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2977956.513787
David Suzuki is an 89-year-old Canadian geneticist, science broadcaster and environmental activist. In this interview he says some things that I’ve come to agree with. • ‘It’s too late’: David Suzuki says the fight against climate change is lost, iPolitics, 2 July 2025. …
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3061309.513876
Apparently, Italy requires residents to secure a medical certificate before joining a gym, sports club, or other source of regular physical exercise. This is (very loosely) estimated to prevent a few deaths per year from sudden cardiac events but at a net cost of thousands of QALYs lost due to exercise deterrence. …
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3064255.513894
In the last NYRB, Kwame Anthony Appiah reviewed two recent books about translation. One is by Damion Searls, whose Tractatus I criticized in this space, provoked in part by his complaint about philosophers as translators of philosophy. …
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3065618.513905
In philosophy of science, the pseudosciences (like cryptozoology, homeopathy, Flat-Earth Theory, anti-vaccination activism, etc.) have been treated mainly negatively. They are viewed not simply as false, but even dangerous, since they try to mimic our best scientific theories, thus gaining respect and trust from the public, without the appropriate credentials. As a result, philosophers have traditionally put considerable effort into demarcating genuine sciences and scientific theories from pseudoscience. Since these general attempts at demarcation have repeatedly been shown to break down, the present paper takes a different and somewhat more positive approach to the study of pseudoscience. My main point is not that we should embrace and accept the pseudosciences as they are, but rather that there are indeed valuable and important lessons inherent in the study of pseudoscience and the different sections of the paper list at least six of them. By showing, through numerous examples, how (the study of) pseudoscience can teach us something about science, ourselves, and society, it makes the case that as philosophers, we should devote more time and energy to engaging with such beliefs and theories to help remedy their harmful effects.
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3150588.513915
How badly would it suck to die because a person who could have saved your life (along with the lives of four others tied to the train tracks beside you) preferred “allowing” to “doing”? A second was just about to save you when they realized that the side track—where just one person awaited as collateral damage—later loops back, turning the purportedly-collateral damage into an instrumental killing. …
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3151955.513924
The belief that beauty leads to truth is prevalent among contemporary physicists. Far from being a private faith, it operates as a methodological guiding principle, essentially when physicists have to develop theories without new empirical data.
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3152008.513934
Scenarios and pathways, as defined and used in the “SSP-RCP scenario framework”, are key in last decade’s climate change research and in the latest report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In this framework, Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP) consist of a limited set of alternative socioeconomic futures, that are both represented in short qualitative narratives and with quantitative projections of key drivers. One important use of the computationally derived SSP-scenarios is to do mitigation analysis and present a “manageable” set of options to decision-makers. However, all SSPs and derivatively SSP-scenarios in this framework assume a globally growing economy into 2100. This, in practice, amounts to a value-laden restriction of the space of solutions to be presented to decision-makers, falling short of IPCC’s general mandate of being “policy-relevant and yet policy-neutral, never policy-prescriptive”. Yet, the Global Economic Growth Assumption (GEGA) could be challenged and in practice is challenged by post-growth scholars.
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3152032.513944
Robustness of AI alignment is one of the safety issues of large language models. Can we predict how many mistakes will a model make when responding to a restricted request? We show that when access to the model is limited to in-context learning, the number of mistakes can be proved inapproximable, which can lead to unpredictability of alignment of the model. Against intuition, this is not entirely bad news for AI safety. Attackers might not be able to easily misuse in-context learning to break alignment of the model in a predictable manner because the mistake bounds of safe responses, which were used for alignment, can be proved inapproximable. This inapproximability can hide the safe responses from attackers and make alignment of the model unpredictable. If it were possible to keep the safe responses from attackers, responsible users would benefit from testing and repairing of the model’s alignment despite its possible unpredictability. We also discuss challenges involved in ensuring democratic AI alignment with limited access to safe responses, which helps us to make alignment of the model unpredictable for attackers.
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3222741.513958
There is a longstanding puzzle about empty names. On the one hand, the principles of classical logic seem quite plausible. On the other hand, there would seem to be truths involving empty names that require rejecting certain classically valid principles.
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3222791.513972
Consider the property of being something that is identical to Hesperus. For short, call this the property of being Hesperus. What is the nature of this property? How does it relate to the property of being Phosphorus? And how do these properties relate to the purely haecceitistic property of being v—the unique thing that has the property of being Hesperus and the property of being Phosphorus?
