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628960.682178
There has long been an impression that reliabilism implies externalism and that frequentist statistics, due to its reliabilist nature, is inherently externalist. I argue, however, that frequentist statistics can plausibly be understood as a form of internalist reliabilism—internalist in the conventional sense, yet reliabilist in certain unconventional and intriguing ways. Crucially, in developing the thesis that reliabilism does not imply externalism, my aim is not to stretch the meaning of ‘reliabilism’ merely to sever the implication. Instead, it is to gain a deeper understanding of frequentist statistics, which stands as one of the most sustained attempts by scientists to develop an epistemology for their own use.
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628973.682254
I once received a simple test for whether I am a frequentist or Bayesian. A coin has just been tossed, but the outcome is hidden. What is the probability that it landed heads just now? According to the test, you are a Bayesian if your answer is ‘50%, because I am 50% sure that it landed heads, and equally sure that it didn’t.’ And you are a frequentist if your answer is ‘the probability is unknown but equals either 1 or 0, depending on whether the coin actually landed heads or tails, because probabilities are frequencies of events.’ Unfortunately, this test is too simplistic to reveal the complexity underlying the seemingly binary question: ‘To be a frequentist or Bayesian?’ There is actually a spectrum of potential answers, extending from radical frequentism to radical Bayesianism, with nuanced positions in between. Let me build up the spectrum one step at a time.
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629117.682268
The debate between scientific realism and anti-realism remains at a stalemate, making reconciliation seem hopeless. Yet, important work remains: exploring a common ground, even if only to uncover deeper points of disagreement and, ideally, to benefit both sides of the debate. I propose such a common ground. Specifically, many anti-realists, such as instrumentalists, have yet to seriously engage with Sober’s call to justify their preferred version of Ockham’s razor through a positive account. Meanwhile, realists face a similar challenge: providing a non-circular explanation of how their version of Ockham’s razor connects to truth. The common ground I propose addresses these challenges for both sides; the key is to leverage the idea that everyone values some truths and to draw on insights from scientific fields that study scientific inference—namely, statistics and machine learning. This common ground also isolates a distinctively epistemic root of the irreconcilability in the realism debate. Keywords: Scientific Realism, Instrumentalism, Ockham’s Razor, Statistics, Machine Learning, Convergence to the Truth.
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629131.682281
The epistemology of scientific inference has a rich history. According to the explanationist tradition, theory choice should be guided by a theory’s overall balance of explanatory virtues, such as simplicity, fit with data, and/or unification (Russell 1912). The instrumentalist tradition urges, instead, that scientific inference should be driven by the goal of obtaining useful models, rather than true theories or even approximately true ones (Duhem 1906). A third tradition is Bayesianism, which features a shift of focus from all-or-nothing beliefs to degrees of belief (Bayes 1763). It may be fair to say that these traditions are the big three in contemporary epistemology of scientific inference.
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629866.682292
Integrated Information Theory (IIT) intends to provide a principled theoretical approach able to characterize consciousness both quantitatively and qualitatively. By starting off identifying the fundamental properties of experience itself, IIT develops a formal framework that relates those properties to the physical substratum of consciousness. One of the central features of ITT is the role that information plays in the theory. On the one hand, one of the self-evident truths about consciousness is that it is informative. On the other hand, mechanisms and systems of mechanics can contribute to consciousness only if they specify systems’ intrinsic information. In this paper, we will conceptually analyze the notion of information underlying ITT. Following previous work on the matter, we will particularly argue that information within ITT should be understood in the light of a causal-manipulabilist view of information (López and Lombardi 2018), conforming to which information is an entity that must be involved in causal links in order to be precisely defined. Those causal links are brought to light by means of interventionist procedures following Woodward’s and Pearl’s version of the manipulability theories of causation.
