1. 95857.5648
    I specialize in trillion-dollar ideas: policy reforms which, if implemented, would generate trillions of dollars of net social benefits. Ideas like open borders, educational austerity, and by-right construction. …
    Found 1 day, 2 hours ago on Bet On It
  2. 169502.564855
    Suppose there are two opaque boxes, A and B, of which I can choose one. A nearly perfect predictor of my actions put $100 in the box that they thought I would choose. Suppose I find myself with evidence that it’s 75% likely that I will choose box A (maybe in 75% of cases like this, people like me choose A). …
    Found 1 day, 23 hours ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  3. 182249.564864
    In 2015, Amy Finkelstein, Nathaniel Hendren, and Erzo Luttmer released an NBER working paper called “The Value of Medicaid: Interpreting Results from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment.” The paper’s results were a slap in the face of Social Desirability Bias — and the authors boldly advertised them right in the abstract: Our baseline estimates of Medicaid's welfare benefit to recipients per dollar of government spending range from about $0.2 to $0.4, depending on the framework, with at least two-fifths – and as much as four-fifths – of the value of Medicaid coming from a transfer component, as opposed to its ability to move resources across states of the world. …
    Found 2 days, 2 hours ago on Bet On It
  4. 329810.564869
    We present a causal model for the EPR correlations. In this model, or better framework for a model, causality is preserved by the direct propagation of causal influences between the wings of the experiment. We show that our model generates the same statistical results for EPR as orthodox quantum mechanics. We conclude that causality in quantum mechanics can not be ruled out on the basis of the EPR-Bell- Aspect correlations alone.
    Found 3 days, 19 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  5. 356819.564875
    When thinking about big social problems like climate change or factory farming, there are two especially common failure modes worth avoiding: Neglecting small numbers that incrementally contribute to significant aggregate harms. …
    Found 4 days, 3 hours ago on Good Thoughts
  6. 851738.564881
    It is a stark truth that the prison system in the United States is a moral catastrophe. Many of those who go to prison are routinely subject to battery, assault, and rape, or live in constant fear thereof. Incarcerated individuals are forced to align with gangs to protect themselves. They are treated by guards and other prison officials in deeply dehumanizing ways, subjected to psychological torture through solitary confinement and other measures, and sometimes inhabit literally unlivable conditions.
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on Alex Worsnip's site
  7. 877623.564886
    Cognitive scientists ascribe inferential processes to (neuro)cognitive systems to explain many of their capacities. Since these ascriptions have different connotations, philosophical accounts of inference could help clarify their assumptions and forestall potential confusion. However, many existing accounts define inference in ways that are out of touch with successful scientific practice – ways that overly intellectualise inference, construe inference in complete opposition to association, and imply that inferential processes prevent minds from being in contact with the outside world. In this chapter, we combine Siegel’s (2017) Response Hypothesis with insights from basal cognition and ecological rationality to sketch a philosophically viable, updated account of inference in (neuro)cognitive systems. According to this view, inference is a kind of rationally evaluable transition from some inputs or current representations to some conclusion or output representation. This notion of inference aligns with and can illuminate scientific practices in disparate fields, while eschewing a commitment to a consciously accessible language-like neural code or a formal system of mental logic, highlighting the continuity between inferential and associative processes, and allowing for a non-indirect mind-world relationship, where minds are genuinely open and responsive to their environment.
    Found 1 week, 3 days ago on Matteo Colombo's site
  8. 1075285.564894
    A general class of presupposition arguments holds that the background knowledge and theory required to design, develop, and interpret a machine learning (ML) system imply a strong upper limit to ML’s impact on science. I consider two proposals for how to assess the scientific impact of ML predictions, and I argue that while these accounts prioritize conceptual change, the presuppositions they take to be disqualifying for strong novelty are too restrictive. I characterize a general form of their arguments I call the Concept-free Design Argument: that strong novelty is curtailed by utilizing prior conceptualizations of target phenomena in model design.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  9. 1295106.5649
    Blame abounds in our everyday lives, perhaps no more so than on social media. With the rise of social networking platforms, we now have access to more information about others’ blameworthy behaviour and larger audiences to whom we can express our blame. But these audiences, while large, are not typically diverse. Just as we tend to gather and share information within online social networks made up of like-minded individuals, much of the moral criticism found on the internet is expressed within groups of agents with similar values and worldviews. Like these epistemic practices, the blaming practices found on social media have also received criticism. Many argue that the blame expressed on the internet is unfitting, excessive, and counterproductive. What accounts for the perniciousness of online blame? And what should be done to address it?