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3237112.514009
Very short summary: This essay provides an account in favor of a progressive consumption tax, in light of the efficiency and fairness issues that affect the more common progressive income tax. I argue that the progressive consumption tax not only avoids the standard incentive problem but also responds to Hayek’s critique of the unfairness of progressive taxation. …
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3301032.514019
Casajus (J Econ Theory 178, 2018, 105–123) provides a characterization of the class of positively weighted Shapley value for …nite games from an in…nite universe of players via three properties: e¢ ciency, the null player out property, and superweak differential marginality. The latter requires two players’payoffs to change in the same direction whenever only their joint productivity changes, that is, their individual productivities stay the same. Strengthening this property into (weak) differential marginality yields a characterization of the Shapley value. We suggest a relaxation of superweak differential marginality into two subproperties: (i) hyperweak differential marginality and (ii) superweak differential marginality for in…nite subdomains. The former (i) only rules out changes in the opposite direction. The latter (ii) requires changes in the same direction for players within certain in…nite subuniverses. Together with e¢ ciency and the null player out property, these properties characterize the class of weighted Shapley values.
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3313002.514029
Baumann, Peter. 2025. “Transcendental Arguments in Reid? A Reply to McCraw.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 14 (7): 1–6. https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-9Ze. Benjamin W. McCraw’s article “A Reidian Transcendental Argument Against Skepticism” (2025) constitutes an original and thought-provoking contribution both to Reid scholarship and to the discussion of epistemic skepticism. In the following I will make a few remarks about it, focusing on the discussion of skepticism. I start with a brief historical remark on Reid and Kant (§ 1) before I explain the anti-skeptical argument in some detail (§ 2). A discussion of the premises of the argument follows (§ 3). I add some remarks about the social aspect of McCraw’s anti-skeptical stance (§ 4). I finish with another set of historical remarks (§ 5), this time about Reid and Wittgenstein, and a brief conclusion (§ 6).
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3317112.514041
I’m a non-conformist, but not a reflexive contrarian. My chief goal is to enjoy every day of my life, and my non-conformism is only a means to that end. But what a means it is! By the power of non-conformism, I weasel out of hours of daily drudgery. …
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3321071.514051
In this paper, I distinguish and compare three kinds of logical expressivism. The first, reminiscent of attitude expressivism in meta-ethics, holds that logic is expressive in that logical vocabulary serves to express attitudes. For instance, traditional attitude expressivism about negation, going back to the work of Frank Plumpton Ramsey, Huw Price and others, holds that not expresses disbelief. The second kind of logical expressivism, reminiscent of deflationism about truth and championed by Robert Brandom, holds that logic is expressive in that logical vocabulary serves to make explicit—typically, by expressing them as contents of assertions—the commitments that are implicit in our discursive practices. For instance, content expressivism about the conditional holds that if expresses as content commitment to the goodness of certain inferential moves. The third kind of logical expressivism, and the one I will be arguing for, holds that, in a sense, logic is expressive in both ways: logical vocabulary serves to make explicit commitments to expressions of attitudes.
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3322544.514067
In a system with identity, quotation, and an axiom predicate, a classical extension of the system yields a falsity. The result illustrates a novel form of instability in classical logic. Notably, the phenomenon arises without vocabulary such as ’true’ or ’provable’. Conservative extensions are safe expansions: They add expressive resources while proving the same theorems (or at most, terminological variants thereof). Conservative extensions are foundational for major developments, including the Lowenheim-Skolem theorems, precise comparisons of proof-theoretic strength (Simpson 2009), and the understanding of reflection principles in arithmetic and set theory (Feferman 1962). The purpose here is not to question these developments, but rather to advise caution for the future. Some extensions that appear quite conservative end up not being so. In a system with identity, quotation, and a metalinguistic singular term, a purely syntactic predicate for axioms can create instability under an innocent-looking extension.
