1. 23134.020959
    Philosophy and Society Vol. 30, No. 4, 463–644 Mega-Labs is a Challenging Task That Requires a Combination of Case-Based and Formal Epistemic Approaches. Data-Driven Studies Suggest That Projects Pursued by Smaller Master-Teams (Fewer Members, Fewer Sub-Teams) Are Substantially More Efficient Than Larger Ones Across Sciences, Including Experimental Particle Physics. Smaller Teams Also Seem to Make Better Project Choices Than Larger, Centralized Teams. Yet the Epistemic Requirement of Small, Decentralized, and Diverse Teams Contradicts the Often Emphasized and Allegedly Inescapable Logic of Discovery That Forces Physicists Pursuing the Fundamental Levels of the Physical World to Perform Centralized Experiments in Mega-Labs at High Energies. We Explain, However, That This Epistemic Requirement Could Be Met, Since the Nature of Theoretical and Physical Constraints in High Energy Physics and the Technological Obstacles Stemming From Them Turn Out to Be Surprisingly Open-Ended.
    Found 6 hours, 25 minutes ago on Slobodan Perović's site
  2. 31864.021054
    The AdS/CFT correspondence posits a holographic equivalence between a gravitational theory in Anti-de Sitter (AdS) spacetime and a conformal field theory (CFT) on its boundary, linked by gauge-invariant quantities like field strengths Fµν and fluxes Φ. This paper examines that link, drawing on my prior analysis of the Aharonov-Bohm (AB) effect, where such quantities exhibit nonlocality, discontinuity, and incompleteness. I demonstrate that gauge potentials Aµ in the Lorenz gauge—not their invariant derivatives—mediate the AB effect’s local, continuous dynamics, a reality extending to gravitational fields gµν as substantival entities. In AdS/CFT, the CFT’s reduction of bulk Aµ and gµν to gauge-invariant imprints fails to reflect this ontology, a flaw so fundamental that it excludes exact gauge/gravity duality—neither standard mappings nor reformulations suffice. A new mathematical proof formalizes this: the bulk’s diffeomorphism freedom cannot correspond to the boundary’s gauge freedoms, Abelian or non-Abelian, under this reality. This critique spans the gauge/gravity paradigm broadly, from AdS/CFT to holographic QCD, where symmetry invisibility obscures bulk physics. While duality’s successes in black hole thermodynamics and strongly coupled systems highlight its utility, I suggest these reflect approximations within specific regimes, not a full equivalence. I propose a shift toward a framework prioritizing Aµ and gµν ’s roles, with gravitational AB effects in AdS as a testing ground. This work seeks to enrich holography’s dialogue, advancing a potential-centric view for quantum gravity.
    Found 8 hours, 51 minutes ago on PhilSci Archive
  3. 31883.021063
    In this brief article I respond to Seifert’s recent views on the periodic law and the periodic table in connection with the views of philosophers regarding laws of nature. I argue that the author makes some factual as well as conceptual errors which are in conflict with some generally held views regarding the periodic law and the periodic table.
    Found 8 hours, 51 minutes ago on PhilSci Archive
  4. 31907.021071
    The article sets out to clarify a number of confusions that exist in connection with the Born-Oppenheimer approximation (BOA). It is generally claimed that chemistry cannot be reduced to quantum mechanics because of the nature of this commonly used approximation in quantum chemistry, that is popularly believed to require a ‘clamping’ of the nuclei. It is also claimed that the notion of molecular structure, which is so central to chemistry, cannot be recovered from the quantum mechanical description of molecules and that it must be imposed by hand through the BOA. Such an alleged failure of reduction is then taken to open the door to concepts such as emergence and downward causation.
