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77055.414765
In his paper, Cian Dorr presents formal development of the view that higher-order entities such as properties, relations, and propositions act not just act as semantic values of predicates and sentences, but also as referents of referential noun phrases (NPs), generally considered singular terms. Dorr’s paper focuses on properties; thus, wise as in Socrates is wise is taken to stand for the very same entity, a property, as the NPs wisdom and the property of being wise. The view entails that lots of expressions now would apply to entities of different types: some, the, is interesting now apply to entities of the type of individuals as well as the type of properties. Moreover, quantifiers like everything will now be able to range over both individuals and properties, and in fact over both individuals and properties at once (Everything is interesting). These problems are dealt with by imposing type ambiguities on the relevant expressions and allowing quantifiers like everything to be specified for sum types, roughly, a disjunctive specification of types.
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161863.414867
Summary. In the first part of this contribution I will present aspects and attitudes towards ’axiomatic thinking’ in various branches of theoretical physics. In the second and more technical part, which is approximately of the same size, I will focus on mathematical results that are relevant for axiomatic schemes of space-time in connection with attempts to axiomatise Special and General Relativity.
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195235.414883
I consider the sense in which teleparallel gravity and symmetric teleparallel gravity may be understood as gauge theories of gravity. I first argue that both theories have surplus structure. I then consider the relationship between Yang-Mills theory and Poincare Gauge Theory and argue that though these use similar formalisms, there are subtle disanalogies in their interpretation.
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195272.414896
We consider the class of physical theories whose dynamics are given by natural equations, which are partial differential equations determined by a functor from the category of n- manifolds, for some n, to the category of fiber bundles, satisfying certain further conditions. We show how the theory of natural equations clarifies several important foundational issues, including the status and meaning of minimal coupling, symmetries of theories, and background structure. We also state and prove a fundamental result about the initial value problem for natural equations.
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247790.414907
Branching time (BT) is a multipurpose label, which is mainly
used to denote (i) a family of structures (BT representations or BT
frames), possibly along with the axiomatic theories defining them,
(ii) a family of semantics for temporal and modal logics (BT
semantics); and (iii) a metaphysical conception concerning our
universe and its temporal and modal features (branching conception of
time or BT conception). In very general terms, a BT representation is a complex of
histories (or chronicles, or possible
worlds) and moments (or nodes), which purports
to represent all possible temporal developments of a given system.
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277203.414917
Homology is a fundamental but controversial concept in biology, referring to the sameness of biological characters across organisms. Despite its crucial role, its ontological nature has been a subject of intense debate, with a dichotomy between individualist and natural kind views. This study proposes a category-theoretic framework to reconcile these views by emphasizing the processual nature of homology. We first review major philosophical views of homology with their respective advantages and disadvantages. Next, we highlight the dynamic and evolving nature of homologs through two thought experiments. Through mathematical formulation, we then show that the individualist and natural kind views represent ordered set- and groupoid-like aspects, derived from a primary category-theoretical model based on a process-first dynamic view of homology. Our model covers a wide range of phenomena linked with homology, such as atavism, deep homology, and developmental system drift (DSD). Furthermore, it provides a unified perspective on the ontological nature of homology, overcoming the longstanding dichotomy between individuals and kinds in Western philosophy.
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280533.414927
Inphilosophyofscience,constitutive explanation shave attracted much attention sinceCraver’sinfluentialbookExplaining the Brain(2007).HisMutualManipulability(MM)theory of constitution aimed to explicate constitution as anon-causal explanatory relation and to demarcate between constituent sand non-constituents. But MM received decisive criticism.Inresponse,Craveretal.(2021)haverecently proposedanewtheory,called Matched Inter level Experiments(MIE),whichis currently gaining traction in various fields. The authors claim that MIE retains “the spirit of MM without conceptual confusion.”Our paper argues that this claim isnotborneout:neitherdoesMIEmeetMM’sob jectivesnorisit free of conceptual confusion.Atthesametime,we show that it is possible to meet MM’sobjectivesin aconceptuallysoundmanner—byadoptingtheso-calledNoDe-Couplingtheory ofconstitution.
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680986.414939
This article describes confirmation of the proposition that numbers are identified with operators in the following three steps. 1. The set of operators to construct finite cardinals satisfies Peano Axioms. 2. Accordingly, the natural numbers can be identified with these operators. 3. From the operators, five kinds of operators are derived, and on the basis of the step 2, the integers, the fractions, the real numbers, the complex numbers and the quaternions are identified with the five kinds of operators respectively. These operators stand in a sequential inclusion relationship, in contrast to the embedding relationship between those kinds of numbers defined as sets.
