Philosophical Progresshttp://www.philosophicalprogress.org/2024-10-28T23:59:00ZArticles and blog posts found on 28 October 20242024-10-28T23:59:00Z2024-10-28T23:59:00ZPhilosophical Progresstag:www.philosophicalprogress.org,2024-10-28://<b>Lisa Herzog, Frank Hindriks, Rafael Wittek: <a href="https://pure.rug.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/1132160252/how-institutions-decay-towards-an-endogenous-theory.pdf">How institutions decay: towards an endogenous theory</a></b> (pdf, 9935 words)<br /> <div>Herzog, L., Hindriks, F., & Wittek, R. (2024). How institutions decay: towards an endogenous theory. Economics and Philosophy. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267124000208 Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). More information can be found on the University of Groningen website: https://www.rug.nl/library/open-access/self-archiving-pure/taverne-amendment.</div><br />
<b>D. G. Mayo's blog: <a href="https://errorstatistics.com/2024/10/27/panel-discussion-questions-from-my-neyman-lecture-severity-as-a-basic-concept-in-philosophy-of-statistics/">Panel Discussion Questions from my Neyman Lecture: “Severity as a basic concept in philosophy of statistics”</a></b> (html, 649 words)<br /> <div>My Neyman Seminar in the Statistics Department at Berkeley was followed by a lively panel discussion including 4 Berkeley faculty, orchestrated by Ryan Giordano (Dept of Statistics):
- Xueyin Snow Zhang (Dept. …</div><br />
Articles and blog posts found on 27 October 20242024-10-27T23:59:00Z2024-10-27T23:59:00ZPhilosophical Progresstag:www.philosophicalprogress.org,2024-10-27://<b>Andrew Richmond: <a href="https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/24113/1/Richmond%20-%20Computational%20Externalism%20(preprint).pdf">Computational Externalism</a></b> (pdf, 12927 words)<br /> <div>I argue that the brain does not have its computational structure intrinsically, but only in relation to its environment. I support this view (externalism) with a case study in the neuroscience and evolutionary biology of color vision, showing that which aspects of the brain’s causal structure rise to the level of computation — which features of its causal structure count as part of its functional structure or “wiring diagram” — depends on its environment. I show that this version of externalism helps answer some pressing methodological questions in neuroscience and explainable AI. Along the way I connect some traditional debates about externalism to contemporary cognitive science, and demonstrate the promise of a deflationary approach to cognitive scientific explanation.</div><br />
<b>Carlo Rovelli: <a href="https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/24112/1/ScienceandRQM.pdf">Can Alice do science and have friends, in a relational quantum world?
Solipsism and Relational Quantum Mechanics</a></b> (pdf, 4988 words)<br /> <div>Some authors have stated that relational understandings of quantum phenomena [Kochen 1985, Bene-Dieks 2002, Berkovitz-Hemmo 2006, Conroy 2012, Mermin- Fuchs-Schack 2014, Healey 2012, Brukner 2015, Auffeves- Grangier, 2016 Zwirn, 2016] and in particular Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) [Rovelli 1996], lead to a form of solipsism [Pienar 2021], and worried that this solipsism could undermine the possibility of doing science.</div><br />
<b>Markus Kneer: <a href="https://philpapers.org/archive/KNETNO-2.pdf">The norm of assertion: Empirical data</a></b> (pdf, 6505 words)<br /> <div>Assertions are speech acts by means of which we express beliefs. As such they are at the heart of our linguistic and social practices. Recent research has focused extensively on the question whether the speech act of assertion is governed by norms, and if so, under what conditions it is acceptable to make an assertion. Standard theories propose, for instance, that one should only assert that p if one knows that p (the knowledge account), or that one should only assert that p if p is true (the truth account). In a series of four experiments, this question is addressed empirically. Contrary to previous findings, knowledge turns out to be a poor predictor of assertability, and the norm of assertion is not factive either. The studies here presented provide empirical evidence in favour of the view that a speaker is warranted to assert that p only if her belief that p is justified.</div><br />
<b>Patrick Neal Rooyakkers: <a href="https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/24114/1/All_About_Actual_Accuracy_Dominance%20(6).pdf">All About Actual Accuracy-Dominance</a></b> (pdf, 10898 words)<br /> <div>We have lots of good arguments for a variety of epistemic norms on how you should plan to change your credences or beliefs upon coming to possess new evidence. We don’t have many good arguments for how you should actually change your credences or beliefs in response to receiving new evidence. Sure, we do have some arguments for actual epistemic norms, but none of them are the gold standard in the field, that is, none of them are accuracy-dominance arguments. Here we fill this gap. Doing so requires some conceptual development about good and bad ways to evaluate your epistemic performance. In short: your evidence, while not directly placing constraints on your rational attitudes, places a constraint on how you should evaluate your epistemic performance. If you possess evidence E, it seems, from your point of view, bad to take non-E worlds as relevant to the assessment of your epistemic performance. Using this idea, we develop an accuracy-dominance argument for Actual Conditionalization and a variety of other actual updating norms.</div><br />
