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693156.544526
I’ve always found punishment and (to a lesser extent) reward puzzling. Why is it that when someone does something wrong is there moral reason to impose a harsh treatment on them, and why is it that when someone does something right—and especially supererogatory—is there moral reason to do something nice for them? …
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749137.544638
A principle of plenitude implies the existence of a host of objects, the point being to avoid arbitrariness and worldly vagueness. But to play this role, the host of objects must exhibit an appropriate host of features.
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751852.544647
In this paper, we address a key question that has been central to discussions on rationality: is the concept of rationality normative or merely descriptive? We present the findings of a corpus-linguistic study revealing that people commonly perceive the concept of rationality as normative.
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751874.544661
As just mentioned, the Knowledge Account is a very influential view of ignorance. Recently, however, it has come under attack. Pritchard (2021a, 2021b) has offered several counterexamples that suggest ignorance has a normative dimension, which the Knowledge Account cannot easily capture (see also Meylan , 2024). Let us point out that we present these counterexamples because one of our objectives in this article is to consolidate the (possibly refutable) intuitions underlying them, using empirical data. So, here are Pritchard’s three counterexamples: First, in Pritchard’s view, it is quite unfitting to attribute ignorance of a fact to individuals when this fact cannot possibly be known. For instance, it does not sound fully appropriate to claim that “prehistorians are ignorant of whether Homo sapiens sapiens were tying their hair up.” We would rather say that they simply do not know this, or that they simply have no belief about this.
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751902.544669
Conceptual engineering is the practice of revising concepts to improve how people talk and think. Its ability to improve talk and thought ultimately hinges on the successful dissemination of desired conceptual changes. Unfortunately, the field has been slow to develop methods to directly test what barriers stand in the way of propagation and what methods will most effectively propagate desired conceptual change. In order to test such questions, this paper introduces the masked time-lagged method. The masked time-lagged method tests people’s concepts at a later time than the intervention without participant’s knowledge, allowing us to measure conceptual revision in action. Using a masked time-lagged design on a content internalist framework, we attempted to revise planet and dinosaur in online participants to match experts’ concepts. We successfully revised planet but not dinosaur, demonstrating some of the difficulties conceptual engineers face. Nonetheless, this paper provides conceptual engineers, regardless of framework, with the tools to tackle questions related to implementation empirically and head-on.
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770703.544674
The paper studies class theory over the logic HYPE recently introduced by Hannes Leitgeb. We formulate suitable abstraction principles and show their consistency by displaying a class of fixed-point (term) models. By adapting a classical result by Brady, we show their inconsistency with standard extensionality principles, as well as the incompatibility of our semantics with weak extensionality principles introduced in the literature. We then formulate our version of weak extensionality (appropriate to the behaviour of the conditional in HYPE) and show its consistency with one of the abstraction principles previously introduced. We conclude with observations and examples supporting the claim that, although arithmetical axioms over HYPE are as strong as classical arithmetical axioms, the behaviour of classes over HYPE is akin to the one displayed by classes in other nonclassical class theories.
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770724.544679
The paper studies classical, type-free theories of truth and determinateness. Recently, Volker Halbach and Kentaro Fujimoto proposed a novel approach to classical determinate truth, in which determinateness is axiomatized by a primitive predicate. In the paper we propose a different strategy to develop theories of classical determinate truth in Halbach and Fujimoto’s sense featuring a defined determinateness predicate. This puts our theories of classical determinate truth in continuity with a standard approach to determinateness by authors such as Feferman and Reinhardt. The theories entail all principles of Fujimoto and Halbach’s theories, and are proof-theoretically equivalent to Halbach and Fujimoto’s CD . They will be shown to be logically equivalent to a class of natural theories of truth, the classical closures of Kripke-Feferman truth. The analysis of the proposed theories will also provide new insights on Fujimoto and Halbach’s theories: we show that the latter cannot prove most of the axioms of the classical closures of Kripke-Feferman truth. This entails that, unlike what happens in our theories of truth and determinateness, Fujimoto and Halbach’s inner theories – the sentences living under two layers of truth – cannot be closed under standard logical rules of inference.
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770746.544684
Supervaluational fixed-point semantics for truth cannot be axiomatized because of its recursion-theoretic complexity. Johannes Stern (Supervaluation-Style Truth Without Supervaluations, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2018) proposed a new strategy (supervaluational-style truth) to capture the essential aspects of the supervaluational evaluation schema whilst limiting its recursion-theoretic complexity, hence resulting in ( -categorical) axiomatizations. Unfortunately, as we show in the paper, this strategy was not fully realized in Stern’s original work: in fact, we provide counterexamples to some of Stern’s key claims. However, we also vindicate Stern’s project by providing different semantic incarnations of the idea and corresponding -categorical axiomatizations. The results provide a deeper picture of the relationships between standard supervaluationism and supervaluational-style truth.