    Found 8 hours, 51 minutes ago on PhilSci Archive
  5. 31927.021081
    It has been argued that, in scientific observations, the theory of the observed source should not be involved in the observation process to avoid circular reasoning and ensure reliable inferences. However, the issue of underdetermination of the source has been largely overlooked. I argue that concerns about circularity in inferring the source stem from the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) method. The epistemic threat, if any, arises not from the theory-laden nature of observation but from the underdetermination of the source by the data, since the data could be explained by proposing incompatible sources for it. Overcoming this under-determination is key to reliably inferring the source. I propose a bidirectional version of inference to the only explanation as a methodological framework that addresses this challenge while circumventing concerns about theory-ladenness. Nevertheless, fully justifying the viability of the background theoretical framework and its accurate description of the source requires a broader conception of evidence. To this end, I argue that integrating meta-empirical assessment into inference to the only explanation offers a promising strategy, extending the concept of evidence in a justifiable manner.
    Found 8 hours, 52 minutes ago on PhilSci Archive
  6. 31944.021087
    Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly produce outputs that resemble introspection, including self-reference, epistemic modulation, and claims about internal states. This study investigates whether such behaviors display consistent patterns across repeated prompts or reflect surface-level generative artifacts. We evaluated five open-weight, stateless LLMs using a structured battery of 21 introspective prompts, each repeated ten times, yielding 1,050 completions. These outputs are analyzed across three behavioral dimensions: surface-level similarity (via token overlap), semantic coherence (via sentence embeddings), and inferential consistency (via natural language inference). Although some models demonstrate localized thematic stability—especially in identity - and consciousness-related prompts—none sustain diachronic coherence.
    Found 8 hours, 52 minutes ago on PhilSci Archive
  7. 31963.021094
    The quantum measurement problem is one of the most profound challenges in modern physics, questioning how and why the wavefunction collapses during measurement to produce a single observable outcome. In this paper, we propose a novel solution through a logical framework called Aethic reasoning, which reinterprets the ontology of time and information in quantum mechanics. Central to this approach is the Aethic principle of extrusion, which models wavefunction collapse as progression along a Markov chain of block universes, effectively decoupling the Einsteinian flow of time from quantum collapse events. This principle introduces an additional degree of freedom to time, enabling the first Aethic postulate: that informational reality is reference-dependent, akin to the relativity of simultaneity in special relativity. This reference point, or Aethus, is rigorously defined within a mathematical structure. Building on this foundation, the second postulate resolves the distinction between quantum superpositions and logical contradictions by encoding superpositions in a “backend” Aethic framework before rendering observable states. The third postulate further distinguishes quantum coherence from decoherence using a two-generational model of state inheritance, potentially advancing beyond simpler interpretations of information leakage. Together, these postulates yield a direct theoretical derivation of the collapse postulate, fully consistent with empirical results such as the outcome of the double-slit experiment. By addressing foundational aspects of quantum mechanics through a logically robust and philosophically grounded lens, this framework sheds new light on the measurement problem and offers a solid foundation for future exploration.
    Found 8 hours, 52 minutes ago on PhilSci Archive
  8. 31993.0211
    The quantum measurement problem is one of the most profound challenges in modern physics, questioning how and why the wavefunction collapses during measurement to produce a single observable outcome. In this paper, we propose a novel solution through a logical framework called Aethic reasoning, which reinterprets the ontology of time and information in quantum mechanics.
    Found 8 hours, 53 minutes ago on PhilSci Archive
  9. 32060.021106
    This article describes confirmation of the proposition that numbers are identified with operators in the following three steps. 1. The set of operators to construct finite cardinals satisfies Peano Axioms. 2. Accordingly, the natural numbers can be identified with these operators. 3. From the operators, five kinds of operators are derived, and on the basis of the step 2, the integers, the fractions, the real numbers, the complex numbers and the quaternions are identified with the five kinds of operators respectively. These operators stand in a sequential inclusion relationship, in contrast to the embedding relationship between those kinds of numbers defined as sets.
    Found 8 hours, 54 minutes ago on PhilSci Archive
  10. 32084.021112
    Inconsistencies! What do they mean? Can we support them? With this paper, we hope to contribute to the claim that we can tolerate inconsistencies in certain situations even without considering any logic that may enable us to do that, say some paraconsistent logic. We argue that in many cases where we apply reason, we work in domains where inconsistencies appear, and even so, we neither get them out (but ‘support’ them) nor modify the underlying logic (such as classical logic) to avoid logical troubles. To make things more precise, we distinguish between inconsistency, anomaly, and contradiction. Our thesis is that we can reason sensibly with classical logic even in the presence of inconsistencies once (as we explain) we either ‘do not go there’ or make things so that the inconsistent sentences cannot be joined to arrive at a contradiction. Some sample cases are given to motivate the discussion.