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629940.682304
The Bayesian brain theory considers the brain as a generative model of its environment (Friston, 2010; Knill & Pouget, 2004). The model infers hidden (inaccessible directly to the brain) states of the environment as likely causes of the sensory input and thus represents the causal structure of the world around it. The input comes to the brain from both the body through interoception and from the external world through exteroception. The generative model makes inferences – that also can be viewed as predictions - about the incoming sensations based on previously learned beliefs or priors. These predictions are then compared to the actual sensory input, and the difference between the two generates a prediction error (PE). The model learns by refining itself through minimization of PE, thus increasing its accuracy. This process is thought of as belief updating according to Bayes theorem, where a prior belief, encoded as a probability distribution, is adjusted into a posterior one based on the likelihood probability distribution:
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629961.68232
The most common theoretical approaches to defining mental disorder are naturalism, normativism, and hybridism. Naturalism and normativism are often portrayed as diametrically opposed, with naturalism grounded in objective science and normativism grounded in social convention and values. Hybridism is seen as a way of combining the two. However, all three approaches share a common feature in that they conceive of mental disorders as deviations from norms. Naturalism concerns biological norms; normativism concerns social norms; and hybridism, both biological and social norms. This raises the following two questions: (a) Are biological and social norms the only sorts of norms that are relevant to considerations of mental disorder? (b) Should addressing norm deviations continue to be a major focus of mental healthcare? This paper introduces several norms that are relevant to mental disorder beyond the biological and social. I argue that mental disorders often deviate from individual, well-being, and regulatory norms. I also consider approaches which question mental healthcare’s focus on addressing norm deviations in the first place, including the neurodiversity paradigm, social model of disability, and Mad discourse. Utilizing these critical approaches, I contend that whether mental health intervention is justified depends, in part, on the type of norm deviation being intervened upon.
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630012.682334
I would like to begin this review by stating that this is an absolutely wonderful book that is full of gems about the elements and the periodic table. In my own 2007 book on the periodic table I concluded that we should perhaps think of the variety of tables that have appeared as spanning a spectrum running from the most abstract and ‘perfect’ tables such as Janet’s left-step table representation, to the unruly tables that emphasize the uniqueness of elements. To illustrate the latter category, I featured an image of Rayner-Canham’s table that is also the table shown on the front cover of his new book now under review. Rayner Canham’s book is all about the individuality of elements and how so many of the commonly held trends in the periodic table are far more complicated than we normally acknowledge.
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630032.682346
In this paper, we introduce a concept of non-dependence of variables in formulas. A formula in first-order logic is non-dependent of a variable if the truth value of this formula does not depend on the value of that variable. This variable non-dependence can be subject to constraints on the value of some variables which appear in the formula, these constraints are expressed by another first-order formula. After investigating its basic properties, we apply this concept to simplify convoluted formulas by bringing out and discarding redundant nested quantifiers. Such convoluted formulas typically appear when one uses a translation function interpreting a theory into another.
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645674.682357
In my last two posts (https://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2025/01/comparing-experiments.html and https://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2025/01/comparing-binary-experiments-for-binary.html), I introduced the notion of an experiment being epistemically at least as good as another for a set of questions. …
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659567.682368
What is pragmatism? I don’t know of a succinct definition. The term encompasses a cluster of ideas associated with the American philosophical tradition running from Charles Peirce and William James through figures such as John Dewey, Nelson Goodman, and Richard Rorty. But a central theme is a shift away from truth and onto us; onto our practices, interests, and needs. This yields distinctive views on a range of topics including the nature of inquiry, truth, justification, and meaning. Thus, while scientific inquiry is often said to aim at truth, pragmatists see it more as an attempt to make our lives better. Insofar as they talk of truth, pragmatists typically deny that it consists in “correspondence” with reality; instead, some understand it in terms of our epistemic practices, e.g. as that on which rational inquiry converges in the long run.
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659605.682381
Let me get the praise out of the way at the start. This is a fabulous book. It develops a sweeping meta-ethical vision and does so with impressive attention to detail. It is packed full of novel ideas about representation, truth, reasoning, and other topics, all of which fit together to support the big picture. The scope of the book is really quite dazzling—it doesn’t miss the forest for the trees, nor the trees for the forest.
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677127.682425
The supervenience of the normative on the non-normative—that any two metaphysically possible worlds that are identical in their non-normative respects are identical in their normative respects—is widely regarded as an intuitive claim. But it’s especially difficult for non-naturalists to explain. This is because supervenience implies that there are metaphysically necessary connections between normative and non-normative properties and explaining these connections seems to require positing some relatively intimate metaphysical relationship between those properties. But that seems in tension with the non-naturalist’s core claim that normative properties are entirely different in kind (sui generis) and not reducible to non-normative properties. This explanatory challenge is often taken to be a reason to prefer naturalism over non-naturalism. Because naturalists hold that there is some intimate metaphysical relationship between normative and non-normative properties—e.g., that the former are identical to, definable in terms of, or fully grounded in the latter—their view seems better suited to explain supervenience.