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1200062.41495
I argue that we need to distinguish between three concepts of actual causation: total, path-changing, and contributing actual causation. I provide two lines of argument in support of this account. First, I address three thought experiments that have been troublesome for unified accounts of actual causation, and I show that my account provides a better explanation of corresponding causal intuitions. Second, I provide a functional argument: if we assume that a key purpose of causal concepts is to guide agency, we are better off making a distinction between three concepts of actual causation.
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1408302.414979
In this paper we provide an ontological analysis of so-called “artifactual functions” by deploying a realizable-centered approach to artifacts which we have recently developed within the framework of the upper ontology Basic Formal Ontology (BFO). We argue that, insofar as material artifacts are concerned, the term “artifactual function” can refer to at least two kinds of realizable entities: novel intentional dispositions and usefactual realized entities. They inhere, respectively, in what we previously called “canonical artifacts” and “usefacts”. We show how this approach can help to clarify functions in BFO, whose current elucidation includes reference to the term “artifact”. In our framework, having an artifactual function implies being an artifact, but not vice versa; in other words, there are artifacts that lack an artifactual function.
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1863593.414995
Comparative philosophy of religion is a subfield of both philosophy of
religion and comparative philosophy. Philosophy of religion engages
with philosophical questions related to religious belief and practice,
including questions concerning the concept of religion itself. Comparative philosophy compares concepts, theories, and arguments from
diverse philosophical traditions. The term “comparative
philosophy of religion” can refer to the comparative
philosophical study of different religions or of different
philosophies of religion. It can thus be either a first-order
philosophical discipline—investigating matters to do with
religion—or a second-order philosophical discipline,
investigating matters to do with philosophical inquiry into religion.
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2036649.415006
Edith Landmann-Kalischer (1877–1951) is the author of several
significant studies on topics in the philosophy of art, aesthetics,
value, mind, and knowledge in the first half of the twentieth century. Influenced by Franz Brentano, Georg Simmel, Carl Stumpf, and Stefan
George, her studies were initiated at a time when the academic, often
tendentious borders between psychology and philosophy, like those
between aesthetics and art history, were still being drawn. While
clearly also influenced by Edmund Husserl, she takes his phenomenology
to task for its idealism and, in her view, its unfounded isolation
from the sciences, especially psychology.
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2294807.415016
Brian Leftow’s 2022 book, Anselm’s Argument: Divine Necessity is an impressively thorough discussion of Anselmian modal metaphysics, centred around what he takes to be Anselm’s strongest “argument from perfection” (Leftow’s preferred term for an Ontological Argument). This is not the famous argument from Proslogion 2, nor even the modal argument that some have claimed to find in Proslogion 3, but rather, an argument from Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilo, expressed in the following quotation: “If … something than which no greater can be thought … existed, neither actually nor in the mind could it not exist. Otherwise it would not be something than which no greater can be thought. But whatever can be thought to exist and does not exist, if it existed, would be able actually or in the mind not to exist. For this reason, if it can be thought, it cannot not exist.” (p. 66) Before turning to this argument, Leftow offers an extended and closely-argued case for understanding Anselm’s modality in terms of absolute necessity and possibility, with a metaphysical foundation on powers as argued for at length (575 pages) in his 2012 book God and Necessity. After presenting this interpretation in Chapter 1, Leftow’s second chapter discusses various theological applications (such as the fixity of the past, God’s veracity, and immortality), addressing them in a way that both expounds and defends what he takes to be Anselm’s approach. Then in Chapter 3 Leftow addresses certain problems, for both his philosophical and interpretative claims, while Chapter 4 spells out the key Anselmian argument, together with Leftow’s suggested improvements. Chapter 5 explains how the argument depends on Brouwer’s system of modal logic, and defends this while also endorsing the more standard and comprehensive system S5.
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2407229.415027
Let us say that a being is omnisubjective if it has a perfect first-person grasp of all subjective states (including belief states). The question of whether God is omnisubjective raises a nest of thorny issues in the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics, at least if there are irreducibly subjective states. There are notorious difficulties analyzing the core traditional divine attributes—omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence—but those difficulties are notorious partly because we seem to have a decent pre-theoretic grasp of what it means for something to be all knowing, powerful, and good, and so it is surprising, frustrating, and perplexing that it is so difficult to provide a satisfactory analysis of those notions.
