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606465.705752
It seems that from an epistemological point of view comparative probability has many advantages with respect to a probability measure. It is more reasonable as an evaluation of degrees of rational beliefs. It allows the formulation of a comparative indifference principle free from well known paradoxes. Moreover it makes it possible to weaken the principal principle, so that it becomes more reasonable. But the logical systems of comparative probability do not admit an adequate probability updating, which on the contrary is possible for a probability measure. Therefore we are faced with a true epistemological dilemma between comparative and quantitative probability.
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606502.70584
What can philosophy offer the discipline of cognitive archaeology? One answer to this question is: analysis. Philosophers do not have to coordinate excavations, collate findings, or build data sets. Most of our time is spent reading, writing, and thinking. But what should philosophers of cognitive archaeology think about? Luckily, there is no shortage of topics apt for analysis.
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606532.705858
The philosophy of cognitive paleoanthropology involves three related tasks: (1) asking what inferences might be drawn from the paleontological and archaeological records to past cognition, behavior and culture; (2) constructing synthetic accounts of the evolution of distinctive hominin capacities; (3) exploring how results from cognitive paleoanthropology might inform philosophy. We introduce some distinctive cognitive paleoanthropological inferences and discuss their epistemic standing, before considering how attention to the material records and the practice of paleoanthropology can inform and transform philosophical approaches.
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606564.70587
The Bohr and von Neumann views on the measurement process in quantum mechanics have been interpreted for a long time in somewhat controversial terms, often leading to misconceptions. On the basis of some textual analysis, I would like to show that – contrary to a widespread opinion – their views should be taken less inconsistent, and much closer to each other, than usually thought. As a consequence, I claim that Bohr and von Neumann are conceptually on the same side on the issue of the universality of quantum mechanics: hopefully, this might contribute to a more accurate history of the measurement problem in quantum mechanics.
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610835.705886
Accuracy scoring rules measure the epistemic utility of having some credence assignment. For simplicity, let’s assume that all credence assignments are probabilistically coherent. A strictly proper scoring rule has the property that always by one’s own lights, the expected value of one’s actual credence assignment is better than that of any other credence assignment. …
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610836.705899
The Scene: Socrates is watching a massive protest of students at the School of Athens. Elektra, a protest leader, and Leonidas, a merchant, notice Socrates furrowing his brow in puzzlement. Leonidas: [approaches Socrates] Aha, Socrates. …
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610837.70591
This week the Brains Blog is hosting a symposium on Mazviita Chirimuuta’s new book The Brain Abstracted: Simplification in the History and Philosophy of Neuroscience (Open Access: MIT Press). Today’s post from Chirimuuta provides a precis and overview of the content of the book. …
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756060.705921
We take up Jason Brennan’s critique of democracy as formulated in his monograph Against Democracy (2016) and discuss the arguments that Åsa Wikforss presents against Brennan’s views in her book Därför demokrati (2021). Both authors grant the importance of knowledge for political decision-making, but they differ in their respective understandings of what counts as knowledge and they draw very different conclusions from the relevant knowledge requirement. Our general aim is to detect problems in democracy as well as in attempts to criticize democracy. We also briefly consider Brennan’s positive proposal to replace democracy by “epistocracy”, a form of government according to which only those citizens are entitled to vote who are “competent” in a sense to be discussed. Our aim is not to propagate any particular form of government. We merely wish to help the reader to recognize that democracy in particular involves a whole lot of assumptions that are in need of a better justification than what is normally provided.
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776459.705932
Plausibly, a Christian commitment prohibits hedging. Thus in some sense even if one’s own credence in Christianity is less than 100%, one should act “as if it is 100%”, without hedging one’s bets. One shouldn’t have a backup plan if Christianity is false. …
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783849.705943
One of the most annoying myths of PHIL 101 is that any interest in people’s intentions (or quality of will) is inherently “Kantian”, or at least contrary to consequentialism. I disagree: there are obvious reasons to care about whether or not others are acting from good intentions, and consequentialists can say perfectly plausible things here (even though many, traditionally, have failed to do so). …
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804854.705954
I continue my 5-year review of some highlights from the “abandon significance” movement from 2019. This post was first published on this blog on November 30, 2019, It was based on a call by then American Statistical Association President, Karen Kafadar, which sparked a counter-movement. …
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819414.705968
TLDR: Things seem bad. But chart-wielding optimists keep telling us that things are better than they’ve ever been. How to explain this gap? Hypothesis: the point of conversation is to solve problems, so public discourse will focus on the problems—making us all think that things are worse than they are. …
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872764.70598
In this paper, we investigate, by means of a computational model, how individuals map quantifiers onto numbers and how they order quantifiers on a mental line. We selected five English quantifiers (few, fewer than half, many, more than half, and most) which differ in truth conditions and vagueness. We collected binary truth value judgment data in an online quantifier verification experiment. Using a Bayesian three-parameter logistic regression model, we separated three sources of individual differences: truth condition, vagueness, and response error. Clustering on one of the model’s parameter that corresponds to truth conditions revealed four subgroups of participants with different quantifier-to-number mappings and different ranges of the mental line of quantifiers. Our findings suggest multiple sources of individual differences in semantic representations of quantifiers and support a conceptual distinction between different types of imprecision in quantifier meanings. We discuss the consequence of our findings for the main theoretical approaches to quantifiers: the bivalent truth-conditional approach and the fuzzy logic approach. We argue that the former approach neither can explain inter-individual differences nor intra-individual differences in truth conditions of vague quantifiers. The latter approach requires further specification to fully account for individual differences demonstrated in this study.