    Found 2 weeks ago on Philosopher's Imprint
  10. 1295186.564905
    This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License doi.org/10.3998/phimp.3806 Suppose you are 40% confident that Candidate X will win in the upcoming election. Then you read a column projecting 80%. If you and the columnist are equally well informed and competent on this topic, how should you revise your opinion in light of theirs? Should you perhaps split the difference, arriving at 60%? Plenty has been written on this topic. Much less studied, however, is the question what comes next. Once you’ve updated your opinion about Candidate X, how should your other opinions change to accommodate this new view? For example, how should you revise your expectations about other candidates running for other seats? Or your confidence that your preferred party will win a majority?
    Found 2 weeks ago on Philosopher's Imprint
  11. 1295332.56491
    This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License doi.org/10.3998/phimp.3416 evidential states giving rise to those credences. As a result, traditional approaches fail to capture the multitude of individual evidential states which can lead to the same group credences. This occurs when we fail to account for dependence among individuals and the resilience of their beliefs. Such omissions are not innocuous: they can underdetermine both the group belief and its updating strategy. We present an approach that allows one to focus instead on appropriately combining evidence, and in particular taking into account any overlaps in information. Once the evidence is properly captured, we will show, a full group distribution can be uniquely established on its basis. From this distribution, we can derive point estimates, intervals, and predictions. We call this the evidence-first method, in part to distinguish our approach from prevailing rules for combining beliefs, which may more accurately be described as credence-first.
    Found 2 weeks ago on Philosopher's Imprint
  12. 1295358.564915
    This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License <doi.org/10.3998/phimp.5853 > science. I will argue that it is false. Rational belief need not be proportioned to the evidence. Nor, of course, does it succumb to prejudice and wishful thinking. The evidentialist doctrine is false because it clashes with compelling norms on the dynamics of rational belief. I’m going to illustrate this clash by looking at scenarios in which an agent’s evidence deteriorates over time, revealing less about the world or the agent’s location than their earlier evidence. According to the evidentialist doctrine, the agent’s beliefs should follow their deteriorating evidence: the agent should lose their confidence in propositions for which they used to have good evidence, without having received any contrary evidence. I will argue that the agent should instead follow a “conservative” policy and retain the earlier beliefs.
    Found 2 weeks ago on Philosopher's Imprint
  13. 1295439.56492
    Poseidon who has the power to inflict a vengeful wrath. Yet Odysseus is overcome by pride at his own cleverness and shouts his own name from the prow of his ship, carelessly jeopardizing the safety of his crew. The parable of Odysseus and the Cyclops is a uniquely rich and compelling story, but it involves an utterly ordinary kind of failure to respond to reasons: ego eclipses prudence. In this moment, Odysseus is irrational and is responsible for this irrationality. His irrationality stems from the fact that he has violated the rational requirement to respond to his reasons. While we often meet this requirement in everyday life, we also often violate it by failing to respond to reasons due to ego, closed-mindedness, carelessness, or other poor epistemic habits. In such cases, our failures render us irrational.
    Found 2 weeks ago on Philosopher's Imprint
  14. 1295545.564925
    at “trolling.” Trolls often post deliberately inflammatory content with the goal of provoking emotional responses. They aim to trick their targets into mistaking them for good faith interlocutors, thereby “baiting” them into responding in an emotional manner. This is typically done for the troll’s own entertainment, as well as the entertainment of anyone who happens to witness the exchange and recognize it as trolling. Some instances of trolling seem mostly harmless, such as when their contents aren’t ethically problematic and no one takes the bait. However, trolling can also be dangerous. For one thing, empirical studies show that racist and misogynistic trolling can be part of a gradual radicalization into extremist or hateful ideologies (Munn 2019; Hoffman et al. 2020; Rauf 2021; Thorleifsson 2022). Furthermore, when problematic trolls are allowed to run amok, online platforms can gradually become cesspools of hateful speech. So, trolling can contribute to the degradation of both individual trolls’ belief systems and broader online environments.