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2584217.415036
trices. The main aim is to construct a system of Nmatrices by substituting standard sets by quasets. Since QST is a conservative extension of ZFA (the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with Atoms), it is possible to obtain generalized Nmatrices (Q-Nmatrices). Since the original formulation of QST is not completely adequate for the developments we advance here, some possible amendments to the theory are also considered. One of the most interesting traits of such an extension is the existence of complementary quasets which admit elements with undetermined membership. Such elements can be interpreted as quantum systems in superposed states. We also present a relationship of QST with the theory of Rough Sets RST, which grants the existence of models for QST formed by rough sets. Some consequences of the given formalism for the relation of logical consequence are also analysed.
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2699522.415046
Determinism is the thesis that the past determines the future, but eorts to dene it precisely have exposed deep methodological disagreements. Standard possible-worlds formulations of determinism presuppose an "agreement" relation between worlds, but this relation can be understood in multiple ways none of which is particularly clear. We critically examine the proliferation of denitions of determinism in the recent literature, arguing that these denitions fail to deliver clear verdicts about actual scientic theories. We advocate a return to a formal approach, in the logical tradition of Carnap, that treats determinism as a property of scientic theories, rather than an elusive metaphysical doctrine. We highlight two key distinctions: (1) the dierence between qualitative and "full" determinism, as emphasized in recent discussions of physics and metaphysics, and (2) the distinction between weak and strong formal conditions on the uniqueness of world extensions. We argue that dening determinism in terms of metaphysical notions such as haecceities is unhelpful, whereas rigorous formal criteria such as Belot's D1 and D3 oer a tractable and scientically relevant account. By clarifying what it means for a theory to be deterministic, we set the stage for a fruitful interaction between physics and metaphysics.
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2699543.415056
The idea that the universe is governed by laws of nature has precursors from ancient times, but the view that it is a or even the primary - or even the primary - aim of science to discover these laws only became established during the 16th and 17th century when it replaced the then prevalent Aristotelian conception of science. The most prominent promoters and developers of the new view were Galileo, Descartes, and Newton. Descartes, in Le Monde dreamed of an elegant mathematical theory that specified laws that describe the motions of matter and Newton in his Principia went a long way towards realizing this dream.
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3218702.415069
Whereas most scientists are highly critical of constructivism and relativism in the context of scientific knowledge acquisition, the dominant school of chemical education researchers appears to support a variety of such positions. By reference to the views of Herron, Spencer, and Bodner, I claim that these authors are philosophically confused, and that they are presenting a damaging and anti-scientific message to other unsuspecting educators. Part of the problem, as I argue, is a failure to distinguish between pedagogical con - structivism regarding students' understanding of science, and constructivism about the way that scientific knowledge is acquired by expert scientists.
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3737934.415081
The theoretical physicist Michio Kaku ([2014]) once stated that the brain is ‘the most complicated object in the known universe’. For decades, neuroscientists have been trying to disentangle the brain’s complexity in order to understand how it can support our behaviours and mental life. In his latest book, Luiz Pessoa wants us instead to embrace the entanglement of this intricate organ, not as a way to give up on our quest to understand its workings, but as a change in strategy to better comprehend its complexity.
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3795738.415093
Explanatory Essentialism (EE) is the view that a property is the essence of a kind because it causally explains the many properties that instances of that kind exhibit. This paper examines an application of EE to biological species, which I call Biological Explanatory Essentialism (BEE). BEE states that a particular biological origin is the essence of a species on the grounds that it causes certain organisms to display the group of properties the species is associated with. Evaluating BEE is important, as it offers a novel argument for biological essentialism—the contentious claim that biological species have essences. This paper critically assesses the empirical foundations of BEE, focusing on the presupposition that a single biological origin causes the many properties associated with the species in question. By discussing a case of cryptic species among five-toed jerboas within the Scarturus elater species complex, I challenge that presupposition, thereby arguing that cryptic species present a serious obstacle to BEE. I conclude that BEE fails to support biological essentialism and suggest that essentialist philosophers reconsider the role of causal-explanatory factors in accounting for the purported essences of biological species. These philosophers may need to explore alternatives beyond such factors, one of which I briefly outline.
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3911023.415106
Quantum entanglement is widely regarded as a nonlocal phenomenon, but Deutsch and Hayden (2000) have recently received growing support for their claim that in the Heisenberg picture, entanglement can be characterised locally using objects they call descriptors. I argue that the notion of locality underlying this claim is a flawed version of the principle of separability that I call spatial separability. An improved version, spatiotemporal separability, reveals that their claim is false. The proposed analysis of separability also reveals the crucial feature of quantum theory that makes it “spooky” in any picture: quantum entanglement entails that there are non-qualitative properties, which are profoundly different from the qualitative properties we have come to expect from classical physics.