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877304.705991
When you think about the reasons that may justify the adoption of a democratic regime rather than any other alternative system, most of us will think of the value of political equality, the respect and dignity of persons viewed as moral equals, making sure that everyone’s interests are taken into account in collective-decision making, leaving the possibility of getting rid of incompetent/corrupt political leaders open, favoring the competition between a plurality of views, and probably a few others. …
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882595.706002
How to compute the probability distribution of a detection time, i.e., of the time which a detector registers as the arrival time of a quantum particle, is a long-debated problem. In this regard, Bohmian mechanics provides in a straightforward way the distribution of the time at which the particle actually does arrive at a given surface in 3-space in the absence of detectors. However, as we discuss here, since the presence of detectors can change the evolution of the wave function and thus the particle trajectories, it cannot be taken for granted that the arrival time of the Bohmian trajectories in the absence of detectors agrees with the one in the presence of detectors, and even less with the detection time. In particular, we explain why certain distributions that Das and Durr [4] presented as the distribution of the detection time in a case with spin, based on assuming that all three times mentioned coincide, is actually not what Bohmian mechanics predicts.
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907336.706012
One of the most pressing tasks for metaethicists is that of solving the location problem: finding a home for morality in the natural world. It goes without saying that some have risen to the occasion more enthusiastically than others, and it is one enthusiast in particular that shall occupy my attention here. The naturalist moral realist affirms continuity between ethics and the empirical sciences, striving to integrate her metaethics with the outputs of scientific theorizing. To her mind, moral epistemology does well to take science as its guide; moral facts are ripe for empirical investigation.1 Unfortunately, the naturalist canon does not always reflect these noble ambitions.2 The naturalist is committed to letting the world do (much of) the talking. But so far, she has scarcely given it the chance to speak. My aim here is to set us back on course. The organizing theme of this paper is that the outputs of empirical investigations are of underrecognized significance for the moral naturalist. Its more specific contention is that these empirical resources help her to address two fundamental challenges that she faces.
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947122.706023
Our aim in this paper is to extend the semantics for the kind of logic of ground developed in [deRosset and Fine, 2023]. In that paper, the authors very briefly suggested a way of treating universal and existential quantification over a fixed domain of objects. Here we explore some options for extending the treatment to allow for a variable domain of objects.
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947145.706034
This paper is concerned with the semantics for the logics of ground that derive from a slight variant GG of the logic of [Fine, 2012b] that have already been developed in [deRosset and Fine, 2023]. Our aim is to outline that semantics and to provide a comparison with two related semantics for ground, given in [Correia, 2017] and [Kramer, 2018a]. This comparison highlights the strengths and difficulties of these different approaches. KEYWORDS: Impure Logic of Ground; Truthmaker Semantics; Logic of Ground; Ground This paper concerns the semantics for the logics of ground deriving from a slight variant GG of the logic of [Fine, 2012b] that have already been developed in [deRosset and Fine, 2023]. Our aim is to outline that semantics and to provide a comparison with two related semantics for ground, given in [Correia, 2017] and [Kramer, 2018a]. This will serve to highlight the strengths and difficulties of these different approaches. In particular, it will show how deRosset and Fine’s approach has a greater degree of flexibility in its ability to acccommodate different extensions of a basic minimal system of ground. We shall assume that the reader is already acquainted with some of the basic work on ground and on the framework of truthmaker semantics. Some background material may be found in [Fine, 2012b, 2017a,b].
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956844.706045
Here’s a comprehensive tax modification I’ve been daydreaming about. While my first choice is just giving people a tax holiday every time they have a kid, imagine the following alternative. After you calculate your regular federal tax, there’s one final adjustment. …
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1005108.706056
A peculiar feature of our species is that we settle what to believe, value, and do by reasoning through narratives. A narrative is adiachronic, information-rich story that contains persons, objects, and at least one event. When we reason through narrative, we usenarrative to settle what to do, to make predictions, to guide normative expectations, and to ground which reactive attitudes we think areappropriate in a situation. Narratives explain, justify, and provide understanding. Narratives play a ubiquitous role in human reasoning. Andyet, narratives do not seem up to the task. Narratives are often unmoored representations (either because they are do not purport to referto the actual world, or because they are grossly oversimplified, or because are known to be literally false). Against this, I argue thatnarratives guide our reasoning by shaping our grasp of modal structure: what is possible, probable, plausible, permissible, required,relevant, desirable and good. Narratives are good guides to reasoning when they guide us to accurate judgments about modal space. Icall this the modal model of narrative. In this paper, I develop an account of how narratives function in reasoning, as well as an account ofwhen reasoning through narrative counts as good reasoning.