    Found 2 weeks ago on Philosopher's Imprint
  15. 1301930.56493
    Attitude relations such as belief and knowledge are two-place relations between a subject and a property, an abstract object that may vary in truth value across individuals. Lewis famously argued that self-locating attitudes should lead us to reject propositionalism in favour of proprietism, while Stalnaker argued, to the contrary, that the phenomenon of self-locating attitudes does not motivate rejecting propositionalism. In what follows, we’ll argue that there are good reasons to prefer propositionalism to pro- prietism, and we’ll show that there are natural accounts of self-locating attitudes that one can provide by appeal to the propositional relations of belief and knowledge.
    Found 2 weeks, 1 day ago on Dilip Ninan's site
  16. 1474715.564935
    Some important policies will change future mortality rates (like climate mitigation), change future fertility rates (like public education), or respond to the emerging challenges of global depopulation. Any such policy will change each of the quality of lives, the quantity of lives, and who will live in the future. Hence, to evaluate economic policies, we need to assess both social risk and variable population. A standard principle for economic policy evaluation is Expected Total Utilitarianism, which maximizes the expected value of the sum of individuals’ transformed lifetime well-being. Despite the prominent use in public economics of both additive utilitarianism and expectation-taking under risk, these methods remain questionable in welfare economics, in part because existing axiomatic justifications make strong assumptions (Fleurbaey, 2010; Golosov et al., 2007).
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on Johan E. Gustafsson's site
  17. 1479325.56494
    The meta-inductive approach to induction justifies induction by proving its optimality. The argument for the optimality of induction proceeds in two steps. The first ‘a priori’ step intends to show that meta-induction is optimal and the second ‘a posteriori’ step intends to show that meta-induction selects object-induction in our world. I critically evaluate the second-step and raise two problems: the identification problem and the indetermination problem. In light of these problems, I assess the prospects of any meta-inductive approach to induction.
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  18. 1537002.564945
    That science is value-dependent has been taken to raise problems for the democratic legitimacy of scientifically-informed public policy. An increasingly common solution is to propose that science itself ought to be ‘democratised.’ Of the literature aiming to provide principled means of facilitating such, most has been largely concerned with developing accounts of how public values might be identified in order to resolve scientific valuejudgements. Through a case-study of the World Health Organisation’s 2009 redefinition of ‘pandemic’ in response to H1N1, this paper proposes that this emphasis might be unhelpfully pre-emptive, pending more thorough consideration of the question of whose values different varieties of epistemic risk ought to be negotiated in reference to. A choice of pandemic definition inevitably involves the consideration of a particular variety of epistemic risk, described here as ontic risk. In analogy with legislative versus judicial contexts, I argue that the democratisation of ontic risk assessments could bring inductive risk assessments within the scope of democratic control without necessitating that those inductive risk assessments be independently subject to democratic processes. This possibility is emblematic of a novel strategy for mitigating the opportunity costs that successful democratisation would incur for scientists: careful attention to the different normative stakes of different epistemic risks can provide principled grounds on which to propose that the democratisation of science need only be partial.
    Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  19. 1652442.56495
    In John Norton’s Material Theory of Induction, background facts provide the warrant for inductive inference and determine evidential relevance. Replication, however, is excluded as a principle of inductive logic. While Norton argues replication lacks the precision and methodological clarity to serve as a material principle of inference, I argue that replication nonetheless functions as an epistemic principle of induction. I examine how replication contributes to epistemic justification within both externalist and internalist frameworks and show that its role extends beyond procedural repetition. Replication acts as a reliable belief-forming process for identifying stable facts and inferences. This reframes MTI as a theory shaped not only by local facts but by how scientists determine which facts can function as background warrant.
