless Strongman. …
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568383.287331
The nineteenth-century distinction between the nomothetic and the idiographic approach to scientific inquiry can provide valuable insight into the epistemic challenges faced in contemporary earth modelling. However, as it stands, the nomothetic-idiographic dichotomy does not fully encompass the range of modelling commitments and trade-offs that geoscientists need to navigate in their practice. Adopting a historical epistemology perspective, I propose to further spell out this dichotomy as a set of modelling decisions concerning historicity, model complexity, scale, and closure. Then, I suggest that, to address the challenges posed by these decisions, a pluralist stance towards the cognitive aims of earth modelling should be endorsed, especially beyond predictive aims.
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568403.287355
This is an introduction to a collection of articles on the conceptual history of epigenesis, from Aristotle to Harvey, Cavendish, Kant and Erasmus Darwin, moving into nineteenth-century biology with Wolff, Blumenbach and His, and onto the twentieth century and current issues, with Waddington and epigenetics. The purpose of the topical collection is to emphasize how epigenesis marks the point of intersection of a theory of biological development and a (philosophical) theory of active matter. We also wish to show that the concept of epigenesis existed prior to biological theorization and that it continues to permeate thinking about development in recent biological debates.
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687783.287367
In his famous “Mathematics is Megethology”, Lewis gives a brilliant reduction of set theory to mereology and plural quantification. A central ingredient of the reduction is a singleton function which assigns to each individual a singleton of which the individual is the only member. …
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732546.287379
Maribel Barroso suggests exploration of an interesting avenue for inductive inference. The material theory, as I have formulated it, takes as its elements propositions that assert scientific facts. Relations of inductive support among them assess their truth or falsity. She proposes that we should take models as the elements instead of proposition. In favor of this proposal is that models have a pervasive presence in science. We should be able to confront them with evidence in a systematic way. Reconfiguring inductive inference as relations over models faces some interesting questions. Just what is it for models to be supported inductively? Can the material theory be adapted to this new case? In works cited in her review, Barroso has already begun the study of inductive relations among models in science, using insights from Whewell’s work. She is, it seems to me, well placed to seek answers to these questions. I wish her well in her continuing efforts.
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734768.287389
‘Structural hylemorphism’ holds that the concept of structure should replace the allegedly less explanatory concept of form. Adherents do not, however, give us a precise idea of what structure is meant to be, and on analysis it is difficult to know how to define it as a replacement for form. I compare and contrast classical and structural hylemorphism. I rehearse the ‘content-fixing problem’ for structuralism about form, then set out the ‘qualitative problem’. These seem insurmountable obstacles to a viable version of structural hylemorphism. Exploration of the relation between quantity and quality shows that classical form can never be reduced to/replaced by a quantitative concept of form. In the end, structure does not capture what metaphysics requires. More radically, I suggest that there is no clear concept of what structure is. Classical hylemorphism, by contrast, gives us form in full metaphysical technicolor—adequate both for science and for fundamental metaphysics.
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741355.287402
The nodes of the ‘geometric trinity’ are: (i) general relativity (in which gravitational effects are a manifestation of spacetime curvature), (ii) the ‘teleparallel equivalent’ of general relativity (which trades spacetime curvature for torsion), and (iii) the ‘symmetric teleparallel equivalent’ of general relativity (which trades spacetime curvature for non-metricity). One popular reformulation of (iii) is ‘coincident general relativity’, but this theory has yet to receive any philosophical attention. This article aims both to introduce philosophers to coincident general relativity, and to undertake a detailed assessment of its features.
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741373.287411
How to articulate the common ontological commitments of symmetry-related models of physical theories? This is a central (perhaps the central) question in the philosophical literature on symmetry transformations in physics; recently, Dewar (2019) has proposed a strategy for answering this question which goes by the name of ‘external sophistication’. And yet: this strategy has been accused of being hopelessly obscure by, among others, Martens and Read (2020). In this article, I demonstrate that not all cases of external sophistication are subject to this charge—for reasons which will become clear, the cases for which this is not so give us what I’ll call ‘good VIBES’. Having established this, I then go on to consider good VIBES in the context of the analysis of hidden symmetries, in dialogue with recent work on that topic by Bieli nska and Jacobs (2024).
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741390.287421
How to make sense of the notion of force-free motion which seems to be presupposed by Newton’s first law? One can identify in the literature various different answers to this question, one among which is to be found in the writings of Torretti (1983). In a wonderful recent article, however, Hoek (2023) has proposed a radical revision to our understanding of Newton’s first law, motivated on both exegetical and philosophical grounds. In light of this, one is left wondering whether this reconceptualisation of the content of Newton’s first law obviates the need to provide a notion of force-free motion with which to undergird it. In this note, I’ll argue that this is not the case: one can (and should!) endorse Hoek’s understanding of the first law, while nevertheless seeking to define force-free motions in one of the various ways which have been proposed in the literature.
