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2910805.072761
It is well-known—a feature and not a bug—that Tarski’s definition of truth needs to be given in a metalanguage rather than the object language. Here I want to note a feature of this that I haven’t seen before. …
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2928384.072955
In this paper, open questions about the nature of gravitation and space-time are discussed, including the emergence of spacetime, and the quest for a theory of quantum gravity. The contribution highlights the contingent nature of the question of spacetime emergence and concludes with some remarks on the possibility of reading different programs in quantum gravity in terms of scientific theory change.
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2928404.073001
This paper proposes a transformative reinterpretation of local gauge invariance, a cornerstone of gauge theories, as a physical symmetry rather than a mathematical redundancy. Conventionally, gauge invariance ensures that only gauge-invariant quantities, such as the electromagnetic field strength Fµν = ∂µAν − ∂νAµ, bear physical significance, rendering the potential Aµ a calculational tool. Challenging this view, I argue that local gauge invariance, analogous to translation invariance, reflects a fundamental phase freedom of quantum fields, with Aµ and the wave function ψ, fixed in the Lorenz gauge (∂µA = 0), constituting real physical states.
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2928425.073032
A persistent debate in the philosophy of mind revolves around whether our conscious experience is richer than the content we are aware of. According to the overflow argument, we have a rich conscious experience, yet we can only cognitively access a small portion of it. Proponents defend this view by referencing the famous Sperling experiments in experimental psychology.
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3043679.073064
The metaphysics of quantum entanglement has been a subject of interest among philosophers of physics in recent decades. Entanglement is commonly described as a relation that does not depend on the intrinsic properties of its relata. This feature has led some authors to propose that the quantum reality is fundamentally relational and/or holistic. Moreover, it has been employed to support various influential metaphysical perspectives within the metaphysics of science, including structuralism, monism, and, recently, coherentism. This paper advocates a non-reductionist approach to internal relations, drawing on Fine’s analysis of propositions involving essential properties. Assuming the pervasiveness of quantum entanglement, it is argued that treating it as an internal relation is the most compelling option. Under this interpretation, entanglement can be accommodated within different metaphysical frameworks: (1) as a fundamental internal relation, it aligns with structuralism; (2) as a derivative internal relation, it is compatible with monism; and (3) as a relation of dependence, it supports coherentism.
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3080225.073116
The natural right to liberty surely includes the right to bring children into this world, and to raise them as your own. If you do so, it’s your business, and (barring abuse or neglect) interference by others, or the state, is illegitimate; nor do you need a justification for your act. …
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3091114.073142
In ‘Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline’, Bernard Williams argued that philosophy has a distinctive relationship with history, and not just the history of philosophy. He had in mind, especially, moral and political theory. For Williams, changes in ethical outlook are typically driven by social and cultural forces distinct from the power of rational argument. When an ethical idea prevails over time, holders of the outlook it supplants often have ‘have [no] reason to recognize the transition as an improvement’ (Williams 2000, p. 486). By their lights, the arguments for change are question-begging, In this respect, Williams believed, the history of ethics is unlike the history of modern science, whose telling typically vindicates later scientists on terms compelling to their predecessors.
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3152524.073169
We will be using classical sentential (viz., truth-functional/Boolean) logic as our background, deductive logical theory. This theory (viz., the truth-table method we will be using to reason, semantically, about it) traces back to Peirce [8] (and, later, Wittgenstein [17]). The basic units of analysis in sentential logic are atomic sentences. These are meant to be declarative sentences which contain no (sentential) logical connectives. We will use capital letters: A, B, C , . . . to denote atomic sentences. The only other elements of the language of sentential logic (LSL) are the (sentential) logical connectives (hereafter, the connectives) themselves. The meanings of the connectives are given by the following truth-table definitions.
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3153685.073237
I made a joke, last year, about philosophy’s failure as a pedagogy of death: if it was meant to teach me how to reconcile with mortality, it doesn’t seem to have done its job. Not that philosophers haven’t tried. …
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3158945.073254
At present, there are at least two set theories motivated by quantum ontology: Décio Krause’s quasi-set theory (Q) and Maria Dalla Chiara and Giuliano Toraldo di Francia’s quasi-set theory (QST). Recent work [Jorge-Holik-Krause, 2023] has established certain links between QST and Pawlak’s rough set theory (RST), showing that both are strong candidates for providing a non-deterministic semantics of N matrices that generalizes those based on ZF. In this work, we show that the new atomless quasi-set theory Q , recently introduced to account for a quantum property ontology [Krause-Jorge, 2024], has strong structural similarities with QST and RST. We study the level of extensionality that each theory presents, its relation to the Leibniz principle and the rigidity property. We believe that developing common features among these three theories can motivate common fields of research. By revealing shared structures, the developments of each theory can have a positive impact on the others.