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on PhilSci Archive
  20. 1825477.564956
    Hypotheses about how and why animals behave the way they do are frequently labelled as either associative or cognitive. This has been taken as evidence that there is a fundamental distinction between two kinds of behavioural processes. However, there is significant disagreement about how to define this distinction whether it ought to be rejected entirely. Rather than seeking a definition of the associative-cognitive distinction, or advocating for its rejection, I argue that it is an artefact of the way that comparative psychologists generate hypotheses. I suggest that hypotheses for non-human animal behaviour are often generated by analogy with hypotheses drawn from human psychology and associative learning theory, a justifiable strategy since analogies help to establish the pursuit-worthiness of a hypothesis. Any apparent distinction is a misleading characterisation of what is a complex web of hypotheses that explain diverse behavioural phenomena. The analogy view of the distinction has three advantages. It motivates the apparent existence of the distinction based on a common inference strategy in science, analogical reasoning. It accounts for why the distinction has been difficult to articulate, because of the diversity of possible analogies. Finally, it delimits the role of the distinction in downstream inferences about animal behaviour.
    Found 3 weeks ago on PhilSci Archive
  21. 1861586.564962
    We say we believe that all children can learn, but few of us really believe it.” Lisa Delpit Teachers are expected to believe in the potential of every student in front of them. To believe otherwise is to give up on a central premise of the educational mission, that students can be taught. However, the people who come into the classroom have different levels of knowledge, skills, and motivations. To deny that what the student brings to the classroom matters to their potential progress is to deny empirical reality. Teachers face a tension between cultivating high expectations for student success and recognizing the limitations that a student and their circumstances impose.
    Found 3 weeks ago on Jennifer M. Morton's site
  22. 1883960.564966
    In my new paper, “Severe Testing: Error Statistics versus Bayes Factor Tests”, now out online at the The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, I “propose that commonly used Bayes factor tests be supplemented with a post-data severity concept in the frequentist error statistical sense”. …
    Found 3 weeks ago on D. G. Mayo's blog
  23. 1927871.564972
    Epistemologists have devoted an enormous amount of attention to justification. Hundreds of papers have tried to analyze the conditions under which a belief is epistemically justified; hundreds more have offered counterexamples to these analyses. Even epistemologists who look askance at conceptual analysis have found it fruitful to explore the connections between justification and other epistemic notions, such as knowledge, rationality, and evidence. Some have even suggested that justification is the central notion in epistemology.
    Found 3 weeks, 1 day ago on Bob Beddor's site
  24. 1943608.564978
    The Inscrutable Evidence Argument targets the thesis that credences are thoughts about evidential probabilities (CTEP). It does so using cases where one knows one’s evidence speaks either strongly in favor of or strongly against a proposition, but one doesn’t know which; in such cases, it seems possible to have a middling credence in that proposition even though one doesn’t think the probability of the proposition is near 50%—contra CTEP. In this paper, I defend CTEP by conceiving of the thoughts involved differently than usual. My diagnosis of the argument turns on appreciating the difference between believing and accepting (in the sense of Bratman 1992) that a proposition has probability n, where accepting is context dependent and allows for guidance in action without commitment to truth. I develop this diagnosis in two directions, one according to which acceptances of probability-involving propositions are credences and another according to which they aren’t. Both views elude the Inscrutable Evidence Argument and are compatible with CTEP.
    Found 3 weeks, 1 day ago on Ergo
  25. 1943630.564983
    In a short note written in 1929, Frank Ramsey put forward a reliabilist account of knowledge anticipating those given by Armstrong (1973) and Goldman (1967), among others, a few decades later. Some think that the note comprises the bulk of what Ramsey has to say about epistemology. But Ramsey’s ideas about epistemology extend beyond the note. Relatively little attention has been paid to his reliabilist account of reasonable belief. Even less attention has been paid to his reliabilist account of reasonable degree of belief. In this paper, I spell out these aspects of Ramsey’s epistemology in more detail than has been done so far. I argue that Ramsey anticipates contemporary reliabilist accounts of justified belief and justified degree of belief. I also flesh out Ramsey’s reasons for being a reliabilist. This is worth doing since Ramsey has one of the earliest arguments for reliabilism, but it has received scarce attention. Also, Ramsey calls his reliabilism “a kind of pragmatism,” and examining the argument will help us clarify Ramsey’s pragmatist commitments and better understand his version of reliabilism. I argue that when viewed through contemporary lenses, Ramsey’s reliabilism contains revisionist elements: he’s not opposed to what we now call “conceptual engineering.”