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3322566.514077
It is known that some diagonal arguments, when formalized, do not demonstrate the impossibility of the diagonal object, but instead reveal a breakdown in definability or encoding. For example, in a formal setting, Richard’s paradox does not yield a contradiction; it instead reflects that one of the relevant sets is ill-defined. (For elaboration and other examples, see Simmons 1993, Chapter 2.) This invites the possibility that other diagonal arguments may reflect similar anomalies. The diagonal argument against a universal p.r. function is considered in this light. The impetus is an algorithm which appears to satisfy all standard criteria for being p.r. while simulating the computation of fi(i, n) for any index i of a binary p.r. function. The paper does not attempt to explain why this construction apparently survives the usual diagonal objection, but presents it in a form precise enough to support that analysis.
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3322585.514086
According to Beebee (2018), methodological problems and intractable disagreement in philosophy suggest that we should not believe any philosophical claims, but (in brief) accept them as working hypotheses. Beebee takes van Fraasseen (1980) as inspiration, whose scientific instrumentalism recommends such “acceptance” for claims about unobservables in microphysics. In this paper, I argue that Beebee-style acceptance faces problems which have no analogue for van Fraasssen-style acceptance. In short, philosophical beliefs for the equilibrist are not optional in a way that beliefs about microphysics are. Or rather, that is so unless a fairly radical deflationism about truth and meaning is joined with equilibrism. For what it’s worth, I am not entirely opposed to this under certain qualifications. Regardless, radical deflationism would be a significant liability for equilibrism, and so it is unlikely to be welcomed by Beebee.
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3324714.514094
Despite their successes at prediction and classification, deep neural networks (DNNs) are often claimed to fail when it comes to providing any understanding of real-world phenomena. However, recently, some authors have argued that DNNs can provide such understanding. To resolve this controversy, I first examine under which conditions DNNs provide humans with explanatory understanding in a clearly defined sense that refers to a simple setting. I adopt a systematic approach that draws on theories of explanation and explanatory understanding, but avoid dependence on any specific account by developing broad conditions of explanatory understanding that leave space for filling in the details in several alternative ways. I argue that the conditions are difficult to satisfy however these details are filled in. The main problem is that, to provide explanatory understanding in the sense I have defined, a DNN has to contain an explanation, and scientists typically do not know whether it does. Accordingly, they cannot feel committed to the explanation or use it, which means that other conditions of explanatory understanding are not satisfied. Still, in some attenuated senses, the conditions can be fulfilled. To complete my conciliatory project, I further show that my results so far are compatible with using DNNs to infer explanatorily relevant information in a thorough investigation. This is what the more optimistic literature on DNNs has focused on. In sum, then, the significance of DNNs for understanding real-world systems depends on what it means to say that they provide understanding, and on how humans use them.
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3324757.514104
Behavioral innovativeness—the propensity of an individual organism or higher group to innovate—is frequently invoked as a measurable trait allowing for cross-species comparisons. Individuals or species are often regarded as more innovative or less innovative than others, implying that we can rank order the degree of innovativeness along a single dimension. This paper defends a novel multidimensional understanding of behavioral innovativeness in which innovativeness can be modulated with respect to the generation and capitalization of opportunities, as well as the effectiveness and depth of the innovative behaviors. Besides innovation being multidimensional, it is also multilevel. Here we show how innovativeness at one level (such as the species level) does not automatically translate to innovativeness at another (such as the organism level) and discuss why this matters for cross-species comparisons.
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3324778.514114
A common criticism of medicine is that there is too much focus on treating symptoms instead of patients. This criticism and its sentiment – among other factors – have motivated many ‘humanistic,’ ‘holistic,’ and ‘non-reductionist’ approaches to medicine including the biopsychosocial model, patient-centered medicine, ‘gentle’ medicine, and others. Much has been said detailing and defending these approaches. My aim here is not to further defend one or any of these. Rather, my aim is to better understand what is at the heart of the ‘common criticism,’ i.e., that treating symptoms – not patients – is bad. What does this mean? Are symptoms not something patients have? By treating symptoms, do clinicians not necessarily treat the patients that have them?
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3324857.514124
Our fine arts were developed, their types and uses were established, in times very different from the present...But the amazing growth of our techniques, the adaptability and precision they have attained, the ideas and habits they are creating, make it a certainty that profound changes are impending in the ancient craft of the Beautiful. In all the arts there is a physical component which can no longer be considered or treated as it used to be, which cannot remain unaffected by our modern knowledge and power…We must expect great innovations to transform the entire technique of the arts, thereby affecting artistic invention itself and perhaps even bringing about an amazing change in our very notion of art. (Valéry 1964 [1928], 225) The passage describes a moment in the history of art in the West in the 20th century characterized by the introduction of new artistic technologies of production and reproduction such as photography. The passage serves as the epigraph to Walter Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” in which he contends that the analyses necessitated by the condition described by Paul Valery compels us to “brush aside a number of outmoded concepts, such as creativity and genius, eternal value and mystery…” (Benjamin 1969[1936]).
