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1779151.89774
Millstein’s comprehensive but accessible work brings back to the present the importance of Aldo Leopold’s “land ethic”. It functions as much more than a revisiting of his most famous work, A Sand County Almanac, but opens modern conservationism to the light of Leopold’s ideas and critique.
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1841514.897818
What’s the probability that God exists? Here, we’re talking about the God of traditional theism, the O3 world-creator (omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent), or a supremely perfect being. This question recently came up in a debate between Matt Dillahunty and Matthew Adelstein. …
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1870833.897833
This post is a sequel to an earlier discussion of close reading, though it should be self-contained, if closely read. Let’s begin with points of convergence. Like Jonathan Kramnick, John Guillory posits close reading as a skill or technê, a form of acquired know-how or expertise. …
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1887872.897843
The neurodiversity movement grew out of the autism community but is now being applied to many neurological types, from dyslexia to schizophrenia. The resulting neurodiversity paradigm maintains that these neurological differences are normal variations in the human species, like race and sexual orientation, which should be valued and accommodated, not “fixed” or eliminated. Yet some clear-eyed individuals view their brain differences as deficits and would continue to seek treatment in the absence of discrimination or lack of accommodation. I argue that fully appreciating cognitive diversity requires more nuanced normative claims that respect individual differences and fluid circumstances. Although analogies to minority statuses can be useful, variations in personality traits provide a more flexible and inclusive model for neurodivergence. Despite ultimately rejecting the biodiversity metaphor, a more nuanced neuro-diversity paradigm emphasizing our shared humanity can promote compassion, respect, and support for all.
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1892932.897853
Among those who employ the notions of common belief and common knowledge in explanations of coordinated action, a dominant view is that these notions are roughly on explanatory par—that the two do not di!er significantly in respect of the robustness or depth with which they can account for coordination, or for the achievement of coordination equilibrium in a group. I argue that this view is mistaken. Common knowledge enables a depth of explanation that mere common belief cannot match. Genuine coordination requires mutual sensitivity, and common knowledge can ground the nonaccidental character of this sensitivity in a way that mere common belief—even justified and true common belief—cannot. In defending this thesis, I draw on and extend a line of thinking familiar in epistemology at the individual level to the group level.
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1898725.897869
This paper introduces the Special Issue of Theoria entitled “Quantum mechanics and reality”. We first comment on its origins related to the VIII International Workshop on Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Information, promoted by the International Network on Foundations of Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Information. We then briefly introduce each contribution individually, bringing the papers together under the Special Issue’s topic.
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1898897.89788
An operational approach to quantum mechanics has been developed in the past decades in our group in Brussels. A similar operational approach is taken in this work, to show that the construction of spacetime is specific to each observer. What is usually referred to as the block universe then emerges by noting that parts of the past and future are also contained in the present, but without the limitations that a four-dimensional block universe usually implies, of a reality in which change would be impossible.
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1898942.89789
Philosophers of science commonly connect ontology and science, stating that these disciplines maintain a two-way relationship: on the one hand, we can extract ontology from scientific theories; on the other hand, ontology provides the realistic content of our scientific theories. In this article, we will critically examine the process of naturalizing ontology, i.e., confining the work of ontologists merely to the task of pointing out which entities certain theories commit themselves to. We will use non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study. We begin by distinguishing two roles for ontology: the first would be characterized by cataloging existing entities according to quantum mechanics; the second would be characterized by establishing more general ontological categories in which existing entities must be classified. We argue that only the first step is available for a naturalistic approach; the second step not being open for determination or anchoring in science. Finally, we also argue that metaphysics is still a step beyond ontology, not contained in either of the two tasks of ontology, being thus even farther from science.
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1898963.897896
In this paper, we discuss and outline a version of non-relativistic quantum mechanics based on a new non-reflexive logic, where the basic entities (elementary particles) lack identity conditions. Some relationships with quantum field theories are also sketched.
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1899084.897902
The purpose of this paper is to argue that neither mathematics nor logic can be applied ‘directly’ to reality, but to our rational representations (or reconstructions) of it, and this is extended to scientic theories in general. The difference to other approaches (e.g., Nancy Cartwright’s, Bueno & Colyvan’s or Hughes’) is that I call attention to something more than what is involved in such a process, namely, metamathematics. A general schema of ‘elaboration’ of theories, which I suppose cope with most of them, is presented and discussed. A case study is outlined, the quantum case, whose anchored description, in my opinion, demands a different metamathematics and a different logic.
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1899107.897907
It’s a mistake to afflict upon on our best theories a single, uniform interpretation meant to apply in all circumstance. It’s a mistake because it impedes the capacity of those theories to function as science. To refrain from the mistake is to adopt the locavore hypothesis: the same theory can merit different interpretations in different circumstances. Using quantum mechanics as an example, I argue for the locavore hypothesis, and examine its consequences not only for the scientific realism debate but also for our notion of scientific understanding.
