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3787067.291535
Modal expressions in language can describe what is possible in light of a subject’s abilities. In English, modals of this sort include the modal auxiliary can, as well as the predicate able. Here are some examples: (1) a. Ava can hit the target on the next throw. b. Ben is able to join the conference virtually. c. Clem can run 100m in 10 seconds. Ability modals are obviously related to other modalities in language, such as epistemic or deontic modality, but also give rise to anomalies that make them unique. This paper develops a general theory of ability modals that is broadly compatible with standard modal semantics, while predicting their peculiar behavior. The central idea is that ability modals include reference to a notion of dependence. Roughly, (1a) requires that there is an accessible world where Ava hits the target, and that Ava’s hitting the target depends on features of Ava, in some relevant sense of dependence.
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3798244.291727
This article provides an overview of the philosophical and linguistic issues raised by de se attitudes. After discussing a version of the problem of de se attitudes, I examine three influential theories of de se attitudes, while also considering the possibility of retaining a more conservative view. I close by discussing some of the further significance of de se attitudes for philosophy and linguistics.
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3798263.29175
This essay attempts to cast light on the recent debate over whether the norm of assertion is ‘weak’ or ‘strong’. I proceed somewhat indirectly, first arguing for a distinction between two classes of utterances of declarative sentences, classes that can be empirically distinguished along a number of dimensions. For example, these two kinds of utterances differ from each other in what they add to the common ground, how they are elicited, and what sorts of attitude reports they license. I suggest that whether this should be understood as showing that ‘the norm of assertion’ is weak or strong or context-sensitive appears to be largely a terminological question about which utterances of declaratives ought to be called “assertions”. But however the terminological issue is resolved, there remain interesting questions concerning what role each type of utterance plays in our epistemic and communicative practices, and I close with some remarks bearing on this issue.
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3804157.291765
Unwarranted and incorrect claims have been made in the philosophy literature regarding the quantum theory of molecules. Various influential authors (Lombardi and Castagnino 2010; Chang 2015; Cartwright 2022) have asserted that approximations used in the quantum chemistry of molecules, and specifically the Born-Oppenheimer approximation, violates the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, and thus is in fundamental conflict with quantum theory. From this the failure of reduction of chemistry to physics is adduced. We refute these claims based upon a (textbook level) presentation of the mathematical details of the approximation together with an analysis of the relevant physical idealizations. There are more subtle questions regarding the formal justification of a particular set of mathematical idealizations involved in modern formalisations of the Born-Oppenheimer approximation (Sutcliffe and Woolley 2012). Drawing upon recent work in the mathematical physics literature (Jecko 2014) we show how such idealizations may also be justified to the relevant standards of rigour. We conclude with a prospectus of wider philosophical issues regarding rigour, reduction, and idealization in the quantum theory of molecules. This prospectus sets an agenda for work in the philosophy of quantum chemistry that is more solidly grounded in scientific practice.
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3804179.291784
In previous work the author has proposed a different approach to the problem of von Neumann measurement and wave function collapse. Here we apply it to the collapse of degenerate states. Our predictions differ from those of von Neumann and, separately, Lüders in significant ways. An experiment is suggested that might distinguish between the possibilities.
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3832248.291797
Here would be a really bad kind of moral dilemma:
- It is certain that unless you murder one innocent person now, you will freely become a mass murderer, but if you do murder that innocent person, you will freely repent of it later and live an exemplary life. …
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3854693.29181
I consider statistical criteria of algorithmic fairness from the perspective of the ideals of fairness to which these criteria are committed. I distinguish and describe three theoretical roles such ideals might play. The usefulness of this program is illustrated by taking Base Rate Tracking and its ratio variant as a case study. I identify and compare the ideals of these two criteria, then consider them in each of the aforementioned three roles for ideals. This ideals program may present a way forward in the normative evaluation of candidate statistical criteria of algorithmic fairness.
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3861821.291827
Based on unpublished, archival material, some informal reactions by George Polya to Imre Lakatos’ ”Proofs and Refutations” are presented. The archival material is letters by Polya to Lakatos in the period between 1957 and 1965. The letters show that Polya admired Lakatos’ work but he also voiced some criticism, especially when Lakatos deviates from heuristics.
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3884160.291841
Johannes Clauberg (1622–65) was a Reformed (Calvinist) professor
at the University of Duisburg. He was among Descartes’ earliest
advocates in Germany, whose apologetics, commentaries, and treatises
did much to introduce Protestant German audiences to Cartesian
philosophy. Clauberg won the admiration of the young Leibniz, who
judged him to be clearer than Descartes himself. Spinoza was familiar
with Clauberg through their mutual connection to the circle of
Lodewijk Meyer (1629–81). Clauberg was also known to the French
Cartesians, including Antoine Arnauld, Claude Clerselier,
Géraud de Cordemoy, Louis de la Forge, and Nicolas Malebranche.