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741408.28743
We consider the distinction between ‘qualified’ and ‘unqualified’ approaches introduced by Read (2020a) in the context of the dynamical/geometrical debate. We show that one fruitful way in which to understand this distinction is in terms of what one takes the kinematically possible models of a given theory to represent; moreover, we show that the qualified/unqualified distinction is applicable not only to the geometrical approach (which is the case considered by Read (2020a)), but also to the dynamical approach. Finally, having made these points, we connect them to other discussions of representation and of explanation in this corner of the literature.
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793093.287439
Indicative conditional antecedents appear to be remarkably scopeless: they are scopeless with respect to the truth-functional connectives, scopeless with respect to epistemic modals, and scopeless with respect to each other (i.e., commutative). This pervasive scopelessness is a basic explanandum for any theory of indicatives, and the subject of much recent work. In this paper I revisit the theory of McGee [1989], which already comes surprisingly close to delivering a simple and powerful account of all of this scopelessness. I reformulate the theory as information-sensitive in the contemporary sense, and extend it with epistemic modals. On the resulting theory, epistemic modals become in e!ect quantifiers over choice functions, and their scopeless interaction with indicative antecedents drops out naturally. I give McGee’s logic a new axiomatization, and show that if his Import-Export axiom is replaced with a weaker Commutativity axiom stating that indicative antecedents commute, then Import-Export can be derived. I explain how the issue of commutativity interacts with the question how to extend information-sensitive theories of the indicative to modal antecedents. Along the way I add to the collapse results of both McGee [1985] and Mandelkern [2021], showing that under weak assumptions, Commutativity is in tension with Modus Ponens and (more generally) with the principle Mandelkern calls Ad Falsum. I convict Ad Falsum, and refine the case against Modus Ponens.
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794309.287452
I’m on holidays this week, spending some time in Cracow (Poland) and Slovakia. Today’s post is a bit off-topic compared to what I’m used to publish here, but still I hope you will enjoy it! If not the case already, do not hesitate to subscribe to receive for free essays on economics, philosophy, and liberal politics in your mailbox! …
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848693.287462
Here’s a metaphysical view I haven’t seen: the fundamental obejcts (priority version) or the only objects (existence version) are universes, but there can be more than one of these. Call this metaphysical universism (as distinguished from Quisling’s philosophy). …
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854972.287472
Every week, I tell myself I won’t do yet another post about the asteroid striking American academia, and then every week events force my hand otherwise. No one on earth—certainly no one who reads this blog—could call me blasé about the issue of antisemitism at US universities. …
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856682.287482
In interactions characterized by agential epistemic injustice, the interpreter avoids engaging with the speaker’s perspective and challenges or distorts the speaker’s contribution before taking time to explore it. Where the success of the interaction depends on a genuine knowledge exchange between interpreters and speakers, epistemic injustice compromises the success of the interaction. Building on recent qualitative work on communication in youth mental health, I argue that clinical interactions are less likely to achieve their aims when practitioners fail to engage with the perspective of the person seeking support, and challenge or distort the person’s contribution before taking time to explore it.
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856700.287492
This paper argues that biostatistical theory (BST) cannot categorically exclude pregnancy from pathology. Common harmful conditions in typical pregnancies are integral to the notion of pregnancy per se. Given this definition, there are two potential ways to classify pregnancy as non-pathological within the BST: (i) most common conditions in pregnancy are not pathological within the appropriate reference class; or (ii) pregnancy’s reproductive value counterbalances its pathological survival harms, rendering it non-pathological. I challenge both views, arguing that non-pregnant women of the same age should be the reference class, making pregnancy a survival pathology that cannot be offset by reproductive value.
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856718.287501
I argue that different ways that branching fits within Minkowski spacetime are merely different descriptions of an invariant notion of branching and are due to the relativity of simultaneity. The argument fits in the wider framework of Everett branches as real patterns, and is both developed in the abstract setting of the (generalised) histories formalism, and discussed comparing the concrete examples of hypersurface-dependent branching and of branching along the forward lightcone. I formulate the latter in terms of branching spacetime, suggesting this is a way in which spacetime can emerge from the universal wavefunction, and I make tentative connections with causal set theory. The proposed view is compatible with both the Schrodinger and Heisenberg picture.
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860717.287512
Standardized testing is glorious, but many standardized tests royally suck. The worst prominent test is almost surely the Graduate Record Exam (GRE). About 9% of test-takers get a perfect score of 170 on the Quantitative part of the exam. …
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914552.287521
While the problem of the philosophical significance of Riemann's theorem on conditionally convergent series has been discussed in detail for some time, specific versions of it have appeared in the literature very recently, over which there have been widespread disagreements. I argue that such discrepancies can be clarified by introducing a rather conventional type of composition rule for the treatment of some infinite systems (as well as supertasks) while analysing and clarifying the role of the concept of continuity by stripping it of the excesses that its application by the Leibnizian tradition has led to. The conclusion reached is that the indeterminacy associated with conditional convergence has a clear philosophical significance, but no fundamental ontological significance. Keywords: Conditional Convergence; Continuity; Expansionist Analysis; Balance Principle; Ross Paradox.
