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5354.001964
Our aim in this paper is to extend the semantics for the kind of logic of ground developed in [deRosset and Fine, 2023]. In that paper, the authors very briefly suggested a way of treating universal and existential quantification over a fixed domain of objects. Here we explore some options for extending the treatment to allow for a variable domain of objects.
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5377.002285
This paper is concerned with the semantics for the logics of ground that derive from a slight variant GG of the logic of [Fine, 2012b] that have already been developed in [deRosset and Fine, 2023]. Our aim is to outline that semantics and to provide a comparison with two related semantics for ground, given in [Correia, 2017] and [Kramer, 2018a]. This comparison highlights the strengths and difficulties of these different approaches. KEYWORDS: Impure Logic of Ground; Truthmaker Semantics; Logic of Ground; Ground This paper concerns the semantics for the logics of ground deriving from a slight variant GG of the logic of [Fine, 2012b] that have already been developed in [deRosset and Fine, 2023]. Our aim is to outline that semantics and to provide a comparison with two related semantics for ground, given in [Correia, 2017] and [Kramer, 2018a]. This will serve to highlight the strengths and difficulties of these different approaches. In particular, it will show how deRosset and Fine’s approach has a greater degree of flexibility in its ability to acccommodate different extensions of a basic minimal system of ground. We shall assume that the reader is already acquainted with some of the basic work on ground and on the framework of truthmaker semantics. Some background material may be found in [Fine, 2012b, 2017a,b].
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183820.002311
We consider two simple criteria for when a physical theory should be said to be “generally covariant”, and we argue that these criteria are not met by Yang-Mills theory, even on geometric formulations of that theory. The reason, we show, is that the bundles encountered in Yang-Mills theory are not natural bundles; instead, they are gauge-natural. We then show how these observations relate to previous arguments about the significance of solder forms in assessing disanalogies between general relativity and Yang-Mills theory. We conclude by suggesting that general covariance is really about functoriality.
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299248.002342
This work explores the hypothesis that subjectively attributed meaning constitutes the phenomenal content of conscious experience. That is, phenomenal content is semantic. This form of subjective meaning manifests as an intrinsic and non-representational character of qualia. Empirically, subjective meaning is ubiquitous in conscious experiences. We point to phenomenological studies that lend evidence to support this. Furthermore, this notion of meaning closely relates to what Frege refers to as "sense", in metaphysics and philosophy of language. It also aligns with Peirce's "interpretant", in semiotics. We discuss how Frege's sense can also be extended to the raw feels of consciousness. Sense and reference both play a role in phenomenal experience. Moreover, within the context of the mind-matter relation, we provide a formalization of subjective meaning associated to one's mental representations. Identifying the precise maps between the physical and mental domains, we argue that syntactic and semantic structures transcend language, and are realized within each of these domains. Formally, meaning is a relational attribute, realized via a map that interprets syntactic structures of a formal system within an appropriate semantic space. The image of this map within the mental domain is what is relevant for experience, and thus comprises the phenomenal content of qualia. We conclude with possible implications this may have for experience-based theories of consciousness.
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357437.002353
This essay introduces, develops, and appraises the mitonuclear compatibility species concept (MCSC), identifying advantages and limitations with respect to alternative species concepts. While the consensus amongst most philosophers of biology is that (kind) essentialism about species is mistaken, and that species at most have relational essences, we appeal to the MCSC to defend a thoroughgoing intrinsic essentialism. Namely, the doctrine that species have fully intrinsic essences and, thus, are natural kinds (of sorts), while allowing that species aren’t categorically distinct.