<b>Rafael-Andrés Aemañ.Berenguer: <a href="https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/24111/1/Philosophical%20lesson%20from%20the%20controversy%20on%20the%20consistency%20of%20classic%20electrodynamics.pdf">Philosophical lesson from the controversy on the consistency of classic electrodynamics</a></b> (pdf, 5594 words)<br /> <div>At the beginning of the 21st century, a peculiar discussion about the possible existence of unresolvable contradictions in the conceptual bases of classical electrodynamics was carried out. The arguments put forward to point out such alleged inconsistencies, as well as the replies they received, constitute an excellent example of scientific controversy from which electromagnetic theory emerged unscathed. However, the details of the debate show that classical physics, far from being devoid of interesting problems, can still accommodate various and profound lines of research of a fundamental nature.</div><br />
<b>Raoni Wohnrath Arroyo, Matteo Morganti: <a href="https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/24110/1/The%20game%20of%20metaphysics__PREPRINT.pdf">The game of metaphysics: towards a fictionalist (meta)metaphysics of science</a></b> (pdf, 9282 words)<br /> <div><b>RÉSUMÉ:</b> La métaphysique est traditionnellement conçue comme visant la vérité — en réalité les vérités les plus fondamentales sur les caractéristiques les plus générales de la réalité. Les partisans du naturalisme philosophique, qui insistent pour que les revendications philosophiques soient fondées sur la science, ont souvent adopté une attitude éliminativiste à l'égard de la métaphysique, n’accordant par conséquent que peu d’attention à cette définition. Dans la littérature plus récente, toutefois, le naturalisme a plutôt été interprété comme signifiant que la conception traditionnelle de la métaphysique ne peut être acceptée que si l'on est réaliste scientifique (et que l'on met les bonnes contraintes sur les revendications métaphysiques acceptables).</div><br />
<b>Ryan Miller: <a href="https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/24109/1/lonerganemergence-sms.pdf">Lonergan's Oddly Strong Theory of Emergence</a></b> (pdf, 4887 words)<br /> <div>Jessica Wilson (2021) offers three characterizations of strong emergence: (1) heuristically, when higher-level features cannot in-principle be deduced from lower-level features, (2) the rejection of Physical Causal Closure in the emergence hexalemma, and (3) when a higher-level feature depends on lower-level features but has a novel power. I explicate Bernard Lonergan (1992 [1957])’s account of emergence to argue that these three characterizations come apart. Lonergan’s account is only weak emergence according to (1), and affirms Physical Causal Closure by denying adjunct premises rather than any of the assumptions of the emergence hexalemma, yet counts as strong emergence according to (3).</div><br />
<b>Mostly Aesthetics: <a href="https://mostly.substack.com/p/holy-sonnet-xiv">Holy Sonnet XIV</a></b> (html, 650 words)<br /> <div>An artwork is better if it’s unified—its parts working together for a single end. If this definition is fuzzier than you like, is greater precision possible? The philosopher Monroe Beardsley, in his massively-comprehensive opus Aesthetics, did no better: unified works, he wrote, “contain nothing that does not belong; it all fits together.” This may be informative enough, because we know unity when we see it, but still, there’s value in looking, and in analyzing what we see. …</div><br />
Articles and blog posts found on 26 October 20242024-10-26T23:59:00Z2024-10-26T23:59:00ZPhilosophical Progresstag:www.philosophicalprogress.org,2024-10-26://<b>Elinor Mason: <a href="https://doc-0g-b0-docs.googleusercontent.com/docs/securesc/ha0ro937gcuc7l7deffksulhg5h7mbp1/8cd7s6kfrh85giqrkaqdnr8s2hi2vj2l/1729950450000/10945312788177292997/*/1Os6ypSADGwb3YM_F8urL2XrN7Y4fX_lF?e=download&uuid=a384fe81-d252-4ee8-b9a3-c64cc804d3bf">Taking Responsibility</a></b> (pdf, 6279 words)<br /> <div>Another usage of the phrase, ‘taking responsibility’ applies to something that has already happened rather than something that the agent is undertaking. Someone might say, ‘I take responsibility for the damage to your car’. In that case, they could be saying that they <i>are</i> responsible (and always were), and now they are owning up to that fact. But the phrase does not always imply that the person accepts that the damage was their fault, or that they feel they are responsible in a basic sense. People often talk about ‘taking responsibility’ when they accept <i>liability,</i> that is, when they accept that it is their duty to repair or recompense for a harm to another person. Liability does not always require basic responsibility: there are other links to the agent that will justify liability. It may be that the agent’s children or pets damaged the car, and so she is not responsible in a basic sense.</div><br />