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3160194.073271
This is an attempt to make an argument for the natural immortality of the soul from the premise that the soul has a proper operation that is independent of the body. The argument is going to be rather odd, because it depends on my rather eccentric four-dimensionalist version of Aristotelian metaphysics. …
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3189485.073288
Dai Zhen 戴震 (1724–1777), also known by his
courtesy name Dai Dongyuan 戴東原, was a highly
accomplished scholar of the Qianlong-Jiaqing era of the Qing dynasty. His expertise encompassed a wide range of fields, including philology,
phonology, mathematics, astronomy, ancient institutions, geography,
chorography, and philosophy. Although his contributions to other
disciplines were recognized during his lifetime, his philosophy was
not widely acknowledged. Despite this, his ideas significantly
influenced philosophically-minded interpreters of the Confucian
Analects and the Mencius, notably Jiao Xun
焦循 (1763–1820), who frequently referenced
Dai’s works in his influential book, Mengzi
Zhengyi
孟子正義 (The Correct Meaning of the
Mencius).
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3189741.073304
Aquinas argues that because the human soul has a proper operation—abstract thought—that does not depend on the body, the soul would survive the destruction of the body. I’ve never quite understood this argument. …
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3192986.073323
For years I have thought the finite to be mysterious, and needs something metaphysical like divine illumination or causal finitism to pick it out. Now I am not sure. I think snakes and exact duplicates can help. …
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3211707.073339
Truth-value realism about (first-order) arithmetic is the thesis that for any first-order logic sentence in the language of arithmetic (i.e., using the successor, addition and multiplication functions along with the name “0”), there is a definite truth value, either true or false. …
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3216605.073354
This paper proposes a naturalistic, emergentist libertarian account of free will, conceptualized as emergent autonomy arising from biological organization and inherent physical indeterminacy. Critiquing classical deterministic assumptions about static time and infinite precision, we introduce "creative time" (objective, dynamic becoming) and "potentiality realism" (objective possibilities) as foundations. Autonomy emerges from the interplay of organizational closure (self-maintenance), non-equilibrium thermodynamics, and the system's capacity to harness ontic indeterminacy (objective openness utilized functionally). Drawing on systems biology, physics, and process philosophy, we outline the philosophical basis (emergence, potentiality realism), scientific principles (thermodynamics, dynamics), biological realization (minimal agency, materiality), and a model of choice involving downward constraint (organizational influence) and emergent sourcehood (agent as origin). We address neural implementation, reinterpret empirical challenges (e.g., Libet), and defend against objections (luck, manipulation). This framework offers a research program for understanding freedom as a graded, natural phenomenon rooted in life's organization unfolding through creative time.
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3285870.073373
Suppose that an extremely reliable cannon is loaded with a rock, and pointed at a window, and the extremely reliable timer on the cannon is set for two minutes. Two minutes later, the cannon shoots out the rock causing the window to break. …
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3297327.073389
Say that a fact is temporally pure about an instantaneous time t provided that it holds solely in virtue of how things are at t. (The term is due to Richard Gale, but I am not sure he would have wanted the “instantaneous” restriction.) …
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3333232.073404
- Grant Sanderson, of 3blue1brown, has put up a phenomenal YouTube video explaining Grover’s algorithm, and dispelling the fundamental misconception about quantum computing, that QC works simply by “trying all the possibilities in parallel.” Let me not futz around: this video explains, in 36 minutes, what I’ve tried to explain over and over on this blog for 20 years … and it does it better. …
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3362653.073416
It is a pleasure to read and respond to Professor Orr’s learned statement of a conservatism, one that is both rooted in tradition and updated to the contemporary. Conservatism’s top values, we learn, are order, hierarchy, a sense of belonging to a particular community in a particular time and place, a deference to tradition, and a resistance to changes that are too sweeping or too quick. Simultaneously, conservatism is distrustful of abstract definitions, eschews commitments to universal principles and certainties, preferring the empirical, the particular, and the pragmatic. Professor Orr devotes a paragraph or two to explicating further each of those core concepts.
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3362687.073432
The most direct route to political fundamentals is to ask: What should governments do? The different ‘isms’—liberalism, socialism, fascism, and so on—answer that question based on their most cherished values, holding that the purpose of government is to achieve those values. Yet societies are complex and we create many kinds of social institutions—businesses, schools, friendships and families, sports teams, churches/synagogues/mosques/temples, associations dedicated to artistic and scientific pursuits, governments, and so on—to achieve our important values.
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3362711.073448
It is difficult to overstate the extent to which contemporary political debates fail to address the underlying philosophical arguments that inform the way we govern our societies and the leaders we elected to do so. It is therefore with tremendous pleasure that I hosted a set of both written and in-person discussions between two of the great minds of modern political and philosophical thought. As you will see, Dr. James Orr, a friend and regular guest on my show, sets out with tremendous clarity and skill the arguments for the conservative worldview. He is ably challenged by Professor Stephen R. C. Hicks, another friend and favourite interviewee of mine, who argues for liberalism as the correct orientation towards the world. The debate is hugely informative, productive, and, I hope, of use to the reader—it certainly has been to me.