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357491.002364
The present paper is divided in two parts . In the first part we will propose Meinong’s theory of time outlined in 1899 interpreted in such a way that the subtlety of his argumentation is emphasised. In the second, we will discuss different solutions for the celebrated McTaggart’s paradox, reaching the conclusion that a theory of time suggested by the reflections of the Austrian Philosopher seems to be the most adequate perspective for tackling this problem . Meinong is concerned with time above all in his essays of 1894 and 1899; thereafter he deals again with the topic only in a cursory manner. Certainly the best of his reflections on the subject is the Third Section of the 1899 essay, and thus we will concern ourselves almost exclusively with this . Let us emphasise that time is not a Meinong’s topic, but briefly in the central part of his thinking, i.e. during the passage from his first psychological-descriptive works – influenced by his teacher Brentano – to the theoretical-objective period, stimulated firstly by the reading of Twardowski and Bolzano . In spite of this we have the feeling that in this short writing the Austrian philosopher outlines a theory of time which ante litteram opens a possible solution of the paradoxes connected with the flux of time, like McTaggart’s. We have to admire the remarkable subtlety of his psychological analysis, accompanied by a clear awareness of the objectivity of time; the latter helps him to avoid the psychologistic drift of Bergson’s perspective, the former to stay away from the scientistic point of view more and more in fashion in connection with modern physics .
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357538.002374
What is the meaning of atemporality in Hegel’s philosophy? What is the relationship between philosophy and physics, according to Hegel’s Naturphilosophie? And why should Hegel’s reading of Plato’s Timaeus be interesting for understanding both his idea of atemporality of time and the philosophical approach to the problem of the origins of the world? This Chapter addresses these questions by analysing some passages of Hegel’s writings, from the Dissertation on the orbits of the planets (1801) up to the Encyclopedia (1817/1827/1830). Hegel tackles the concept of atemporality (Zeitlosigkeit) when he refers to the idea or to the ideal dimension as considered in se and per se, the question about the eternity or the beginning of the world emerges as an integral part of the problem. The Chapter includes Hegel’s reconsideration of Plato’s Timaeus up to the arguments about the origins of the world and the notion of life in the second part of the Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse devoted to Naturphilosophie.
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357591.002385
This Chapter endeavors to explore the notion of atemporality within selected works belonging to the Platonic tradition. Beyond providing an overview of various facets of atemporality and highlighting their mutual relations, this chapter aims to investigate their role in a range of accounts of the world’s origins. By focusing on the cosmogonical views elaborated by Platonists who deny that the cosmos is generated in time, such as Plotinus, Porphyry, Calcidius, and Proclus, I will dwell on a specific kind of atemporality, namely ‘timeless simultaneity,’ and shed light on its theoretical advantages in explaining the demiurgic creation of the cosmos within a sempiternalist framework. Paradoxical as it may seem, within this perspective, the assertion that the Demiurge creates the cosmos at once does not conflict but, in fact, is fully compatible with the assumption that the cosmos has no temporal beginning, causally depends on a higher cause, and is always in a process of coming to be. As a result, a multi-layered taxonomy of atemporality, and especially the notion of ‘timeless simultaneity,’ enables Platonists adopting a sempiternalist stance to argue consistently that the cosmos is both ungenerated and created all at once, and to effectively explain in what sense it is so.
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467043.0024
This axiomatization parallels the structure of first order logic exactly. It can be read as a reduction of the axiom scheme of comprehension of TST(U) to finitely many axiom templates (up to type assignment) or as a reduction of the axiom scheme of stratified comprehension to finitely many axioms. Probably one should assume weak extensionality: nonempty sets with the same elements are equal.
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467289.002417
According to urban legend, people’s number one fear is public speaking. Death is number two.1
I don’t know if it’s true, but if it is, I’d bet that the most dreaded form of public speaking is to stand onstage, alone, attempting to make an audience of strangers laugh. …
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476773.002427
Fictionalists about a kind of disputed entity aim to give a face-value interpretation of our discourse about those entities without affirming their existence. The fictionalist’s commitment to non-realism leaves open three options regarding their ontological position: they may deny the existence of the disputed entities (anti-realism), remain agnostic regarding their existence (agnosticism), or deny that there are ontological facts of the matter (ontological anti-realism). This paper outlines a method of adjudicating between these options and argues that fictionalists may be expected to hold preferences between them. The typical arguments and motivations for fictionalism lead naturally to a practice-based metaontological framework under which our practices regarding a kind of disputed entity might inform our ontological beliefs about those entities. When that framework is applied to fictionalism, it is found that the usual motivations for fictionalism lead naturally, though not decisively, to ontological anti-realism. And, where there are reasons against ontological anti-realism, fictionalism leans more toward anti-realism than agnosticism.