<b>Elinor Mason: <a href="https://doc-0c-b0-docs.googleusercontent.com/docs/securesc/ha0ro937gcuc7l7deffksulhg5h7mbp1/8bbl483qr6nlpdpjb5co5nrppanr1oj8/1729950375000/10945312788177292997/*/1DQnN1z_0epqBJD8-GO2otMQG19EXCiLA?e=download&uuid=11821448-84a9-4089-9045-bd3360cada6d">Negligence, Recklessness, Strict Liability</a></b> (pdf, 10217 words)<br /> <div>This article focusses on arguments concerning the blameworthiness, or culpability, of negligence. Roughly speaking, a negligent action is a harmful action that is done inadvertently. The article sets out the puzzle of negligence and contrasts it with recklessness and strict liability. Unlike recklessness, negligence does not involve an awareness of the risk taken. On the other hand, negligence seems more plausible as a genuine ground of culpability than strict liability. The article surveys the various arguments that have been given for the culpability of negligence, and suggests that we will not find grounds for blameworthiness in pure negligence. However, there may nonetheless be ways to vindicate legal and informal practices of negligence responsibility.</div><br />
<b>Under the Net: <a href="https://ksetiya.substack.com/p/how-do-you-get-to-carnegie-hall">How Do You Get to Carnegie Hall?</a></b> (html, 835 words)<br /> <div>Like many superficially accomplished people, my life strategy has been to stick with things at which I was immediately adept and abandon all others. Take philosophy. It’s not that I was great at it when I started out, or that I haven’t got better, but I showed some early promise and so I persevered. …</div><br />
Articles and blog posts found on 25 October 20242024-10-25T23:59:00Z2024-10-25T23:59:00ZPhilosophical Progresstag:www.philosophicalprogress.org,2024-10-25://<b>Elinor Mason: <a href="https://doc-0o-b0-docs.googleusercontent.com/docs/securesc/ha0ro937gcuc7l7deffksulhg5h7mbp1/ccgr2b6q1665kkcprd87j6aacspjf9u3/1729892700000/10945312788177292997/*/1FI35dDF1H8NacO041Mf-F9viXNnCSGA1?e=download&uuid=350c3722-e55f-4dfc-9465-2f63dc30ad37">False Consciousness and Fragile Agency: Towards a Solidarity Response</a></b> (pdf, 10887 words)<br /> <div>This chapter explores the blameworthiness of everyday compliance with oppressive norms. Any account of the appropriate response should meet two desiderata: first, it should make sense of the difference in position, and corresponding difference in appropriate response, of those in the oppressed groups and those in the oppressor groups (the asymmetry intuition), and second, it should not ignore or undermine the agency of the oppressed person (it should navigate the ‘agency dilemma’). I argue that neither traditional stinging response, such as blame or shame, nor traditional therapeutic responses such as those a clinician may take, are apt in the case of wrongdoing that is due to false consciousness. False consciousness does damage agency, but it does not undermine it completely. The chapter proposes a solidarity based response, which is primarily appropriate between those who are in the same group. This makes sense of the relevance of different social positions without denying that those in the oppressed group are also in the grip of false consciousness. It avoids the problem of being patronizing because it is limited to those who are in the same situation, and so does not have a hierarchical structure.</div><br />
<b>Elinor Mason: <a href="https://doc-08-b0-docs.googleusercontent.com/docs/securesc/ha0ro937gcuc7l7deffksulhg5h7mbp1/lv19jvn49gpoohnmu095vk0lra9180er/1729892700000/10945312788177292997/*/1jbQRcgSHP-fafS4ZtA9zdms4IE4cHKnV?e=download&uuid=f7d11a71-6aed-4082-a978-7c59c3ca1ac0">Being in the World: Self-Conception and Taking Responsibility</a></b> (pdf, 10857 words)<br /> <div>This paper builds on one of Raz’s most interesting contributions to responsibility theory: his argument for the claim that we are responsible for some inadvertent actions. Raz argues that, as persons, we are not separable from our interactions with the world. (Raz, <i>From Normativity to Responsibility</i>). The world sometimes cooperates, and it sometimes does not, but in order to act at all, we need to see ourselves a certain way: as having “a domain of secure competence”, and within our domain of secure competence, we see ourselves as responsible. Raz thinks that an important aspect of our sense of self (or possibly an <i>inescapable</i> aspect of our sense of self) entails that we can (or possibly, must) take responsibility in some cases where we do not meet the traditional control and intention conditions. I will call this, ‘expansive responsibility’.</div><br />
<b>Marcel Weber: <a href="https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/24108/1/Weber_Modeling%20the%20Biologically%20Possible_penultimate%20draft.pdf">Modeling the Biologically Possible: Evolvability as a Modal Concept</a></b> (pdf, 10293 words)<br /> <div>Biological modalities, i.e., biologically possible, impossible, or necessary states of affairs have not received much attention from philosophers. Yet, it is widely agreed that there are biological constraints on physically possible states of affairs, such that not everything that is physically possible is also biologically possible, even if everything that is biologically possible is also physically possible. Furthermore, biologists use concepts that appear to be modal in nature, such as the concept of <i>evolvability</i> in evolutionary developmental