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718851.682453
In my previous post I introduced the notion of an experiment being better than another experiment for a set of questions, and gave a definition in terms of strictly proper (or strictly open-minded, which yields the same definition) scoring rules. …
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741285.682464
Our second stop in 2025 on the leisurely tour of SIST is Excursion 4 Tour II which you can read here. This criticism of statistical significance tests continues to be controversial, but it shouldn’t be. …
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741286.682478
When you’re investigating reality as a scientist (and often as an ordinary person) you perform experiments. Epistemologists and philosophers of science have spent a lot of time thinking about how to evaluate what you should do with the results of the experiments—how they should affect your beliefs or credences—but relatively little on the important question of which experiments you should perform epistemologically speaking. …
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745366.68249
A speculative exploration of the distinction between a relational formal ontology and a classical formal ontology for modelling phenomena in nature that exhibit relationally-mediated wholism, such as phenomena from quantum physics and biosemiotics. Whereas a classical formal ontology is based on mathematical objects and classes, a relational formal ontology is based on mathematical signs and categories. A relational formal ontology involves nodal networks (systems of constrained iterative processes) that are dynamically sustained through signalling. The nodal networks are hierarchically ordered and exhibit characteristics of deep learning. Clarifying the distinction between classical and relational formal ontologies may help to clarify the role of interpretative context in physics (eg. the role of the observer in quantum theory).
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745393.682502
The anthropic principle suggests that the universe’s fundamental constants are precisely fine-tuned to allow for life. However, by incorporating a dynamic physical perspective of nature, such as the multiscale thermodynamic principle known as Principium Luxuriæ, it is found that fundamental constants and forces of the universe may evolve over time in a non-Euclidean universe. If the universe has this geometry, it would have profound implications, which are discussed in this paper. For example, that the conditions conducive to life are not static and finely tuned but rather transient, undermining the need for a fine-tuned universe. Given that multiscale thermodynamics requires external forces, it’s plausible that the universe’s expansion could be linked to the existence of other phenomena such as other universes acting as external forces, each with their own evolving laws of physics. This suggests that life might be a transient and coincidental occurrence across multiple universes, if they exist. Additionally, the ever-evolving physical laws limit our ability to fully comprehend the universe at any given time. As we inevitably overlook certain aspects of reality, physical systems cannot be fully explained by the sum of their parts. Consequently, emergent phenomena like consciousness could not be studied from a self-referential perspective, as there will always be elements beyond our understanding.
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745436.682514
The paper studies in detail a precise formal construction of spacetime from matter suggested by the logician John Burgess. We presuppose a continuous and perdurantistic matter ontology. The result is a systematic method to translate claims about the geometry of a flat relativistic, or classical, spacetime into claims about geometrical relations between matter points. The approach is extended to electric and magnetic fields by treating them as multifields defined on matter, rather than as fields in the vacuum. A few tentative suggestions are made to adapt the method to general relativity and to quantum theories.
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745512.682526
Prior research has unveiled a pathologization effect where individuals perceived as having bad moral character are more likely to have their conditions labeled as diseases and are less often considered healthy compared to those viewed as having a good moral character. Moreover, these individuals are perceived as less unlucky in their affliction and more deserving of it. This study explores the broader impacts of moral character on such judgments, hypothesizing that these effects reach deeper and extend to both negative and positive moral evaluations. The pathologization effect also raises concerns about potential discrimination and the overmedicalization of normal health variations, so we also examine whether providing more detailed descriptions of conditions mitigates the influence of judgments of moral character. The methodology and broader implications of our findings are discussed, emphasizing the need for a deeper understanding of how moral judgments might influence patient care.
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793481.682537
Questions about our knowledge of other minds have occupied far less philosophical attention than have questions about our knowledge of the material world. The major reason for this is the underlying assumption that the resources we should appeal to in explaining such knowledge are the same as those we appeal to in explaining our knowledge of the material world, namely observation and inference. Given this, accounting for our knowledge of other minds is not of much additional interest, epistemologically speaking. There can be debates about the kinds of inference required, and, indeed about whether perception on its own suffices for knowledge, but there is nothing fundamentally different here from debates and claims about our knowledge of the material world. Hence, it warrants only a page or two, or, at most, a chapter, in general treatises about our knowledge of the ‘external’ world. Call this the Nothing Special Claim.