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750921.002438
Alonzo Church proposed a theory of sequences of functions and their arguments as surrogates for Russellian singular propositions and singular concepts. Church’s proposed theory accords with his Alternative (0), the strictest of his three competing criteria for strict synonymy. The currently popular objection to strict criteria like (0) on the basis of the Russell-Myhill antinomy is rebutted. Russell-Myhill is not a problem specifically for 1 ACKOWLEDGMENTS: This essay is dedicated to the memory of the great philosopher and logician, Alonzo Church. I had the good fortune to study under Prof. Church (among others) through the 1970s. Years later he read my Frege’s Puzzle (1986), in which I defend what is now called a Millian theory of semantic content. In May 1989, Prof. Church sent me a pair of manuscripts, then not yet published, in which he independently proposed similar ways of developing a theory of n–tuple surrogates for singular propositions. Church’s cover letter began “Just to prove that great minds run in the same channel.” Although his throwaway remark did not reflect a genuine assessment—of me or of himself—it was exceedingly generous, and the memory of it can still cause me to blush. The present essay is in part a much delayed result of careful study of Church’s excellent papers. I am profoundly in his debt.
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808693.002448
Empirical research provides striking examples of non-human animal responses to death, which look very much like manifestations of grief. However, recent philosophical work appears to challenge the idea that animals can grieve. Grief, in contrast to more rudimentary emotional experiences, has been taken to require potentially human-exclusive abilities like a fine-grained sense of particularity, an ability to project toward the distal future and the past, and an understanding of death or loss. This paper argues that these features do not rule out animal grief and are present in many animal loss responses. It argues that the principal kind of “understanding” involved in grief is not intellectual but is instead of a practical variety available to animals, and outlines ways that the disruption to an animal’s life following a loss can hinge upon a specific individual and involve a degree of temporal organisation.
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819061.002465
Physiology has produced a rich theoretical foundation that is now understood to apply to all known life forms from microbes to plants and animals, including humans. Physiological theories are equal in scope to evolutionary theories, but they have received much less attention and critical analysis from biologists and philosophers. Four Theories (Principles) are identified here. These are Homeostasis, Positive Feedback, Growth and Development, and Reproduction. These are undergirded by the universal biological property of Metabolism.
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819120.002476
This paper challenges the soundness of the two-dimensional conceiv-ability argument against the derivation of phenomenal truths from physical truths (cf. Chalmers, 1996; 2010) in light of a hyperintensional regimentation of the ontology of consciousness. The regimentation demonstrates how ontological dependencies between truths about consciousness and about physics cannot be witnessed by epistemic constraints, when the latter are recorded by the conceivability – i.e., the epistemic possibility – thereof. Generalizations and other aspects of the philosophical significance of the hyperintensional regimentation are further examined.
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819147.00249
This paper aims to provide two abductive considerations adducing in favor of the thesis of Necessitism in modal ontology. I demonstrate how instances of the Barcan formula can be witnessed, when the modal operators are interpreted ‘naturally’ – i.e., as including geometric possibilities – and the quantifiers in the formula range over a domain of natural, or concrete, entities and their contingently non-concrete analogues. I argue that, because there are considerations within physics and metaphysical inquiry which corroborate modal relationalist claims concerning the possible geometric structures of spacetime, and dispositional properties are actual possible entities, the condition of being grounded in the concrete is consistent with the Barcan formula; and thus – in the geometric setting – merits adoption by the Necessitist.