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772571.544689
Teleparallel Gravity (TPG) is an alternative, but empirically equivalent, spacetime theory to General Relativity. Rather than as a manifestation of spacetime curvature, TPG conceptualises gravitational degrees of freedom as a manifestation of spacetime torsion. In its modern formulation (as presented e.g. in the book-length study by Aldrovandi and Pereira (2013)), TPG also and expressly purports to be both a gauge theory of translations (G), as well as locally Lorentz-invariant (L). However, the reasoning which these authors invoke in order to implement (L) and (G) is often involved; indeed its mathematical coherence seems on occasion to be questionable. As such, clarification of the reasoning upon which TPG proponents rely in constructing the theory is sorely needed. The present paper will address this need. More broadly, we aim at achieving three interrelated tasks: (i) to shed light on TPG’s aspirations of maintaining (G) and (L) at the same time, (ii) to illuminate TPG’s conceptual and interpretative structure, and (iii) to offer a succinct methodological assessment of TPG as a theory per se.
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772619.544695
Ontological universalism is widespread, but this paper argues that the validity of many ontological claims is bounded, and thus that segmented (though not fragmented) ontologies may represent the world more accurately. To be more specific, it criticizes the work of Karen Barad, and of James Ladyman and Don Ross. Both draw ontological conclusions from interpretations of quantum mechanics and then attempt to universalize the reach of those conclusions. By contrast, the paper adapts a loosely Bhaskarian critical realism to develop a segmented ontology. This identifies two boundaries between three related but also substantially different ontological segments. At the boundary between the quantum and material segments, quantum particles can become entangled with larger systems in ways that provide determinate relative locations for material objects. This enables the emergence of causal powers that depend on determinate spatial relations between the parts of material objects. At the boundary between the material and social segments, mental properties provide the possibility of human agents forming intentional relations and thus enable the emergence of social causal powers. Regardless of the merits of this particular ontological scheme, I argue that segmented ontologies are likely to fit better with the causal structure of our universe.
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772641.544701
Bohmian Mechanics (BM) posits a deterministic quantum framework where particle trajectories are guided by a wave function within a preferred Lorentz frame, a dependence starkly revealed by a novel EPR-Bohm experiment with reversible measurements. Unlike Bell tests, where BM’s predictions align with standard quantum mechanics regardless of frame, this experiment demonstrates that the Born rule’s application in the preferred frame determines whether Alice’s intermediate measurement statistics are random or deterministic. This reliance on a preferred frame—a measure-zero set in the continuum of Lorentz frames—exposes BM’s fundamental deficiency, as it is experimentally undetectable, lacks physical justification, and violates special relativity’s frame equivalence. Collapse theories, such as GRW and CSL, face analogous issues, requiring a preferred frame for non-local collapse events. This analysis highlights the inherent tension between single-world quantum theories and relativistic constraints, raising significant doubts about their viability as alternative quantum theories. The findings underscore the need for quantum interpretations that reconcile realism with relativity, suggesting that the Many-Worlds Interpretation, which provides a Lorentz-invariant framework without requiring a preferred frame, may offer a more robust and consistent foundation for quantum mechanics.
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830335.544706
The concept of infinity has long occupied a central place at the intersection of mathematics and philosophy. This paper explores the multifaceted concept of infinity, beginning with its mathematical foundations, distinguishing between potential and actual infinity and outlining the revolutionary insights of Cantorian set theory. The paper then explores paradoxes such as Hilbert’s Hotel, the St. Petersburg Paradox, and Thomson’s Lamp, each of which reveals tensions between mathematical formalism and basic human intuition. Adopting a philosophical approach, the paper analyzes how five major frameworks—Platonism, formalism, constructivism, structuralism, and intuitionism—each grapple with the metaphysical and epistemological implications of infinity. While each framework provides unique insights, none fully resolves the many paradoxes inherent in infinite mathematical objects. Ultimately, this paper argues that infinity serves not as a problem to be conclusively solved, but as a generative lens through which to ask deeper questions about the nature of mathematics, knowledge, and reality itself.
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830358.544713
The Recursive Ontological Calculus (ROC) furnishes a complete, machine-verifiable axiomatisation of symbolic identity, curvature, and semantic recursion. Building directly on C. S. Peirce’s triadic conception of the sign, ROC links category-theoretic morphology with information-geometric entropy bounds. We present formal schemas, a sequent calculus equipped with an infinitary Master Recursion Equation, eleven core theorems (T1–T11), and cross-framework embeddings into ordinary category theory, ZFC, and Homotopy Type Theory. Worked examples demonstrate numeric curvature computation, gauge-orbit quantisation, and prime-gate symbolic statistics.