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796728.682548
[Cognitive science’s] open character has allowed it to evolve as its constituent fields change, allowing the mix of disciplines to seed new ideas. Far from being a fault, this pluralism should be celebrated and preserved. (Gentner, 2019, p. 890)
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818017.682559
As always, please ‘like’ this post via the heart below and restack it on notes if you get something out of it. It’s the best way to help others find my work. Of course, the very best way to support my work is with a paid subscription. …
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838315.68257
This article argues that the “qua problem” for purely causal theories of reference grounding is an illusion. Reference can be grounded via description and fit, but purely causal reference grounding is possible too. In fact, “arguments from ignorance and error” suggest that many of our terms have had their reference grounded purely causally. If the qua problem is illusory, then there is no need to adopt a “hybrid” theory of reference grounding of the kind recently recommended by Amie Thomasson (Ontology made easy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) and Ron Mallon (The construction of human kinds, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016). This opens the door to a “discovery model” of philosophical knowledge, a model we could then choose to accept.
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842270.682583
Competency questions (CQs) are broadly used within a variety of domains such as education to design curricula using Bloom’s Taxonomy, performance evaluation to assess an employee’s performance, or assessing fitness of interrogation in a trial [19,27]. Within ontology development, CQs are used throughout the processes to guide the development, such as in the NeOn methodology [23] and test-driven development [15], including scoping the ontology [25], aligning ontologies [24], validating content coverage [4,5,15], and to assist in interrogating the ontological nature of an entity when aligning a domain entity to an entity in a foundational ontology [3].
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845798.682593
There is growing concern that inhabitants of wealthy societies are falling into an increasingly lonely condition (Holt-Lunstad et al, 2017). Social scientists have offered a variety of competing explanations for what is often characterized as an epidemic of loneliness (Umberson et. al, 2010; Bianchi and Vohs 2016). By ‘loneliness’ we mean unchosen social isolation and deprivation of subjectively desired goods that would typically result from social contact and close personal relationships. Loneliness is generally regarded as one of the worst misfortunes that can befall us, and it is accompanied by a range of terrible personal and social consequences. As such it would be good if AI technologies could help alleviate our increasingly lonely condition. Given the prevalence and harmfulness of loneliness it is tempting, for Bianchi and Vohs explain that income predicts the nature of social contact. “People with higher incomes spent less time with their families and neighbors and spent more time with their friends. These findings suggest that income is associated with how and with whom people spend their time” (Bianchi and Vohs 2016). Other factors that cause loneliness such as immigration, increased engagement with technology, race, educational level and so on have all been widely discussed. Given this large body of empirical evidence and variety of competing explanations, it is safe to assume that people are lonelier than they used to be decades ago in the United States.
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845818.682606
This article reviews Matthew Liao’s edited volume Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. Liao’s volume consists of seventeen essays organized into four sections: Building Ethics into Machines, The Near Future of AI, The Long-Term Impact of Superintelligence, and Artificial Intelligence, Consciousness and Moral Status. The core arguments and issues discussed in Liao’s volume remain philosophically interesting. The book's insights into the theoretical foundations of AI ethics, the potential impact of superintelligence, and the moral status of AI, continue to be valuable contributions. What it is missing from this volume and what we have seen explored in detail in the intervening years is engagement with questions around the broader social impacts of AI. The main topics of recent work have been fairness and algorithmic bias, privacy, and the impacts on human interactions. In this review, I focus on some of the most interesting arguments from the volume and I make some suggestions about the ways that the field has changed in the years following its publication.
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860788.682618
This paper introduces a digital method for analyzing propositional logical equivalences. It transforms the theorem-proof method from the complex statement-derivation method to a simple number-comparison method. By applying the digital calculation method and the expression-number lookup table, we can quickly and directly discover and prove logical equivalences based on the identical numbers, no additional operations are needed. This approach demonstrates significant advantages over the conventional methods in terms of simplicity and efficiency.
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863009.682629
Flannery O’Connor’s stories are, by her own account, “preoccupied with the grotesque.” The reason, some argue, is that the grotesque is fascinating to the southern imagination. And indeed her grotesques have many southern precedents, most notably those of William Faulkner, whose novel The Sound and the Fury is famously narrated in part by an idiot. …
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964208.68264
Report on the Conference on Probabilistic Reasoning in the Sciences which took place at the Marche Polytechnic University in Ancona, Italy. 29-31 August 2024. Keywords Probabilistic reasoning; Science; Methodology.