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847465.0025
Two sorts of claims are ubiquitous in philosophy: claims that something is essentially the way it is and claims that something is socially constructed. The purpose of this essay is to explore the relation between essentialist and social constructionist claims. In particular, the focus will be on whether socially constructed items can have essences or essential properties. In section 1, I outline a number of views about the nature of social construction. In section 2, I outline a number of views about essence. In section 3, I consider ways in which certain claims about social construction may be thought to challenge certain claims about essences. Section 4 then offers rejoinders to these challenges and attempts to point the way toward reconciling constructionist and essentialist claims.
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847487.002515
Ontology and Oppression: Race, Gender, and Social Reality, by Katharine Jenkins, is a wonderful and engaging book in social ontology. It perfectly weds a rigorous theoretical account of social kinds with a deep concern for oppressed people. I expect that Jenkins’ book will generate significant conversation about the nature of social kinds and the relation between social ontology (and philosophy in general) and efforts at achieving social justice.
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853714.002531
The term ‘physicalism’ was coined by Otto Neurath in the early 1930s and was quickly adopted by other members of the Vienna Circle, including most prominently by Rudolph Carnap. Neurath was a socialist who believed that enterprises like science and industrial production should be organized according to the results of collective deliberation. Such deliberation, he thought, required a common physicalist language that would permit communication across disciplines and languages in ways that were accessible to everyone. Physicalism focused on universally shared features of human life; it was meant to provide a thing-language which was directed towards empirically observable events and objects. By talking in concrete, pragmatic terms about the problems of ordinary life, Neurath thought physicalism could provide the basis for the unified sciences and for inclusive collective deliberation about research priorities and the allocation of resources. Physicalism was Neurath’s way of eliminating traditional philosophy, which he understood to pose barriers to communication and support to politically reactionary elements. In later decades, and contrary to Neurath’s intention, ‘physicalism’ came to designate an ontological position whose principal features are familiar parts of contemporary philosophy. We now think of physicalism as some version of the claim that all real things are identical with or in some sense necessitated by the basic stuff that physics reveals to us. This was not what Neurath had in mind.
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869603.002543
Suppose that we have n objects α1, ..., αn, and we want to define something like numerical values (at least hyperreal ones, if we can’t have real ones) on the basis of comparisons of value. Here is one interesting way to proceed. …
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876833.00256
We propose our account of the meaning of local symmetries. We argue that the general covariance principle and gauge principle both are principles of democratic epistemic access to the law of physics, leading to ontological insights about the objective nature of spacetime. We further argue that relationality is a core notion of general-relativistic gauge field theory, tacitly encoded by its (active) local symmetries.
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1055484.00257
Humean Supervenience (HS) is a metaphysical model of the world according to which all truths hold in virtue of nothing but the total spatiotemporal distribution of perfectly natural intrinsic properties. David Lewis and others have worked out many aspects of HS in great detail. A larger motivational question, however, remains unanswered: As Lewis admits, there is strong evidence from fundamental physics that HS is false. What then is the purpose of defending HS? In this paper, we argue that the philosophical merit of HS is largely independent of whether it correctly represents the world’s fundamental structure. In particular, we show that insofar as HS is an apt model of the world’s higher-level structure, it thereby provides a powerful argument for reductive physicalism and explains otherwise opaque inferential relations. Recent criticism of HS on the grounds that it misrepresents fundamental physical reality is, therefore, beside the point.
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1055518.002588
We present the reply Leibniz gave to Stahl’s Theoria medica vera (1707), and the controversy between the authors that those remarks stimulated. After having described the main points of Stahl’s dualism between life and death, correlated to his dualism mechanism/organism, we unravel the main epistemological and scientific points of debate. We propose several distinctions in order to make sense of the various uses of mechanism in this period, and suggest that what essentially motivated Leibniz was both Stahl’s implicit denial of uniform laws of nature, and Stahl’s misunderstanding of the metaphysics of substance and causality that Leibniz was in general elaborating in his own conceptions. We finally suggest how both authors were misunderstanding each other because of different scientific agendas and metaphysical commitments.