    Found 3 weeks, 1 day ago on Ergo
  26. 1943679.564988
    Emotions can get things right and serve us in many productive ways. They can also get things wrong and harm our epistemic or practical endeavors. Resenting somebody for having insulted your friend gets it wrong when your friend well understood that the remark was a joke. On the other hand, if your friend is not familiar with the given cultural context and hence couldn’t quite grasp the subtly sexist nature of the joke, your resentment might not only be appropriate but also help her navigate the new social context. Hoping that your meeting with your supervisor will be productive might motivate you to prepare better but will be inappropriate if all your previous meetings were failures.
    Found 3 weeks, 1 day ago on Ergo
  27. 1943707.564993
    Besides disagreeing about how much one should donate to charity, moral theories also disagree about where one should donate. In many cases, one intuitively attractive option is to split your donations across all of the charities that are recommended by theories in which you have positive credence, with each charity’s share being proportional to your credence in the theories that recommend it. Despite the fact that something like this approach is already widely used by real-world philanthropists to distribute billions of dollars, it is not supported by any account of handling decisions under moral uncertainty that has been proposed thus far in the literature. This paper develops a new bargaining-based approach that honors the proportionality intuition. We also show how this approach has several advantages over the best alternative proposals.
    Found 3 weeks, 1 day ago on Ergo
  28. 1943861.564998
    A moral requirement R1 is said to be lexically prior to a moral requirement R just in case we are morally obliged to uphold R1 at the expense of R2—no matter how many times R2 must be violated thereby. While lexical priority is a feature of many ethical theories, and arguably a part of common sense morality, attempts to model it within the framework of decision theory have led to a series of problems—a fact which is sometimes spun as a “decision theoretic critique” of lexical priority. In this paper, I develop an enriched decision theoretic framework that is capable of model-ling lexical priority while avoiding all extant problems. This will involve introducing several new ingredients into the standard decision theoretic framework, including multidimensional utilities, de minimis risks, and the means to represent two different conceptions of risk.
    Found 3 weeks, 1 day ago on Ergo
  29. 1943956.565003
    Skeptical theists contend that human cognitive limitations undermine atheistic arguments from evil. One recent challenge to skeptical theism has been posed by Climenhaga (2025), who argues that if we should—as some skeptical theists argue— be agnostic about the probability of the total collection of evils we observe given theism, Pr(E|T), we should also be agnostic about the probability of theism given these evils, Pr(T|E), and therefore be agnostic with respect to God’s existence. If one is persuaded, as I am, that Climenhaga’s argument is correct, the most promising skeptical theist response available seems to be one of mitigation: concede that Pr(E|T) is not inscrutable—and thereby concede skeptical theism cannot undermine arguments from the total collection of observable evils to the nonexistence of God— but maintain that skeptical theism is still able to undermine other Bayesian problems of evil; namely, those which argue from some individual instance of observable evil to the nonexistence of God. However, as I will argue, this mitigation strategy is not viable: if Pr(Ei|T) is inscrutable, where Pr(Ei|T) is the probability of any individual instance of observable evil occurring given theism, so too is Pr(E|T) correspondingly inscrutable. Therefore, absent demonstrating Climenhaga to be incorrect, skeptical theism cannot undermine any Bayesian arguments from evil.
    Found 3 weeks, 1 day ago on Ergo
  30. 1985608.565008
    What is the point of inquiry? Some say that the aim of inquiring into some question is to come to know its answer; others, that the aim is to attain justified belief, epistemic improvement, or some other coveted epistemic status. Still others eschew “aim” talk altogether, and instead formulate norms governing inquiry. However, virtually all extant work on inquiry has agreed on at least this much: the aims or norms of inquiry can be specified in terms of the epistemic states of the inquirer (i.e., the agent conducting the inquiry). This paper argues that this conception of inquiry struggles to account for some central features of what is arguably the most successful form of inquiry in the modern era: scientific inquiry. We show that scientific inquiry is governed by several distinctive norms that are difficult to explain if inquiry is all about achieving epistemic benefits for the inquirer. Instead, many inquiries aim to confer epistemic benefits on others. This “inclusive” conception of inquiry has important advantages and implications.
    Found 3 weeks, 1 day ago on Bob Beddor's site