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1010127.706071
Artificial neural networks and supervised learning have become an essential part of science. Beyond using them for accurate input-output mapping, there is growing attention to a new feature-oriented approach. Under the assumption that networks optimized for a task may have learned to represent and utilize important features of the target system for that task, scientists examine how those networks manipulate inputs and employ the features networks capture for scientific discovery. We analyse this approach, show its hidden caveats, and suggest its legitimate use. We distinguish three things that scientists call a “feature”: parametric, diagnostic, and real-world features. The feature-oriented approach aims for real-world features by interpreting the former two, which also partially rely on the network. We argue that this approach faces a problem of non-uniqueness: there are numerous discordant parametric and diagnostic features and ways to interpret them. When the approach aims at novel discovery, scientists often need to choose between those options, but they lack the background knowledge to justify their choices. Consequentially, features thus identified are not promised to be real. We argue that they should not be used as evidence but only used instrumentally. We also suggest transparency in feature selection and the plurality of choices.
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1010151.706082
This article argues for the explanatory autonomy of psychology drawing on cases from the multilevel modeling practice. This is done by considering a multilevel linear model in personality and social psychology, and discussing its philosophical implications for the reductionism debate in philosophy of psychology. I argue that this practice challenges the reductionist position in philosophy of psychology, and supports the explanatory autonomy of psychology.
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1010236.706093
Even though quantum entanglement is today’s most essential concept within the new technological era of quantum information processing, we do not only lack a consistent definition of this kernel notion, we are also far from understanding its physical meaning [35]. These failures have lead to many problems when attempting to provide a consistent measure or quantification of entanglement. In fact, the two main lines of contemporary research within the orthodox literature have created mazes where inconsistencies and problems are found everywhere.
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1010306.706107
In this essay I suggest that we view design principles in systems biology as minimal models, for a design principle usually exhibits universal behaviors that are common to a whole range of heterogeneous (living and nonliving) systems with different underlying mechanisms. A well-known design principle in systems biology, i ntegral feedback control, is discussed, showing that it satisfies all the conditions for a model to be a minimal model. This approach has significant philosophical implications: it not only accounts for how design principles explain, but also helps clarify one dispute over design principles, e.g., whether design principles provide mechanistic explanations or a distinct kind of explanations called design explanations.
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1046134.70612
Suppose that Alice wronged Bob, repented, and God forgave Alice for it. Bob, however, withholds his forgiveness. First, it is interesting to ask the conceptual question: What is it that Bob withholds? …
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1119013.70614
Some people have the intuition that there is something fishy about doing standard Bayesian update on evidence E when one couldn’t have observed the absence of E. A standard case here is where the evidence E is being alive, as in firing squad or fine-tuning cases. …
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1125588.706152
We consider two simple criteria for when a physical theory should be said to be “generally covariant”, and we argue that these criteria are not met by Yang-Mills theory, even on geometric formulations of that theory. The reason, we show, is that the bundles encountered in Yang-Mills theory are not natural bundles; instead, they are gauge-natural. We then show how these observations relate to previous arguments about the significance of solder forms in assessing disanalogies between general relativity and Yang-Mills theory. We conclude by suggesting that general covariance is really about functoriality.
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1125613.706166
Einstein thought that quantum mechanics was incomplete because it was nonlocal. In this paper I argue instead that quantum theory is incomplete, even if it is nonlocal, and that relativity is incomplete because its minimal spatiotemporal structure cannot naturally accommodate such nonlocality. So, I show that relativistic pilot-wave theories are the rational completion of quantum mechanics as well as relativity: they provide a spatiotemporal ontology of particles, as well as a spatiotemporal structure able to explain quantum correlations.
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1125638.706177
Bell’s inequality is an empirical constrain on theories with hidden variables, which EPR argued are needed to explain observed perfect correlations if keeping locality. One way to deal with the empirical violation of Bell’s inequality is by openly embracing nonlocality, in a theory like the pilot-wave theory. Nonetheless, recent proposals have revived the possibility that one can avoid nonlocality by resorting to superdeterministic theories. These are local hidden variables theories which violate statistical independence which is one assumption of Bell’s inequality. In this paper I compare and contrast these two hidden variable strategies: the pilot-wave theory and superdeterminism. I show that even if the former is nonlocal and the other is not, both are contextual. Nonetheless, in contrast with the pilot-wave theory, superdeterminist contextuality makes it impossible to test the theory (which therefore becomes unfalsifiable and unconfirmable) and renders the theory uninformative (measurement results tell us nothing about the system). It is questionable therefore whether a theory with these features is worth its costs.
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1125662.706202
Here I look to some work in the historical sciences in order to draw out some of the epistemic benefits of “speculative narratives,” which bears on some more general epistemic benefits of speculative reasoning. Due to the contingent nature of much historical evidence, some degree of speculative reasoning is necessary to get the epistemological ball rolling in the historical sciences, and I argue that speculative narratives provide the necessary sort of frameworking apparatus for doing precisely this. I use contemporary work on the first peopling of the Americas (the “Clovis First Debate”) for illustration.