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1097528.002601
During the first half of the eighteenth century, Newton’s work became the emblem of the “new philosophy” all over Europe. It provided a model to be followed in every field and the divide between the friends and the enemies of Reason. Reasons for such a sanctification of Newton are primarily due to the competitor’s disappearance of the polemics against Aristotelianism, which had provided seventeenth-century philosophers with an excellent straw man with its sequel of occult qualities and substantial forms. Secondly, they are to be found in the birth of controversy between Cartesians and Newtonians. This controversy will grow with a snowball effect, starting with a purely scientific issue, namely the theory of vortices, coming to include two overall views of the scientific method and two distinct theories of knowledge. Thus, as the interest in attacking Aristotle vanished since Aristotelianism ceased being perceived as a real competitor, the villain became Descartes, the author of an “illusive philosophy” or “one of the most entertaining romances” ever written.
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1160334.00261
One feature of language is that we are able to make mistakes in our use of language. Amongst other sorts of mistakes, we can misspeak, misspell, missign, or misunderstand. Given this, it seems that our metaphysics of words should be flexible enough to accommodate such mistakes. It has been argued that a nominalist account of words cannot accommodate the phenomenon of misspelling. I sketch a nominalist trope-bundle view of words that can.
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1163246.00262
‘Naturalism’ is a term so notorious for its murkiness that entire anthologies have been devoted largely to the task of pinning down its meaning – and for all that, nothing near consensus has been reached. Agreement is elusive even on how the available options are best taxonomized. One general tendency is to distinguish ‘ontological’ or ‘metaphysical’ versions – those that recognize only ‘physical’ or ‘material’ or ‘scientific’ items, eschewing, for example, angels or abstracta – from ‘epistemological’ or ‘methodological’ versions – those that recognize only ‘empirical’ or ‘scientific’ ways of finding out about the world, eschewing, for example, revelation – but these broad categories contain multitudes. So the task of explicating the current state of naturalism about logic is unusually daunting.
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1213165.002633
Let serious propositional contingentism (SPC) be the package of views which consists in (i) the thesis that propositions expressed by sentences featuring terms depend, for their existence, on the existence of the referents of those terms, (ii) serious actualism— the view that it is impossible for an object to exemplify a property and not exist—and (iii) contingentism—the view that it is at least possible that some thing might not have been something. SPC is popular and compelling. But what should we say about possible worlds, if we accept SPC? Here, I first show that a natural view of possible worlds, well-represented in the literature, in conjunction with SPC is inadequate. Though I note various alternative ways of thinking about possible worlds in response to the first problem, I then outline a second more general problem—a master argument— which generally shows that any account of possible worlds meeting very minimal requirements will be inconsistent with compelling claims about mere possibilia which the serious propositional contingentist should accept.
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1454342.002643
This paper explores the concept of "Nothingness" and its connection to Graham Priest's paraconsistent logic, with a critical focus on Heidegger's ontological perspective. Heidegger argues that logic and ontology are incompatible, and truth extends beyond mere propositions, tied to the indescribable experience of "Nothing." He contends that logical rules are not essential for ontological truth, leading to two conceptions of truth: fundamental and propositional. The study delves into this profound examination, considering the implications for understanding truth and the limitations of logic in grasping the elusive aspects of existence.
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1627386.002655
I apply Dennett’s ‘real patterns’ idea to the ontology of physics, and specifically to the puzzle of how to relate the very different ontologies one finds at different scales in physics (e.g. particles vs continua, or fields vs particles). I argue that real patterns provide part but not all of the answer to the puzzle, and locate the rest of the answer in the structural-realist idea that ontology in general is secondary to (mathematically-presented) structure. I make some suggestions for the application of these ideas outside physics, including in the philosophy of mind context that motivated Dennett’s original proposal.
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1813718.002666
I’ve been thinking a bit about the relationship between dignity and value. Here are four plausible principles:
If x has dignity, then x has great non-instrumental value. If x has dignity, then x has great non-instrumental value because it has dignity. …