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1899128.897913
This paper offers a critical analysis of Ding and Liu’s (2022) contribution to the ongoing debate stemming from Machery et al.’s (2004) experimental investigation of Kripke’s Gödel Case. Machery et al . test referential intuitions on proper names among laypeople from American and Chinese backgrounds and contend that their results challenge Kripke’s refutation of descriptivism. Ding and Liu argue that descriptions in Gödel-style scenarios are ambiguous between a brute-fact and a social-fact interpretation, and Machery et al. overlook the latter. Building upon this ambiguity, Ding and Liu conduct several studies, maintaining that the results reveal that Machery et al. misclassify some descriptivist answers as causal-historical. If that is the case, the challenge that experimental philosophy poses to Kripke’s refutation of descriptivism is even more substantial than Machery et al.
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1899150.897919
This paper deals with the issue of the admissible content of perceptual experience at the centre of the debate that opposes Conservatives and Liberals —who advocate, respectively, a Sparse and a Rich Content-View— and aims, specifically, to consider how this debate interacts with the Externalism/Internalism debate in philosophy of perception. Indeed, apart from a few exceptions (Siegel, 2006, 2010, 2013; Bayne, 2009; Ashby, 2020a; Raleigh, 2022), this issue has not yet been sufficiently addressed, and the present paper, in the wake of the aforementioned works, aims to focus on this issue in order to assess whether it would be more congenial for a Liberal to adopt content internalism or rather content externalism. In my paper I argue that the best move the Liberal should make is to endorse externalism with regard to the content of perceptual experience and internalism with regard to its phenomenal character. But, as it will turn out, this combination can only be sustained consistently if the Liberal discards the standard interpretation of one of its central claims, the so-called (Ashby, 2020a, p. 689) “phenomenal reflection claim” (PRC) —the claim according to which perceptual properties are reflected in/reverberate in the phenomenology of the experience— and adopts a different interpretation of it. To indicate what alternative interpretation of PRC the liberal should provide is one of the main goals of the paper. KEYWORDS: Sparse vs Rich View of Perceptual Experience, Content Externalism, Phenomenal Internalism, Phenomenal Reflection Claim, Representationalism.
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1899173.897925
Are doubt and suspension of judgment similar attitudes? In the burgeoning literature on suspension of judgment, the notion of doubt is curiously absent. This paper aims to argue for the plausibility of an identity claim, which I term the “No-Difference View.” This view suggests that there is no substantial difference between being in doubt and suspending judgment. The argument will draw on historical and systematic considerations that support the No-Difference View as a plausible view within the logical space of positions.
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1899194.89793
This article has three purposes. First, it illustrates the strengths of social constructivism (SC) as a major thesis and its two interrelated corollaries: the “social dependency” thesis, the “communitarian” theory of meaning, and the “contingency” view of knowledge. Second, by underscoring these strengths, it will show how one can counter the anti-social critique of the kind Boghossian espouses, highlighting some genuine disagreements that cannot be resolved by appealing to the assumptions and resources that are at the heart of the matter in the first place. To this end, the following points will be discussed: (1) Boghossian misses the mark primarily by focusing his main critique not on “social dependency” but on a conceptually different doctrine, namely “relativism” (defined as the “social relativity” thesis); (2) he criticizes SC by presupposing the very “non-social” view of meaning that SC was originally proposed to attack; and (3) the logic of SC “debunks” the very epistemic system on which Boghossian relies by claiming that it is as dependent on “(historical) contingencies” as any other. Finally, some responses are offered to “rationalist” concerns, which are mainly concerned with the application of SC’s logic to its own arguments. KEYWORDS: social constructivism, knowledge, meaning, contingency, normativity, Boghossian.
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1899216.897936
Accounts of scientific representation typically assume that there is a single sense of “represent”, and they attempt to develop a theory that can account for all its features. The aim of this article is to draw the consequences of a distinction between two senses of “represent” that has been proposed recently. Taking inspiration from the distinction between speaker-meaning and expression-meaning in philosophy of language, a first sense is analysed in terms of the mental states of the user of a vehicle in context, and a second sense in terms of communal norms constraining contextual uses. I argue that making this distinction, and thus understanding the representation relation as essentially indexical and normative, can help us move beyond the controversies between various accounts of scientific representation, notably what have been dubbed informational and functional accounts, as well as debates regarding the ontology of scientific models.
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1899236.89795
Phil Dowe’s Conserved Quantity Theory (CQT) is based on the following theses: (a) CQT is the result of an empirical analysis and not a conceptual one, (b) CQT is metaphysically contingent, and (c) CQT is refutable. I argue, on the one hand, that theses (a), (b), and (c) are not only problematic in themselves, but also they are incompatible with each other and, on the other, that the choice of these theses is explained by the particular position that the author embraces regarding the relationship between metaphysics and physics.