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914576.287531
Bell’s theorem states that no model that respects Local Causality and Statistical Independence can account for the correlations predicted by quantum mechanics via entangled states. This paper proposes a new approach, using backward-in-time conditional probabilities, which relaxes conventional assumptions of temporal ordering while preserving Statistical Independence as a “fine-tuning” condition. It is shown how such models can account for EPR/Bell correlations and, analogously, the GHZ predictions while nevertheless forbidding superluminal signalling.
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914594.287542
This paper examines the historical split of microbiology into the fields of medicine and ecology from a feminist perspective, using Helen Longino’s contextual empiricism and her onto-epistemic view of interactions. Examining microbial interactions is interesting for two reasons, one is ontological as microbial metabolic interactions constitute the bio-geo-chemical cycles that are the driving force of life on Earth. The second reason is epistemic, involving our conceptual challenges in understanding microbial traits and classification, as their activities and ability to evolve are, for the most part, driven by their interactions. I follow the work and methodology of Sergei Vinogradskii (1856-1953) and Robert Koch (1843-1910), as two main founders each of a different microbiology field. Koch focused on medicine, developing pure mass cultures and the Koch postulates. Vinogradskii focused on soil microbiology and ecosystem ecology, developing the elective culture technique, and is known for the Winogradsky Column. I use contextual empiricism to discuss their methodological differences in classification and cultivation and reflect on their position regarding microbial individuality and interactions. For instance, Vinogradskii’s research focused on metabolic interactions and microbial life cycles, considering individual microbes as part of their environment and never in isolation. This view emphasizes the individual, the interactions, and the environment as equally focal in causal explanations.
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946297.287554
Imagine that Fred has all ten toes at 10 am, and there are infinitely many grim reapers. When a grim reaper wakes up, it looks at Fred, and if he has all his ten toes, it cuts one off and destroys it; otherwise, it does nothing. …
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946298.287565
The main objection to the Grim Reaper paradox as an argument against infinite causal sequences is the Unsatisfiable Pair (UP) objection that notes that paradox sets up an impossible situation—and that’s why it’s impossible! …
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949440.287575
A friend and I were discussing whether there’s anything I could possibly say, on this blog, in 2025, that wouldn’t provoke an outraged reaction from my commenters. So I started jotting down ideas. Let’s see how I did. …
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949441.287584
Trump’s tariff mayhem has crashed stock markets across the globe. His loyalists are searching for silver linings in these dark clouds, without success. But if you value insight for its own sake, there is indeed a silver lining to be found. …
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963974.287593
The View from Everywhere is now available for those with an Oxford Scholarship Online subscription; hardcopies ship next month (but you can preorder now). I’ll probably write more about it as the print publication date approaches. …
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1020914.287603
My earlier volume, The Material Theory of Induction, asserts that inductive inferences are warranted materially by facts and not by conformity with universally applicable schemas. A few examples illustrate the assertion. Marie Curie inferred that all samples of radium chloride will be crystallographically like the one sample she had prepared. The inference was warranted, not by the rule of enumerative induction, but by factual discoveries in the 19th century on the properties of crystalline substances. Galileo inferred to the heights of mountains on the moon through an analogy with mountain shadows formed on the earth. The inference was not warranted by a similarity in the reasoning in the two cases conforming with some general rule, but by the warranting fact that the same processes of linear light propagation formed the patterns of light and dark in both cases. Probabilistic inductive inferences are not warranted by the tendentious supposition that all uncertainties can be represented probabilistically. They are warranted on a case-by-case basis by facts specific to the case at hand. That we can infer probabilistically from samples to the population as a whole depends on the fact that the samples were taken randomly, that is, with each individual having an equal probability of selection. If no such warranting facts prevail, we are at serious risk of spurious inferences whose results are an artifact of misapplied logic.
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1062630.287613
Social institutions—such as the government of Canada, the National Football League in the United States, the Japanese monetary system, and the Catholic Church—often seem as real to us as mountains, oceans, and forests. And yet, social institutions seem to be real in an importantly different, more human-dependent way. This distinctive feature of institutional reality motivates the key question behind the metaphysics of social institutions: what, precisely, makes it the case that social institutions exist? Or in other words: what are the metaphysical determinants of institutional reality? Here we are asking not the empirical question of what historical events caused particular institutions to exist, but rather the metaphysical question of the kinds of states of affairs in virtue of which institutions exist.
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1063253.287623
An adequate theory of representation should distinguish between the structure of a representation and the structure of what it represents. I argue that the simplest sorts of transformers (the architecture that underlies most familiar Large Language Models) have only a very lightweight structure for their representations: insofar as they work with the structure of language, they represent it but do not use it. In addition to being interesting in its own right, this also shows how we may use high-level invariants at the computational level to place constraints on representational formats at the algorithmic level.
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1073777.287632
European painting had pursued “naturalistic illusionism” since the Renaissance. Japanese art had different ideals. Rather than using perspective, light, and shadow, to create the appearance of depth, Japanese prints and paintings tended toward “flatness.”
Japanese art also favored
The partial view, the view as from a very great height, the suspension of figures in space without a background,
all of which flouted the conventional European rules of composition. …