biology, or “evo-devo.” The present chapter investigates what kind of modality underlies the concept of evolvability. This concept tries to capture the capacity of an organism or a lineage to sustain genetic changes that enable it to evolve or to evolve adaptively. The basic idea of the proposed approach is to construe evolvability as a kind of accessibility in a modal space. The difficult part is to specify this modal space and the relevant accessibility relation. While there may not be a general way of defining such a relation, there exist model systems for which it is possible, e.g., evolving small RNAs. The modal space in such cases turns out to be quite distinct from those constructed by philosophers, e.g., David Lewis’s similarity metric for possible worlds. Even though the biological case examined here is quite special, attending to the way in which biological possibilities are modeled in this case harbors some general lessons about biological modalities, in particular their dependence on the explanatory goals of the models modeling modality.</div><br />
<b>Muhammad Ali Khalidi: <a href="https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/24103/1/Khalidi%202023%20Natural%20kinds%20Cambridge%20Elements.pdf">Natural Kinds</a></b> (pdf, 34469 words)<br /> <div>This series of Elements in Philosophy of Science provides an extensive overview of the themes, topics and debates which constitute the philosophy of science. Distinguished specialists provide an up-to-date summary of the results of current research on their topics, as well as offering their own take on those topics and drawing original conclusions.</div><br />
<b>Robert Pasnau: <a href="https://spot.colorado.edu/~pasnau/inprint/pasnau.who_killed.pdf">Who killed the causality of things?</a></b> (pdf, 15920 words)<br /> <div>Modern analyses of causation standardly treat cause and effect as events. Disagreement persists over what exactly events are, and whether some nearby analysis—perhaps in terms of facts or states of affairs—might be superior. There is, however, not much sympathy for the traditional understanding of causes as persisting things, whether those be substances, powers, or properties. One does still find hearty bands of enthusiasts who defend such old-school ideas. But to endorse things as causes requires setting oneself against the mainstream of research in the metaphysics of causation.</div><br />
<b>Theodore Sider: <a href="https://tedsider.org/papers/package_deal.pdf">Accept no substitutes: Against best-system theories without naturalness</a></b> (pdf, 14766 words)<br /> <div>The best-system theory of lawhood is understandably popular (especially in the philosophy-of-science wing of metaphysics), above all because it avoids the metaphysical excesses of more inflationary competitors. But some regard its best-known version, namely, David Lewis’s, as still being too inflationary. “Lite” versions have been developed that attempt to avoid Lewis’s reliance on a distinction between natural and non-natural properties. The concerns about naturalness are misguided. Lewis’s theory doesn’t introduce a problematic gap between the metaphysics of laws and the aims of physics. And lite best-system theories (which come in different flavors) have their own troubles. Accept no substitutes! The best best-system theory is the original, still with 100% naturalness.</div><br />
<b>Azimuth: <a href="https://johncarlosbaez.wordpress.com/2024/10/25/triangulations-of-the-sphere/">Triangulations of the Sphere</a></b> (html, 620 words)<br /> <div>If you cut out the yellow shape here, you can fold it up along the red lines, and all 11 sharp tips will meet at one point! You’ll get a polyhedron with 12 corners, tiled by equilateral triangles. 5 triangles meet at each corner. …</div><br />
Articles and blog posts found on 24 October 20242024-10-24T23:59:00Z2024-10-24T23:59:00ZPhilosophical Progresstag:www.philosophicalprogress.org,2024-10-24://<b>Adam Koberinski, Chris Smeenk: <a href="https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/24102/1/Inflation-PhilSciArchive.pdf">Establishing a theory of inflationary cosmology</a></b> (pdf, 14590 words)<br /> <div>Inflation remains a promising, yet speculative, account of structure formation in the early universe. In this paper, we provide a general account of what is needed to establish a speculative theory, and apply the account to inflation. Particular challenges for inflation are its flexibility as a phenomenological framework, and the lack of empirical access to test seemingly independent features of specific realizations of inflation. This makes it difficult to leverage initial empirical successes to learn further physical details about the inflationary epoch. One prima facie appealing response is to treat phenomenological accounts of inflation as effective field theories (EFTs), screening off details of higher-energy physics. We argue that inflation is a poor fit into the EFT framework due to its sensitivity to high-energy physics. We close by stating specific recommendations to take steps towards establishing inflation as part of a theory of the early universe that follow from our approach.</div><br />