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836705.544719
I was delighted that Good Thoughts passed 5,000 (mostly free) subscribers a few months ago: that’s at least 4,800 more people interested in moral philosophy than I was expecting! (And it continues to grow at ~100 new subscribers each month, with no sign of a cap as yet.) …
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865994.544724
Have the points in Stephen Senn’s guest post fully come across? Responding to comments from diverse directions has given Senn a lot of work, for which I’m very grateful. But I say we should not leave off the topic just yet. …
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926042.544731
Most recent theorists take social norms to arise from certain attitudes, such as expectations on others, perhaps along with conforming practices. Challenging this view, we argue that social norms are instead grounded in a social norming process: an (often non-verbal) social communication process that institutes or ‘makes’ the norm. We present different versions of a process-based account of social norms and social normativity. The process-based view brings social norms closer to legal norms, by taking social norms to arise through ‘expressive acts’, just as some laws and contracts arise through acts of voting or signing, not through mere attitudes. Social norms should be distinguished from social pressures, which often co-exist with social norms but are caused by attitudes.
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933395.544738
I’m so frustrated by low-decoupling academics who refuse to acknowledge basic evaluative facts (like that, all else equal, it’s better to have smarter, healthier children) because they’re terrified of what they—mistakenly!—imagine to be the implications. …
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949515.544743
I suggest a unified account of conditional oughts and of contrastive reasons. The core of the account is an explanation of facts about conditional oughts in terms of facts about contrastive reasons, and a reduction of contrastive reasons to non-contrastive reasons. In rejecting contrastivism about reasons, the account is consistent with orthodoxy about reasons. Moreover, it extends a standard view of how oughts and reasons are related to one another, and it makes sense of important and explanatorily recalcitrant phenomena. To the extent to which the account involves an explanation of facts about conditional oughts, it does not directly compete with semantic analyses of statements about conditional oughts. However, as I indicate in passing, the account coheres well with an important type of such analyses, while it is inconsistent with others.
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1003269.544748
This paper’s first aim is to prove a modernized Occam’s razor beyond a reasonable doubt. To summarize the main argument in one sentence: If we consider all possible, intelligible, scientific models of ever-higher complexity, democratically, the predictions most favored by these complex models will agree with the predictions of the simplest models. This fact can be proven mathematically, thereby validating Occam’s razor.
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1003294.544755
Even when one continued to speak of the fundamental concepts of theoretical physics as symbols, in order to avoid from the first any danger of ontological interpretation, there was a necessity of attributing to these very symbols themselves a theoretical meaning and therewith an “objective” content. Far from being merely arbitrary additions to what was given by direct observations they became essential factors with which alone an organization of the given, the fusion of the isolated details into the system of experience, was possible. The first great physicist actually to complete this turn of affairs and at the same time to grasp the full measure of its philosophical implications, was Heinrich Hertz, with whom began a new phase in the theory of physical methods.
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1003315.544761
Recently Chiao and his collaborators proposed a novel scalar electric Aharonov-Bohm (AB) effect [Phys. Rev. A 107, 042209 (2023)]. They claimed that a quantum system inside a Faraday cage with a time varying but spatially uniform scalar potential acquires an AB phase, resulting in observable energy level shifts. This comment argues that their analysis is flawed: a spatially uniform scalar potential inside the cage, despite external variations, can be gauged away without altering gauge-invariant observables, such as energy differences, thus invalidating their claim. A possible explanation of this seemingly puzzling result is also given.
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1003340.544766
There is large consensus across clinical research that feelings of worthlessness (FOW) are one of the highest risk factors for a patient’s depression becoming suicidal. In this paper, I attempt to make sense of this empirical relationship from a phenomenological perspective. I propose that there are purely reactive and pervasive forms of FOW. Subsequently, I present a phenomenological demonstration for how and why it is pervasive FOW that pose a direct suicidal threat. I then outline criteria, contingent upon empirical verification, by which clinicians can more confidently identify when a patient’s FOW place them at high risk of suicide.
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1003362.544771
Heinrich Hertz dedicated the last four years of his life to a systematic reformulation of mechanics. One of the main issues that troubled Hertz in the traditional formulation was a ‘logical obscurity’ in the notion of force. However, it is unclear what this logical obscurity was, hence it is unclear how Hertz took himself to have avoided this obscurity in his own formulation of mechanics. In this paper, I argue that a subtle ambiguity in Newton’s original laws of motion led to the development of two slightly different notions of force: Newtonian and Lagrangian. I then show how Hertz employed the mathematical apparatus of differential geometry to arrive at a unitary notion of force, thus avoiding the logical obscurity that lurked in the customary representation of mechanics.