    Found 8 hours, 54 minutes ago on PhilSci Archive
  11. 138811.021117
    I don’t use ChatGPT much, but while looking something up on Google around 2am this morning, I got one of those pop-ups nudging me to try a paid plan of ChatGPT. I figured maybe it would let me do more with the artwork I do, so I clicked. …
    Found 1 day, 14 hours ago on D. G. Mayo's blog
  12. 142081.021123
    It is sometimes claimed that arbitrary mereological fusions and plural quantification are a metaphysical free lunch, just a new way of talking without any deep philosophical (or at least metaphysical) commitments. …
    Found 1 day, 15 hours ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  13. 147182.021129
    This paper explores the theme of human limitedness and the virtues in David McPherson’s The Virtues of Limits. I survey some of the main themes of his discussion— including kinds of human limits and the idea of “limiting-virtues”—and indicate salient themes in Buddhist and classical Chinese philosophical traditions. I then suggest that McPherson is too quick to dismiss forms of moral quietism and that his discussion of our limitedness rests on a latent pessimism worthy of further articulation.
    Found 1 day, 16 hours ago on Ian James Kidd's site
  14. 147345.021134
    The (dis)continuism debate in the philosophy of memory revolves around the question of whether memory and imagination belong to the same natural kind. Continuism, on the one hand, defends that they belong to the same natural kind. Discontinuism, on the other hand, defends that they do not belong to the same natural kind. By adopting a minimal notion of natural kind, one can recognize that there are different legitimate ways of sorting kinds, which lead to different positions in the debate. In this paper, I interpret continuism as a mechanistic thesis, according to which memory and imagination belong to the same natural kind because they are underpinned by the same constitutive mechanism. I clarify the implications of this thesis and show that most of the discontinuist attacks on continuism do not constitute a challenge to the mechanistic thesis. I also present a possible challenge to mechanistic continuism. This suggests that there may be multiple (dis)continuism debates. Keywords: Continuism. Discontinuism. Natural kinds. Mechanism. Episodic Memory. Episodic Imagination.
    Found 1 day, 16 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  15. 147370.021141
    Empiricists following Poincaré have argued that spacetime geometry can be freely chosen by convention, while adjusting unobservable structure so as to maintain empirical adequacy. In this article, I first strengthen a no-go result of Weatherall and Manchak against the conventionality of geometry, and then argue that any remaining conventionality arises from scientific incompleteness. To illustrate, I discuss a new kind of conventionality that is available in the presence of higher spatial dimensions, and illustrate how the incompleteness in such models can be resolved by introducing new physical theories like Kaluza-Klein theory. Conventional choices of this kind may provide a fruitful starting point in the search for new science, but if successful would eliminate the conventionalist alternatives.
    Found 1 day, 16 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  16. 202201.021146
    Free choice sequences play a key role in the Brouwerian continuum. Using recent modal analysis of potential infinity, we can make sense of free choice sequences as potentially infinite sequences of natural numbers without adopting Brouwer’s distinctive idealistic metaphysics. This provides classicists with a means to make sense of intuitionistic ideas from their own classical perspective. I develop a modal-potentialist theory of real numbers that suffices to capture the most distinctive features of intuitionistic analysis, such as Brouwer’s continuity theorem, the existence of a sequence that is monotone, bounded, and non-convergent, and the inability to decompose the continuum non-trivially.