<b>Alan C. Love: <a href="https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/24095/1/evolution-and-development.pdf">Evolution and Development: Conceptual Issues</a></b> (pdf, 35540 words)<br /> <div>The intersection of development and evolution has always harbored conceptual issues, but many of these are on display in contemporary evolutionary developmental biology (evodevo). These issues include: (1) the precise constitution of evo-devo, with its focus on both the evolution of development and the developmental basis of evolution, and how it fits within evolutionary theory; (2) the nature of evo-devo model systems that comprise the material of comparative and experimental research; (3) the puzzle of how to understand the widely used notion of “conserved mechanisms”; (4) the definition of evolutionary novelties and expectations for how to explain them; and (5) the demand of interdisciplinary collaboration that derives from investigating complex phenomena at key moments in the history of life, such as the fin–limb transition.</div><br />
<b>Dustin Lazarovici: <a href="https://mdpi-res.com/d_attachment/quantumrep/quantumrep-06-00031/article_deploy/quantumrep-06-00031.pdf?version=1725615739">Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics from the Perspective of Boltzmannian Statistical Mechanics</a></b> (pdf, 9774 words)<br /> <div>This paper examines no-hidden-variables theorems in quantum mechanics from the point of view of statistical mechanics. It presents a general analysis of the measurement process in the Boltzmannian framework that leads to a characterization of (in)compatible measurements and reproduces several features of quantum probabilities often described as “non-classical”. The analysis is applied to versions of the Kochen–Specker and Bell theorems to shed more light on their implications. It is shown how, once the measurement device and the active role of the measurement process are taken into account, contextuality appears as a natural feature of random variables. This corroborates Bell’s criticism that no-go results of the Kochen–Specker type are based on gratuitous assumptions. In contrast, Bell-type theorems are much more profound, but should be understood as nonlocality theorems rather than no-hidden-variables theorems. Finally, the paper addresses misunderstandings and misleading terminology that have confused the debate about hidden variables in quantum mechanics.</div><br />
<b>Richard Moore, Giulia Palazzolo: <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/animal-communication/">Animal Communication</a></b> (html, 18374 words)<br /> <div>It is intuitive to think that animals communicate. This intuition
shapes our everyday interactions with animals, and guides much
empirical and theoretical research. Pet owners take their cats’
meows to be requests for food, and interpret their dogs’ play
bows as invitations to play. Meanwhile, scholars argue that bees use
their dances to communicate information about the location of food,
and that the flashing behaviours of fireflies communicate sexual
availability to potential mates. But what is animal communication? While it may seem obvious to us that animals communicate, it is more
difficult to say what makes their behaviours communicative.</div><br />
<b>Rolf Pfister: <a href="https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/24104/1/The%20Role%20of%20Overdetermination%20and%20Alternative%20Implication%20in%20the%20Evaluation%20of%20Conditionals.pdf">The Role of Overdetermination and Alternative Implication in the Evaluation of Conditionals</a></b> (pdf, 11102 words)<br /> <div>In this article, the suppositional account and different approaches of relevance conditionals are analysed on a specific type of conditional: Conditionals whose antecedent and consequent have a relevance connection, but where the acceptability of the antecedent has no influence on the acceptability of the consequent. Such conditionals occur in cases of multiple implication of a consequent, as in overdetermination. When evaluating such conditionals, the approaches examined lead to different and partly incoherent results. It is argued that approaches to conditionals should consider such conditionals acceptable, which is a challenge for e.g. approaches based on statistical measures. Furthermore, it is argued that the probability of a conditional should be evaluated only according to the strength of the relevance connection between the antecedent and the consequent, but not according to other relevance connections. It is shown that only two approaches correctly evaluate such conditionals, one of which, inferentialism, may provide a basis for a coherent theory of conditionals.</div><br />
<b>Yifeng Ding, Wesley H. Holliday, Eric Pacuit: <a href="https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00355-024-01539-w.pdf">An axiomatic characterization of Split Cycle</a></b> (pdf, 23511 words)<br /> <div>A number of rules for resolving majority cycles in elections have been proposed in the literature. Recently, Holliday and Pacuit (J Theor Polit 33:475–524, 2021) axiomatically characterized the class of rules refined by one such cycle-resolving rule, dubbed Split Cycle: in each majority cycle, discard the majority preferences with the smallest majority margin. They showed that any rule satisfying five standard axioms plus a weakening of Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), called Coherent IIA, is refined by Split Cycle. In this paper, we go further and show that Split Cycle is the only rule satisfying the axioms of Holliday and Pacuit together with two additional axioms, which characterize the class of rules that refine Split Cycle: Coherent Defeat and Positive Involvement in Defeat. Coherent Defeat states that any majority preference not occurring in a cycle is retained, while Positive Involvement in Defeat is closely related to the well-known axiom of Positive Involvement (as in J Pérez Soc Choice Welf 18:601–616, 2001). We characterize Split Cycle not only as a collective choice rule but also as a social choice correspondence, over both profiles of linear ballots and profiles of ballots allowing ties.</div><br />