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1003387.544777
It is widely accepted that Hertz’s Principles of Mechanics was one of Wittgenstein’s earliest and longest-lasting influences. Wittgenstein cited Principles in the Tractatus and also considered using a quotation from Hertz’s introduction as the motto for the Philosophical Investigations. 1
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1038832.544788
Too often, people are tempted to assume that upsetting outcomes must be bad (worse than nothing). But an objectively neutral outcome may still be extremely distressing, when one had reasonably hoped for better. …
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1118672.544793
Several anecdotal claims about the relationship between philosophical discourse and the subject of autism have been forwarded in recent years. This paper seeks to verify or debunk these descriptive claims by carefully examining the philosophical literature on autism. We conduct a comprehensive scoping review to answer the question, what do philosophers talk about when they talk about autism? This empirical work confirms that the philosophy of autism is underdeveloped as a subfield of philosophy. Moreover, the way that philosophers engage with autism is often unreflective and uncritical.
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1118696.544799
Hyperscanning has been increasingly used to quantify the quality of social relationships by tracking the neural correlates of interpersonal interactions. This paper critically examines the use of hyperscanning to track the neural correlates of psychotherapeutic change, e.g., the patient-therapist relationship. First, we motivate our project by diagnosing a lack of complex models in this domain and, looking for the causes of this issue, we highlight the epistemic blindspots of current methodologies that prioritize neural synchrony as a marker of therapeutic success. Drawing on empirical studies and theoretical frameworks, we identify an asymmetry between the neural and behavioral conceptual toolkits, with the latter remaining underdeveloped. We argue that this imbalance stems from two key issues: the underdetermined qualitative interpretation of brain data and the neglect of strong reciprocity in neuroscientific second-person paradigms. In light of our critical analysis, we suggest that further research should address the complexity of reciprocal, dynamic interactions in therapeutic contexts. Specifically, drawing on enactivism, we highlight that the autonomy of interactions is one of the factors that undermines the synchrony paradigm. This approach emphasizes the co-construction of meaning and shared experiences through embodied, reciprocal interactions, offering a more integrative understanding of therapeutic change that accounts for neural correlates of the emergent and dynamic nature of social cognition.
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1118730.544804
Scientific understanding typically involves multiple specialists performing interdependent tasks. According to several social-epistemological accounts, this suggests that scientific communities are collective epistemic subjects. We argue instead that the data does not warrant the postulation of a collective subject. Our position, rather, is fictionalist: we argue that the use of sentences attributing understanding to scientific communities amounts to loose talk which is best construed as indicating how social environments associated with a scientific community promote individual scientists' understanding.
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1118758.54481
Radical ontic structural realism (ROSR) argues that structure is all that there is and that objects are metaphysically eliminable. By making such claims, ROSR is widely considered metaphysically obscure. To address this, I propose a novel characterisation of ROSR, drawing on two metaphysical concepts: existence monism, attributed to Spinoza by Bennett (1984) and Spinoza’s concept of modes. These concepts are adaptable to ROSR, which becomes a structuralist existence monism, where putative objects are reconceptualised as modes of the world’s structure. This proposal directly contributes to solving two problems ROSR faces: (A) the need for a metaphysical framework clarifying ROSR’s key claims and (B) ROSR’s need to account for the apparent plurality of objects we experience. Drawing on Wallace and Timpson’s (2010) spacetime state realism, I suggest a solution to a third problem, (problem C), McKenzie’s (2024) challenge to ROSR's status as a substantive metaphysical doctrine. My reformulation of ROSR is a natural interpretation of this solution. I also compare my proposal to French’s (2014) ROSR, and Esfeld and Lam's (2011) moderate structural realism, highlighting my proposal's advantages.
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1118781.544816
In his comprehensive survey of the contemporary debate over scientific progress in philosophy of science, Rowbottom observes that philosophers of science have mostly relied on interpretations of historical cases from the history of science and intuitions elicited by hypothetical cases as evidence for or against philosophical accounts of scientific progress. Only a few have tried to introduce empirical evidence into this debate, whereas most others have resisted the introduction of empirical evidence by claiming that doing so would reduce the debate to empirical studies of science. In this paper, I set out to show how empirical evidence can be introduced into the scientific progress debate. I conduct a corpus-based, quantitative study whose results suggest that there is a positive linear relationship between knowledge that talk and knowledge how talk in scientific articles. These results are contrary to Niiniluoto’s view according to which there is a clear distinction between scientific progress and technological progress such that knowledge that belongs to the former, whereas knowledge how belongs to the latter.