    Found 2 days, 8 hours ago on Ethan Brauer's site
  17. 205002.021155
    The notion of malfunction is critical to biological explanation. It provides a test-bed for the normative character of functional attribution. Theories of biological functioning must permit traits to operate but, at the same time, be judged as malfunctioning (in some naturalized, non-arbitrary sense). Whereas malfunctioning has attracted most attention and discussion in evolutionary etiological approaches, systemic and organizational ones have been less discussed. The most influential of the organizational approaches (by Saborido, Moreno and Mossio) takes a dual-order approach to malfunctions, as a set of functions that fit first-order constitutive norms but fail to obey second-order regulatory ones. We argue that this conception is unnecessarily complicated (malfunctions do not need to arise as a result of two conflicting orders of norms) and too narrow (it excludes canonical cases of malfunctioning). We provide an alternative organizational account grounded on viability theory. The dynamics of the traits that constitute an organism define the normative field of its viability space: sugar must be replaced at certain rate, blood must be pumped at a certain pace, etc. A trait operates normatively when its effects on the viability space correlate positively with the normative field.
    Found 2 days, 8 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  18. 205020.021162
    Theories of consciousness are abundant, yet few directly address the structural conditions necessary for subjectivity itself. This paper defends and develops the QBist constraint: the proposal that any conscious system must implement a first-person, self-updating inferential architecture. Inspired by Quantum Bayesianism (QBism), this constraint specifies that subjectivity arises only in systems capable of self-referential probabilistic updating from an internal perspective. The QBist constraint is not offered as a process theory, but as a metatheoretical adequacy condition: a structural requirement which candidate theories of consciousness must satisfy if they are to explain not merely behaviour or information processing, but genuine subjectivity. I assess five influential frameworks — the Free Energy Principle (FEP), Predictive Processing (PP), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), Global Workspace Theory (GWT), and Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory — and consider how each fares when interpreted through the lens of this constraint. I argue that the QBist constraint functions as a litmus test for process theories, forcing a shift in focus: from explaining cognitive capacities to specifying how an architecture might realize first-personal belief updating as a structural feature.
    Found 2 days, 8 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  19. 232474.021167
    We draw on value theory in social psychology to conceptualize the range of motives that can influence researchers’ attitudes, decisions, and actions. To conceptualize academic research values, we integrate theoretical insights from the literature on personal, work, and scientific work values, as well as the outcome of interviews and a survey among 255 participants about values relating to academic research. Finally, we propose a total of 246 academic research value items spread over 11 dimensions and 34 sub-themes. We relate our conceptualization and proposed items to existing work and provide recommendations for future scale development. Gaining a better understanding of researchers’ different values can improve careers in science, attract a more diverse range of people to enter science, and elucidate some of the mechanisms that lead to both exemplary and questionable scientific practices.
    Found 2 days, 16 hours ago on Krist Vaesen's site
  20. 272548.021174
    Leftist Students and Faculty: We’d sooner burn universities to the ground than allow them to remain safe for the hated Zionist Jews, the baby-killing demons of the earth. We’ wi’ll disrupt their classes, bar them from student activities, smash their Hillel centers, take over campus buildings and quads, and chant for Hezbollah and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades to eradicate them like vermin. …
    Found 3 days, 3 hours ago on Scott Aaronson's blog
  21. 363109.021179
    1. You can make your child learn the cello, and refuse to serve them candy for breakfast. Parents have these, and other, rights. What is the source, and extent, of these rights? As for source, the welfare of the child is a natural answer: in general and on average, granting parents certain rights is in the best interest of children. …
    Found 4 days, 4 hours ago on Mostly Aesthetics
  22. 378002.021184
    I argue that chatbots create a peculiar new kind of responsibility gap, which I call the “speech act responsibility gap”. Unlike the responsibility gaps commonly discussed in the context of self-driving cars and autonomous weapons, speech act responsibility gaps arise from the fact that paradigmatic speech acts like assertions (statements), promises or orders always generate linguistic commitments and entitlements. Unlike more familiar kinds of responsibility gaps, speech act responsibility gaps are inherently interpersonal and directed. I first argue that currently dominant treatments of chatbot speech acts as proxy agents cannot bridge these gaps. I also discuss why current arguments against the existence of responsibility gaps don’t apply in the case of chatbots. Instead, responsibility appears to be best attributed to the chatbot itself. However, this poses a dilemma. Either these machines don’t speak (we are fundamentally mistaken about their output), or we need to engineer (broaden) our notion of responsibility.