<b>Alexander Pruss's Blog: <a href="http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2024/10/an-impartiality-premise.html">An impartiality premise</a></b> (html, 342 words)<br /> <div>In an argument that David Lewis’s account of possible worlds leads to inductive skepticism, I used this premise:
- If knowing that x is F (where F is purely non-indexical and x is a definite description or proper name) does not epistemically justify inferring that x is G (where G is purely non-indexical), then neither does knowing x is F and that x is I (now, here, etc. …</div><br />
<b>Alexander Pruss's Blog: <a href="http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2024/10/a-new-kind-of-project.html">A new kind of project</a></b> (html, 124 words)<br /> <div>here). In the screenshot, the markers 1 and 2 are landmarks, identified and outlined in green with OpenCV library code, and then the phone uses their positions and the accelerometer data to predict where the control markers 3 and 4 are on the screen, outlining them in red. …</div><br />
Articles and blog posts found on 23 October 20242024-10-23T23:59:00Z2024-10-23T23:59:00ZPhilosophical Progresstag:www.philosophicalprogress.org,2024-10-23://<b>Christian de Ronde, Raimundo Fernández Mouján, Cesar Massri: <a href="https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/24093/1/de%20Ronde,%20FM%20&%20Massri%20-%20Tensorial%20QM.pdf">Tensorial Quantum Mechanics: Back to Heisenberg and Beyond</a></b> (pdf, 9605 words)<br /> <div>In this work we discuss the establishment of Standard Quantum Mechanics (SQM) developed through Schrodinger’s and Dirac’s wave-vectorial reformulations of Heisenberg’s original matrix mechanics. We will argue that while Heisenberg’s approach was consistently developed —taking as a standpoint the intensive patterns that were observed in the lab— as an invariant-operational formalism, Dirac’s axiomatic re-formulation was, instead, developed —taking as a standpoint Schrodinger’s wave mechanics and the methodological guide of Bohr and logical positivists— as an essentially inconsistent “recipe” intended (but unable) to predict (binary) measurement outcomes. Leaving SQM behind and attempting to restore the consistent and coherent account of a real state of affairs, we will present a new tensorial proposal which —taking as a standpoint Heisenberg’ original approach— will prove capable not only to extend the matrix formalism to a tensorial representation but also to account for new experimental phenomena. Keywords: matrix mechanics, tensors, quantum mechanics, realism.</div><br />
<b>Dana Matthiessen: <a href="https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/24092/1/Crystallizing%20Techniques%20-%20final,%20unblinded.pdf">Crystallizing Techniques: Sample Preparations, Technical Knowledge, and the Characterization of Blood Crystals, 1840-1909</a></b> (pdf, 13285 words)<br /> <div><b></b>Sample preparation is the process of altering a naturally occurring object into a representative form that is amenable to scientific inquiry. Preparation is an important preliminary to data collection, ubiquitous in the life sciences and elsewhere, yet relatively neglected in historical and philosophical literature. This paper presents a detailed historical case study involving the preparation and study of blood crystals in the nineteenth century. The case is used to highlight significant features of preparation, which aid our understanding of the epistemology of sciences in which preparations play an important role. First, it shows the role of technical knowledge in efforts to characterize a scientific phenomenon or object of interest. Especially in early stages of characterization, scientists improve their understanding of what they are preparing by better understanding their preparation procedures. Second, this case contributes to recent views of characterization as a relatively autonomous domain of scientific activity. It shows how preparation functions as a site for integrating different experimental methods, and the difficulties that ensue. In light of these considerations, the case shows how characterization is capable of shaping or constraining explanatory pursuits as much as it is guided by them.</div><br />