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1899280.89796
This paper begins with some brief intellectual autobiography, recalling my first engagement with philosophy of biology . The substantive part of the paper then focuses on the plurality of possible classifications central to the theses of scientific disunity and metaphysical disorder developed in my early career . After discussing this in terms of biological classification, and introducing the reasons for thinking of classifications as typically value-laden, I discuss two sets of human classifications bearing on normatively vital questions, those around sex and gender and those involved in the distinctions between human races .
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1899299.897966
In this paper I discuss the process ontology that has been the central focus of my research for almost 20 years . I explain what this is, and illustrate how it applies to biology through the example of the organism . I also aim to show how naturally process ontology fits with the disordered world I described in the preceding article . Finally, I show how process philosophy illuminates a number of topics relating to the human condition, including personal identity and freedom of the will, and provides a deeper understanding of the issues around human classification, notably by sex and gender and by race .
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1899321.897972
There is no doubt that slurs harm . They do so by denigrating their targets, by putting them down, by marginalizing them . This is why in many legislations around the world, the use of slurs has been banned or penalized . But should all uses of slurs be banned? Many uses of slurs seem to be non-derogatory and to have beneficial effects . However, such uses are double-faceted: as both armchair reflection and experimental studies have shown, they are able to produce harm as well . In this paper, I approach the broad question of whether all non-derogatory uses of slurs should be banned . I first present the main uses of slurs that have been considered to be non-derogatory and recent reactions to those . The upshot of this survey is that uses of slurs that have been considered non-derogatory do, in fact, produce harm . I also flag what various authors have recommended in relation to the issue of banning such uses . Against this background, I engage with a recent view put forward by Alba Moreno Zurita and Eduardo Pérez-Navarro, who urge extreme caution with respect to any uses of slurs, due to their potential to normalize derogation . After presenting their view and their main argument, I raise an objection related to their treatment of neutral uses of slurs . I end with pointing out that, while their endeavour has merit in that it pushes the discussion further, it raises certain issues —of both an empirical and a normative nature— that need to be addressed .
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1899342.897978
Over the past decade, there has been a growing interest in dual character concepts (DCCs) . These concepts are defined by their internal structures, which consist of two distinct dimensions: a descriptive and an independent normative dimension . However, a more in-depth exploration of their internal structures is still needed . This article examines the internal structure of one DCC that has garnered significant attention in the literature, scientist . First, I analyze the components of the different dimensions of this concept . Second, I explore the interaction between these two dimensions . To do so, I investigate scientist in the enTenTen20 corpus using Sketch Engine, focusing on the expressions “good scientist” and “true scientist”, as the literature suggests they interact more directly with the descriptive and normative dimensions, respectively . The findings from this investigation offer valuable insights for studying other DCCs, as the results suggest, among others, the following key points: first, that the complexity of the two dimensions of scientist is greater than previously recognized; and second, contrary to what is agreed, both the descriptive and the normative dimension interact with “good” and “true,” which implies that both expressions can be used to make the two types of normative evaluation proper of DCCs .
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1899361.897985
This paper reconstructs Duncan Pritchard’s (2011, pp . 278-284; 2021, pp . 1120-1122; 2025, pp . 56- 58) refutation of epistemic relativism and presents an objection to it . This refutation presupposes that epistemic relativism would be true in case there were rationally irresolvable deep disagreements . Pritchard’s refutation, thus, amounts to an argument purporting to show that all deep disagreements are rationally resolvable . Our objection, in turn, aims to show that the examples of rationally resolvable deep disagreement Pritchard presents have particular features that, while making them rationally resolvable, not all deep disagreement has . In order for these examples to be representative of all deep disagreements we need to accept a particularly strong notion of rationality . Pritchard’s (2011) notion of a truth-seeker presupposes a strong notion of rationality that could play that role . In recent papers, in contrast, Pritchard (2023, pp . 305-308; 2025, p . 53) makes use of a weaker rationality notion in characterizing deep disagreements . Both these alternatives prove to be problematic for Pritchard’s refutation . On the one hand, if the notion of rationality used to characterize deep disagreements secures their rational resolvability, it will already presuppose the falsehood of epistemic relativism . On the other hand, if the refutation treads on a weaker rationality notion, it will simply fail to give reasons to think that all deep disagreements can be rationally resolved . Be that as it may, we claim that Pritchard’s work allows us to identify a subset of deep disagreements that have a particular structure that makes them rationally resolvable .