    Found 4 days, 9 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  23. 406402.02119
    Mexican existentialism grows out of the encounter, engagement, and appropriation with French and German existentialist philosophies in Mexico mid-way through the twentieth-century. Key players in this tradition were José Gaos (1900–1969), Antonio Caso (1883–1946), and, especially, el grupo Hiperión (the Hyperion Group). Members of Hyperion, but particularly Emilio Uranga (1921–1988), Leopoldo Zea (1912–2004), Jorge Portilla (1918–1963), and Luis Villoro (1922–2014), focused their efforts on existential reinterpretations of that which is Mexican (“lo mexicano” or Mexicanness), a focus that lends this tradition its historical and conceptual uniqueness and importance.
    Found 4 days, 16 hours ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  24. 414341.021195
    "Pirate" training of generative AI is fair use and in the public interest Property is essentially coercive: property rights exclude others from use of the “owned” good. But there are obvious reasons why property is nonetheless a socially valuable institution (especially for “rival” goods, like a sandwich, that cannot be shared without loss). …
    Found 4 days, 19 hours ago on Good Thoughts
  25. 452568.021201
    Sunwin chính chủ sở hữu bộ core game cùng hệ thống chăm sóc khách hàng vô địch. Sunwin hiện nay giả mạo rất nhiều anh em chú ý check kĩ uy tín đường link để đảm bảo an toàn và trải nghiệm game đỉnh cao duy nhất. …
    Found 5 days, 5 hours ago on PEA Soup
  26. 452568.021206
    Sunwin chính chủ sở hữu bộ core game cùng hệ thống chăm sóc khách hàng vô địch. Sunwin hiện nay giả mạo rất nhiều anh em chú ý check kĩ uy tín đường link để đảm bảo an toàn và trải nghiệm game đỉnh cao duy nhất. …
    Found 5 days, 5 hours ago on PEA Soup
  27. 493360.021211
    Knowledge brokers, usually conceptualized as passive intermediaries between scientists and policymakers in evidence-based policymaking, are understudied in philosophy of science. Here, we challenge that usual conceptualization. As agents in their own right, knowledge brokers have their own goals and incentives, which complicate the effects of their presence at the science-policy interface. We illustrate this in an agent-based model and suggest several avenues for further exploration of the role of knowledge brokers in evidence-based policy.
    Found 5 days, 17 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  28. 493378.021237
    Philosophers of mind and philosophers of science have markedly different views on the relationship between explanation and understanding. Reflecting on these differences highlights two ways in which explaining consciousness might be uniquely difficult. First, scientific theories may fail to provide a psychologically satisfying sense of understanding—consciousness might still seem mysterious even after we develop a scientific theory of it. Second, our limited epistemic access to consciousness may make it difficult to adjudicate between competing theories. Of course, both challenges may apply. While the first has received extensive philosophical attention, in this paper I aim to draw greater attention to the second. In consciousness science, the two standard methods for advancing understanding—theory testing and refining measurement procedures through epistemic iteration—face serious challenges.
    Found 5 days, 17 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  29. 496100.021246
    Assume Peano Arithmetic (PA) is consistent. Then it can’t prove its own consistency. Thus, there is a model M of PA according to which PA is inconsistent, and hence, according M, there is a proof of a contradiction from a finite set of axioms of PA. …
    Found 5 days, 17 hours ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  30. 551045.021251
    One Approach to the Necessary Conditions of Free Will Logical Paradox and the Essential Unpredictability of Physical Agents Even today, there is no precise definition of free will – only mere hypotheses and intuitions. This is why this paper will approach the question of free will from a negative perspective, depicting a scenario in which free will seemingly exists. Subsequently, it will attempt to refute this scenario (as a necessary condition for free will). The absence of free will might seem absolute if scientific determinism holds true. Therefore, the goal of the study is to present a logical argument (paradox) that demonstrates the impossibility of an omniscient (P) predictor (scientific determinism), highlighting its inherent self-contradiction. This paradox reveals that the prediction (P = C) by a (P) physical agent of itself is objectively impossible. In other words, even a fully deterministic agent in a deterministic universe cannot predict its own future state, not even in a Platonic sense.
    Found 6 days, 9 hours ago on PhilSci Archive