<b>Eddy Keming Chen, Roderich Tumulka: <a href="https://www.eddykemingchen.net/uploads/4/6/1/3/46137503/chen_and_tumulka_arxiv_2024.pdf">Typical Quantum States of the Universe are Observationally Indistinguishable</a></b> (pdf, 9401 words)<br /> <div>This paper is about the epistemology of quantum theory. We establish a new result about a limitation to knowledge of its central object—the quantum state of the universe. We show that, if the universal quantum state can be assumed to be a typical unit vector from a high-dimensional subspace of Hilbert space (such as the subspace defined by a low-entropy macro-state as prescribed by the Past Hypothesis), then no observation can determine (or even just narrow down significantly) which vector it is. Typical state vectors, in other words, are observationally indistinguishable from each other. Our argument is based on a typicality theorem from quantum statistical mechanics. We also discuss how theoretical considerations that go beyond the empirical evidence might bear on this fact and on our knowledge of the universal quantum state.</div><br />
<b>Elisabetta Lalumera: <a href="https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/24097/1/Lalumera-Philosophical%20Issues%20in%20Medical%20Imaging-OHPM-25.docx">24 Philosophical Issues in Medical Imaging</a></b> (doc, 13397 words)<br /> <div>This chapter aims to shed light on the normative questions raised by medical imaging (MI), paving the way for interdisciplinary dialogue and further philosophical exploration. MI comprises noninvasive techniques aimed at visualizing internal human body structures to aid in explanation, diagnosis, and monitoring of health conditions. MI requires interpretation by specialized professionals, and is routinely employed across medical disciplines. It is entrenched in clinical guidelines and therapeutic interventions. Moreover, it is a dynamic research field, witnessing ongoing technological advancements. After surveying philosophical issues arising from MI, which are relatively unexplored, the chapter focuses on the epistemology of diagnostic imaging.</div><br />
<b>Inmaculada de Melo-Martín: <a href="https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/24094/1/Contextual%20Values%20and%20the%20legitimate-illegitimate%20distinction.pdf">Concerns about Contextual Values in Science and the Legitimate/Illegitimate Distinction</a></b> (pdf, 9915 words)<br /> <div>Philosophers of science have come to accept that contextual values can play unavoidable and desirable roles in science. This has raised concerns about the need to distinguish legitimate and illegitimate value influences in scientific inquiry. I discuss here four such concerns: epistemic distortion, value imposition, undermining of public trust in science, and the use of objectionable values. I contend that preserving epistemic integrity and avoiding value imposition provide good reasons to attempt to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate influences of values in science. However, the trust and the objectionable values concerns constitute no good reason for demarcation criteria.</div><br />
<b>Justin Holder: <a href="https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/24090/1/Poincar%C3%A9s%20Radical%20Ontology%20philsci%20archive.pdf">Poincaré’s Radical Ontology</a></b> (pdf, 13557 words)<br /> <div>I present an exegesis of Henri Poincaré’s metaphysical position in three key essays within his book, <i>The Value of Science</i>. In doing so, I argue for three theses: First, that Poincaré’s metaphysical position in these sources is incompatible with his metaphysical position in his earlier book, <i>Science and Hypothesis</i>. Second, that the phenomenological relationism defended by Poincaré in these sources is not a form of structural realism but a structuralist form of empiricism, and (by design) has no greater metaphysical commitments than constructive empiricism. Third, that Poincaré holds in these sources that the existence of the external world is merely a convention. These theses serve to correct misconceptions about the consistency of Poincaré’s philosophical corpus, about his position(s) on the realism/anti-realism landscape, and about the scope of his conventionalism.</div><br />
<b>The Brains Blog: <a href="https://philosophyofbrains.com/2024/10/23/rethinking-biological-functions.aspx">Rethinking Biological Functions</a></b> (html, 3412 words)<br /> <div>Mindcraft is a series of opinion posts on current issues in cognitive science by Brains Blog founder Gualtiero Piccinini. Do you agree? Disagree? Please contribute on the discussion board below! If you’d like to write a full-length response, please contact editor Dan Burnston. …</div><br />
<b>Alexander Pruss's Blog: <a href="http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2024/10/aristotelian-sciences.html">Aristotelian sciences</a></b> (html, 144 words)<br /> <div>There is an Aristotelian picture of knowledge on which all knowable things are divided exhaustively and exclusively into sciences by subject matter. This picture appears wrong. Suppose, after all, that p is a fact from one science—say, the natural science fact that water is wet—and q is a fact from another science—say, the anthropological fact that people pursue pleasure. …</div><br />
<b>The Archimedean Point: <a href="https://cyrilhedoin.substack.com/p/arguing-with-unreasonable-persons">Arguing with Unreasonable Persons</a></b> (html, 1483 words)<br /> <div>I wrote last week about a kind of applied political philosophy conundrum that people like Donald Trump create for those of us who endorse the idea of public reason. As polls and predictive models are now putting Trump slightly ahead in the presidential race, I would like to expand on this discussion briefly. …</div><br />