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1899382.89799
Much effort has been devoted to explaining in what sense models represent their corresponding target systems . This has been considered a pivotal philosophical problem since representational models have been widely assumed to canalize our knowledge and understanding of reality . The aim of the paper is to analytically structure the framework commonly adopted to address the Scientific Representation Problem (SR-P), i .e ., onto-representationalism, and to examine its main problems . Due to its very theoretical conditions, I conclude that onto-representationalism constitutes an inadequate meta-scientific platform to approach SR-P . I locate the problem in the semantic assumption . To materialize these analyses, I examine the main arguments proposed by the main variants of onto-representationalism: classical onto-representationalism and sophisticated onto-representationalism .
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1899402.897996
Investigation of Indigenous concepts and their meanings is highly inspirational for contemporary science because they represent adaptive solutions in various environmental and social milieus. Past research has shown that the conceptualisations of consciousness can vary widely between cultural groups from different geographical regions. The present study explores variability among a few of the thousands of Indigenous cultural understandings of consciousness. Indigenous concepts of consciousness are often relational and inseparable from environmental and religious concepts. Furthermore, this exploration of variability reveals the layers with which some Indigenous peoples understand the conscious experience of the world. Surprisingly, the Indigenous understandings of global consciousness was found not to stay in opposition to local consciousness. The final concluding section of this study discusses the usability of Indigenous concepts and meanings for recent scientific debates regarding the nature of consciousness. Issues such as material versus non-material sources of consciousness, the energy component of consciousness, or the interconnection of consciousness with the environment arose from the in-depth exploration of Indigenous concepts and their meanings.
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1899424.898004
Scientific models often contain assumptions known not to be true. Despite being false representations, models provide us with a key understanding of phenomena. What is more, the falsehoods that figure in models are in many cases central to them, and there is no available alternative to their use. If falsehoods play such an irreplaceable role in our understanding of phenomena, it would seem that truth is not a key concern of scientific modeling. In this paper, I assess the prospects and challenges of reconciling truth and understanding in scientific modeling. More specifically, I review a thesis recently emerging in the literature, what I shall call the Derivation Thesis (DT), according to which we use models to derive true information. First, I examine different versions of the thesis and develop what I take to be its most promising formulation (what I call the generalized DT). Second, I discuss a serious challenge to the generalized DT. I consider a thought experiment in which an unreliable astrological model gives true explanations by fluke. This scenario challenges the idea that models can provide genuine understanding by generating truths. In response, I argue that genuine scientific models also fulfill a specific normative role that epistemically lucky models lack (what I call the normative generalized DT). I test this hypothesis by analysing how the Ideal Gas Law advances scientific understanding of real gases.
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1910181.898011
My paper ‘Preference and Prevention: A New Paradox of Deontology’ has just been published in the inaugural issue of the open access journal Free & Equal.1 As is often the case with ambitious papers, finding a good home took several years and tens of thousands of words of revisions and responses to referees, but I’m very happy with how it turned out in the end!2 I’m especially delighted that it’s open access—and I hope my paper helps contribute to a good start for Free & Equal.3
Overview
The paper undertakes three main tasks. …
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1910182.898016
The Oort cloud is a huge region of icy objects surrounding our Sun. We’re not sure it exists, but we think it’s where comets come from. I’ve often seen the Oort cloud drawn as a vague round blob. But recently some people simulated it—and discovered that tidal forces from the Milky Way may pull it into a much more interesting shape:
• David Nesvorný, Luke Dones, David Vokrouhlický, Hal F. Levison, Cristian Beaugé, Jacqueline Faherty, Carter Emmart, and Jon P. Parker, A spiral structure in the inner Oort cloud, The Astrophysical Journal 983 (2025). …
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2001115.898021
Could you be a brain in a vat, with all your experiences of people, plants, pebbles, planets and more being generated solely by computer inputs? It might seem difficult to know that you aren’t, since everything in the world would still appear just as it is. In his 1981 book, Reason, Truth, and History, Hilary Putnam argues that if you were in such a predicament, your statement ‘I am a brain in a vat”, would be false since, as an envatted brain, your word ‘vat’ would refer to the vats you encounter in your experienced reality, and in your experienced reality, you are not in one of those but are instead a full-bodied human being with head, torso, arms, and legs living in the wide open world. The following extended thought experiment is intended to illustrate that, contrary to Putnam’s view, you, as an envatted brain, could truthfully believe that you are a brain in a vat.
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2011679.89803
The inferentialist answer is that an existential quantifier is any symbol that has the syntactic features of a one-place quantifier and obeys the same logical rules of an existential quantifier (we can precisely specify both the syntax and logic, of course). …
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2013319.898036
Mind uploading promises us a digital afterlife. Critics believe that this promise is void, since we are not the type of thing that could be transmitted as data from one location to another. In this paper, I shall make the case that even if the critics are right and we cannot be uploaded, much of uploading’s appeal can be maintained. I will argue for Parfitian Transhumanism, a view that comprises two claims. First, it maintains that our minds can be uploaded, even if we cannot. Second, uploading our minds preserves what matters in survival.