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3370408.073466
Common ground is the information that the participants in a conversation treat as background information for the purposes of their interaction. We review two traditions of research on common ground: The formal tradition, consisting mainly of theoretical linguists and philosophers of language, has developed increasingly sophisticated formal models of common ground in order to generate predictions about an expanding range of empirical phenomena. Meanwhile, the psycholinguistic tradition has focused on a narrower range of phenomena while developing more realistic theories of the psychological mechanisms that allow us to select and represent common ground. After summarizing these two traditions, we consider several reasons why they should be re-integrated, and argue that the best way to bring them back together would be to adopt a cognitive-pluralist approach, whereby language users have access to a variety of mechanisms for managing background information, which are more or less available and efficient depending on the communicative situation and the kind of information mentally represented, as well as the cognitive demands of each mechanism.
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3387719.073485
Suppose time is in fact continuous and modeled by the real numbers. It seems odd indeed to me that the real numbers should be the only possible way for time to run. The real numbers are a very specific mathematical system. …
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3387720.0735
Phew. I’ve rarely had such a big reaction to something I’ve written. In my previous post, I argued for a feminist anti-natalism in the US currently, on the grounds that the package deal of pregnancy and early childrearing, especially with a male partner, is currently an intolerably bad deal for many if not most people contemplating it. …
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3387720.073514
Assume an Aristotelian account of substantial form on which forms are found in the informed things. A classic question is whether substantial forms are shared between members of the same kind or whether each individual has their own numerically (but maybe not qualitatively) distinct form. …
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3389629.073529
Hyperscanning has been increasingly used to quantify the quality of social relationships by tracking the neural correlates of interpersonal interactions.This paper critically examines the use of hyperscanning to track the neural correlates of psychotherapeutic change, e.g., the patient-therapist relationship. First, we motivate our project by diagnosing a lack of complex models at the mesoscale in this domain and, consequently, a polarization of the analysis at the micro and macroscales. Looking for the causes of this issue, we highlight the epistemic blindspots of current methodologies that prioritize neural synchrony as a marker of therapeutic success. Drawing on empirical studies and theoretical frameworks, we identify an asymmetry between the neural and behavioral conceptual toolkits, with the latter remaining underdeveloped. We argue that this imbalance stems from two key issues: the underdetermined qualitative interpretation of brain data and the neglect of strong reciprocity in neuroscientific second-person paradigms. In light of our critical analysis, we suggest that further research could address the complexity of reciprocal, dynamic interactions in therapeutic contexts. Specifically, drawing on enactivism, we highlight that the autonomy of interactions is one of the factors that undermines the synchrony paradigm. This approach emphasizes the co-construction of meaning and shared experiences through embodied, reciprocal interactions, offering a more integrative understanding of therapeutic change that moves beyond static neural measures to account for the emergent and dynamic nature of social cognition.
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3389653.073544
Suppose we consider an agent with both numerical credences and all-or-nothing beliefs. This agent might also have a plan about how she is going to update her beliefs upon receiving new evidence. What rational requirements on such a plan can be justified from an epistemic value point of view? Plan Almost Lockean Revision is the claim that it is rationally required that one’s planned beliefs are exactly one’s sufficiently high conditional credences. We start by reviewing arguments available for Plan Lockean Revision in the current literature, ultimately concluding that they are non-optimal. We provide a better argument to the effect that the belief updating rule that is expected to be the best according to one’s current credences is exactly Plan Almost Lockean Revision, that is, we prove a Qualitative Greaves-Wallace Theorem. Furthermore, building on the work of (Rothschild, 2021), we investigate the dutchbookability of Lockean betting behavior for all-or-nothing beliefs and their plannings, ultimately proving a qualitative version of the dutch strategy theorem which leads to the development of novel dutch-strategy/accuracy-dominance arguments for Lockean norms on belief/belief-planning pairs.
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3389708.073559
A number of authors (Morgan, 1999; Boumans, 2005; Morrison, 2009; Massimi and Bhimji, 2015; Parker, 2017) have argued that models can be quite literally thought of as measuring instruments. I here challenge this view by reconstructing three arguments from the literature and rebutting them. Further, I argue that models should be seen as cognitive rather than measuring instruments, and that the distinction is important for understanding scientific change: Both yield two distinct sources of insight that mutually depend on each other, and should not be equated. In particular, we may perform the exact same actions in the laboratory but conceive of them entirely differently by virtue of the models we endorse at different points in time.
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3389728.073567
The gravitational Aharonov-Bohm (AB) effect, where quantum particles acquire phase shifts in curvature-free regions due to a gauge-fixed metric perturbation hµν , highlights the intriguing gauge dependence of spacetime. This study explores whether Loop Quantum Gravity (LQG), which views spacetime as emerging from SU(2)- and diffeomorphism-invariant spin networks, can accommodate this effect. The AB effect suggests that LQG should incorporate gauge dependence at the quantum level, which appears challenging within its relational, gauge-invariant framework. Potential modifications to LQG, such as introducing gauge-fixing constraints or effective fields, may require assumptions aligned with substantivalism, potentially diverging from its emergent paradigm. These results invite a thoughtful reconsideration of spacetime’s ontological status, encouraging a dialogue between relational and substantivalist perspectives in quantum gravity.