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3986056.415117
This post is free to read, so please share it widely. And, as always, please ‘like’ it via the heart below and restack it on notes if you get something out of it. It’s the best way to help others find my work. …
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4748001.415128
Nietzsche’s first book was entitled The Birth of Tragedy out
of the Spirit of Music (1872), and one of his very last works was
called The Case of Wagner: A Musician’s Problem (1888). As this simple fact indicates, reflection on art (and especially, on
music and drama) is an abiding and central feature of
Nietzsche’s thought. Indeed, very nearly all of his works
address aesthetic questions at least in passing. Some of these
questions are familiar from the philosophical tradition: e.g., how
should we explain the effect tragedy has on us? What is the relation
of aesthetic value to other kinds of value?
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4765192.415137
Journal of the American Philosophical Association () – © The Author(s), . Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Philosophical Association. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/.), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
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4831938.415153
Neil Mehta has written a fantastic book. A Pluralist Theory of Perception develops a novel theory of perception that illuminates the metaphysical structure, epistemic significance, and semantic role of perceptual consciousness. By and large, I found the core tenets of Mehta’s theory to be highly plausible and successfully defended. I could quibble with some parts (e.g., his claim that our conscious awareness of sensory qualities is non-representational). But I suspect our disagreements are largely verbal, and where they are non-verbal, they are minor. Instead of focusing on disagreements, in this commentary I wish to explore the metaphysical ramifications of Mehta’s theory with respect to the mind-body problem. Mehta has a great deal to say about the metaphysics of perception. Much of it seems to me to be in tension with physicalism. But throughout the book he remains officially neutral on the truth of physicalism, “in reflection of [his] genuine uncertainty” (ibid: 100). I will try to show that Mehta’s commitments lead almost inexorably to dualism (or, at least, away from physicalism) by giving three arguments against physicalism that centrally rely on premises to which Mehta is committed.
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4833889.41517
If the philosophy of mathematics wants to be rigorous, the concept of infinity must stop being equivocal (both potential and actual) as it currently is. The conception of infinity as actual is responsible for all the paradoxes that compromise the very foundation of mathematics and is also the basis on which Cantor's argument is based on the non-countability of R, and the existence of infinite cardinals of different magnitude. Here we present proof that all infinite sets (in a potential sense) are countable and that there are no infinite cardinals.
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4891558.415182
The philosophical literature on mathematical structuralism and its history has focused on the emergence of structuralism in the 19th century. Yet modern abstractionist accounts cannot provide an historical account for the abstraction process. This paper will examine the role of relations in the history of mathematics, focusing on three main epochs where relational abstraction is most prominent: ancient Greek, 17th and 19th centuries, to provide a philosophical account for the abstraction of structures. Though these structures emerged in the 19th century with definitional axioms, the need for such axioms in the abstraction process comes about, as this paper will show, after a series of relational abstractions without a suitable basis.
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5094257.415195
This entry surveys the literature surrounding certain kinds of views
about metaphysics. In particular, the central concern here will be
with critiques of metaphysics and responses to those
critiques. And so the views under discussion can be thought of as
metametaphysical views, or metaontological
views. Section 1
distinguishes the views to be discussed—namely, realist and
anti-realist views about metaphysics—from views of
another kind (namely, realist and anti-realist views in
metaphysics). Then the survey of views begins in
section 2. The survey is organized around anti-realist views—i.e.,
views that offer critiques of metaphysics—and realist responses
to the anti-realist critiques.
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5190427.415206
[The final chapter of my undergraduate thesis on Modal Rationalism. The initial sections contrast realist vs conceptualist understandings of “metaphysical possibility”, with an eye to helping skeptical readers to grasp the core concept (e.g. …
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5353193.415217
Primitivism about the direction of time is the thesis that the direction of time does not call for an explanation because it is a primitive posit in one’s ontology. In the literature, primitivism has in general come along with a substantival view of time according to which time is an independent substance. In this paper, we defend a new primitivist approach to the direction of time –relational primitivism. According to it, time is primitively directed because change is primitive. By relying on Leibnizian relationalism, we argue that a relational ontology of time must be able to distinguish between spatial relations and temporal relations to make sense of the distinction between variation and change. This distinction, however, requires the assumption of a primitive directionality of change, which ushers in the direction of time. Relational primitivism is an attractive view for those who want to avoid substantivalism about time but retain a primitive direction of time in a more parsimonious ontology.