<b>D. G. Mayo's blog: <a href="https://errorstatistics.com/2024/10/22/response-to-ben-rechts-post-what-is-statistics-purpose-on-my-neyman-seminar/">Response to Ben Recht’s post “What is Statistics’ Purpose?” on my Neyman seminar</a></b> (html, 2802 words)<br /> <div>There was a very valuable panel discussion after my October 9 Neyman Seminar in the Statistics Department at UC Berkeley. I want to respond to many of the questions put forward by the participants (Ben Recht, Philip Stark, Bin Yu, Snow Zhang) that we did not address during that panel. …</div><br />
Articles and blog posts found on 22 October 20242024-10-22T23:59:00Z2024-10-22T23:59:00ZPhilosophical Progresstag:www.philosophicalprogress.org,2024-10-22://<b>Elzė Sigutė Mikalonytė, Ryan Doran, Shen-yi Liao: <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/experimental-aesthetics/">Experimental Philosophy of Art and Aesthetics</a></b> (html, 18139 words)<br /> <div>Experimental philosophy of art and aesthetics is the application of
the methods of
experimental philosophy
to questions about art and
aesthetics. By taking a scientific approach to experiences with art
and aesthetic phenomena, it is continuous with the longstanding
research program in psychology called <i>empirical aesthetics</i>
(see Nadal & Vartanian 2022 for overviews of work in this
program). However, it is also continuous with traditional research in
philosophy of art and aesthetics because it is centered on many of the
same timeless questions. Like other branches of experimental
philosophy, such as
experimental moral philosophy,
it involves gathering data using empirical methods and bringing
analyses of the data to bear on theorizing on a wide range of topics
in philosophy of art and aesthetics: definition of art, ontology of
art, aesthetic properties, aesthetic judgments, aesthetic adjectives,
morality and aesthetics, and emotion and art.</div><br />
<b>Katherine Ritchie, Henry Schiller: <a href="http://www.kcritchie.com/documents/papers/Ritchie_Schiller_Default%20Domain%20Restrictions.pdf">Default Domain Restriction Possibilities</a></b> (pdf, 18472 words)<br /> <div>We start with an observation about implicit quantifier domain restriction: certain implicit restrictions (e.g., restricting objects by location and time) appear to be more natural and widely available than others (e.g., restricting objects by color, aesthetic, or historical properties). Our aim is to explain why this is. That is, we aim to explain why some implicit domain restriction possibilities are available by default. We argue that, regardless of their other explanatory virtues, extant pragmatic and metasemantic frameworks leave this question unanswered. We then motivate a partially nativist account of domain restriction that involves a minimal view of joint planning around broad shared goals about navigating and influencing our environments augmented with cognitive heuristics that facilitate these. Finally, we sketch how the view can be extended to account for the ways <i>non-default</i> restriction possibilities become available when conversationalists have shared idiosyncratic goals.</div><br />
<b>Katherine Ritchie, Sandeep Prasada: <a href="http://www.kcritchie.com/documents/papers/Ritchie_Prasada_Explaining%20Systematic%20Polysemy_7.8.24.pdf">Explaining Systematic Polysemy: Kinds and Individuation</a></b> (pdf, 12193 words)<br /> <div><b></b> Polysemy is a phenomenon involving single lexical items with multiple related senses. Much theorizing about it has focused on developing linguistic accounts that are responsive to various compositional and representational challenges in semantics and psychology. We focus on an underexplored question: Why does systematic polysemy cluster in the ways it does? That is, why do we see certain regular patterns of sense multiplicity, but not others? Drawing on an independently motivated view of kind cognition—i.e., the formal structures for different classes of kind representations—we argue for an answer centered on conceptual individuation. Specifically, we argue that classes of kind concepts vary in what they individuate (i.e., counting as one and specifying what makes it the same or different from others). By elucidating these differences, we can explain why a range of patterns of systematic polysemy are found cross-linguistically and why other patterns are not attested. Overall, our account provides an explanatory framework addressing an important question at the interface between language and mind and opens new avenues for future theoretical and empirical research.</div><br />
<b>Alexander Pruss's Blog: <a href="http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2024/10/actual-result-utilitarianism-implies.html">Actual result utilitarianism implies a version of total depravity</a></b> (html, 173 words)<br /> <div>Assume actual result utilitarianism on which there are facts of the matter about what would transpire given any possible action of mine, and an action is right just in case it has the best consequences. …</div><br />
<b>Bet On It: <a href="https://www.betonit.ai/p/uae-and-utopia">UAE and Utopia</a></b> (html, 778 words)<br /> <div>I debate immigration habitually. Whenever there’s before-and-after voting, I always lose. No matter how leftist the audience is, the anti-immigration side need only warn “Immigration could hurt some Americans” to flip the vote. …</div><br />