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3385507.514137
In logic and philosophy of logic, “formalization” covers a broad range of interrelated issues: some philosophers hold that logical systems are means to formalize theories and reasoning (Dutilh Novaes 2012), others seek to formalize semantical by syntactical systems (Carnap 1942/43), ask whether logical languages are formalizations of natural languages (Stokhof 2018), teach undergraduates to formalize arguments using elementary logic, debate how to formalize notions such as moral obligation (Hansson 2018), or develop formalizations of belief change processes (Rott 2001). This variety goes hand in hand with an equally broad range of general views about what logic and its role in philosophy is or should be – whether, for example, logic is first of all a tool for reasoning (Dutilh Novaes 2012), a mathematical theory of certain formal structures which can be used to model philosophically interesting phenomena (Hansson 2018; Sagi 2020a; Stokhof 2018), or a theory that studies inferential relations in natural language and enables us to show that certain ordinary-language arguments are valid (Peregrin/Svoboda 2017), to name just a few. More or less implicitly, these approaches contain views on what the target phenomena of formalizing are (languages, arguments, …), what kind of relation formalizations have to it (model, tool, …) and whether formalizing is an integral part of logic or an application of it.
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3409590.514146
Historically, the hypothesis that our world is a computer simulation has struck many as just another improbable-but-possible “skeptical hypothesis” about the nature of reality. Recently, however, the simulation hypothesis has received significant attention from philosophers, physicists, and the popular press. This is due to the discovery of an epistemic dependency: If we believe that our civilization will one day run many simulations concerning its ancestry, then we should believe that we are probably in an ancestor simulation right now. This essay examines a troubling but underexplored feature of the ancestor-simulation hypothesis: the termination risk posed by both ancestor-simulation technology and experimental probes into whether our world is an ancestor simulation. This essay evaluates the termination risk by using extrapolations from current computing practices and simulation technology. The conclusions, while provisional, have great implications for debates concerning the fundamental nature of reality and the safety of contemporary physics.
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3488799.514156
I present, discuss and critically evaluate Wallace’s account of functional (non-compositional) emergence to explain macroscopic phenomena within Everettian quantum mechanics. In brief, my main argument against this view is that it provides an unsatisfactory explanation, as it employs ‘effective ontologies’ defined in virtue of their usefulness which however do not possess any deeper justification.
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3488840.514166
A minimal realist thinks we are justified in believing in unobservable entities as explanatory, but we should be cautious in allowing non-empirically justified entities in our ontology. In this paper I argue that a minimalist would find my proposal for an ontology of fundamental entities without fundamental properties the best balance between empirical adequacy, explanatory power, and physical justification.
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3496164.514176
It was a particularly cruel heckling. Ketel Marte, a star baseball player for the Arizona Diamondbacks, was brought to tears by a heckler who shouted derogatory comments about Marte’s late mother, Elpidia Valdez, who died in a car crash in 2017. …
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3497421.514185
In this paper we will try to provide a solid form of intrinsic set theoretical optimism. In other words, we will try to vindicate Gödel’s views on phenomenology as a method for arriving at new axioms of ZFC in order to decide independent statements such as CH. Since we have previously written on this very same subject [41, 43, 44], it is necessary to provide a justification for addressing it once again.
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3497472.514196
I discuss the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic approaches to reformulating a theory with symmetries, and offer an account of the special value of intrinsic formalisms, drawing on a distinction between which mathematical expressions are meaningful within an extrinsic formalism and which are not.
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3497517.514206
This work explores the connection between logical independence and the algebraic structure of quantum mechanics. Building on results by Brukner et al., it introduces the notion of onto-epistemic ignorance : situations in which the truth of a proposition is not deducible due to an objective breakdown in the phenomenal chain that transmits information from a system A to a system B, rather than to any subjective lack of knowledge. It is shown that, under such conditions, the probabilities accessible to a real observer are necessarily conditioned by decidability and obey a non-commutative algebra, formally equivalent to the fundamental postulates of quantum mechanics.