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3890903.291854
Standard decision theory studies one-shot decisions, where an agent faces a single choice. Real decision problems, one might think, are more complex. To find the way out of a maze, or to win a game of chess, the agent needs to make a series of choices, each dependent on the others. …
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3900295.291866
The computational properties of a system are generally thought to be independent in some sense from its physical properties, in virtue of the fact that computation is a formally characterized concept. Several philosophers have recently challenged the idea that such “medium-independence” is an essential feature of computation by arguing that some kinds of computation lack medium-independence. This paper explores and rejects three such arguments in an attempt to defend the essential medium-independence of computation.
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3914632.291892
Unless we are willing to countenance the skeptical possibility that most of our thought and talk is meaningless, it would seem that something must guarantee that the ontology presupposed by semantics aligns with the truth about ontology. One motivation for Linguistic Idealism is that it provides such a guarantee. We argue here that such a guarantee is not actually needed to avoid skepticism, since semantics can successfully ‘do its job’ of systematically pairing meanings with utterances even if it has false ontological presuppositions. More broadly, we explore and defend a form of anti-realism about linguistics according to which correct or acceptable linguistic theories can have false presuppositions and thus fail to be true. We argue that this is partly due to the fact that linguistic ‘laws’ or principles themselves—the things that govern or explain language and linguistic competence—do not need to be true in order to ‘do their job’.
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3915395.291906
There are many contexts where a necessary condition of the permissibility of a course of action is a kind of proportionality between the goods and bads resulting from the course of action. (If utilitarianism is true, then given a utilitarian understanding of the proportionality, it’s not only necessary but sufficient for permissibility.) …
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3919483.291919
Recently, research on grief has gained momentum in phenomenology and philosophy of mind. Grief, it is often assumed, is a temporally extended emotional experience of the irreversible, bereavement-induced loss of a significant person. Within and across philosophical approaches, grief memoirs are frequently quoted as phenomenological evidence for the tenability of assumptions about the occurrence, structure, and unfolding of grief experiences. In this article, I argue that this research strategy is problematic. The reason is that it overlooks the epistemic status and artefactual configuration of grief memoirs. They are not first-person reports of lived experiences, but carefully crafted and curated literary artefacts. As such, they explore and challenge the possibilities and limitations of autobiographical remembering, acts of remembrance, master narratives, and genre expectations. For this reason, grief memoirs should not be treated as phenomenological evidence, but as exemplars of literary griefworld technologies. The positive proposal is that the interdisciplinary investigation of grief memoirs could lead to new insights into the role of literary self-narrative practices for navigating and negotiating processes of grief.
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3977174.291936
Katie Steele and H. Orri Stefánsson argue that, to reflect an agent’s limited awareness, the algebra of propositions on which that agent’s credences are defined should be relativised to their awareness state. I argue that this produces insurmountable difficulties. But the project of relativising the agent’s algebra to reflect their partial perspective need not be abandoned: the algebra can be relativised, not to the agent’s awareness state, but to what we might call their subjective modality.
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3977263.29195
The terms ‘mind’ and ‘mental’ are used to refer to different phenomena across and within at least philosophy, psychology, psychiatry, and cognitive science. My main aim in this paper is to argue that the terms ‘mind’ and ‘mental’ are in this way ‘pluralistic’, and to explore the different options for responding to this situation. I advocate for a form of pluralistic eliminativism about the terms ‘mind’ and ‘mental’, ‘mind concept eliminativism,’ because I believe that current use of the terms results in both public and scientific confusions that hamper progress on important issues and increase stigma around certain vulnerable groups.
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3977285.291964
The modern conception of academic freedom was partly motivated by a desire to insulate academia from the monied classes. In perhaps "the most famous breach of academic freedom" of the era, the economist Scott Nearing was terminated in 1915 from his position at the University of Pennsylvania (Whitfield 1974, 43). Nearing was a successful researcher and massively popular teacher, but he was socially radical, advocating against exploitative child labor in the manufacturing state that most heavily relied upon it. Among other reforms, Nearing wanted children to go to school one half-day per week and the legal working age raised from thirteen to fourteen. The Trustees of the university represented many firms directly or indirectly relying on child labor, e.g., gas, coal, banking, railroad. They didn’t appreciate his campaign or his other progressive opinions.
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3977308.29198
Studies of visual event individuation often consider people’s representations of activities involving agents performing complex tasks. Concomitantly, theories of event individuation emphasize predictions about agents’ intentions. Studies that have examined simple, non-agential occurrences leave open the possiblity that principles of visual object individuation play a role in visual event individuation. Unearthing principles that may be sufficient for event individuation which are distinct both from predictions about agents’ intentions and from visual object individuation, we draw on and extend studies that reveal object and event representation to be deeply analogous in our cognitive economy. We provide evidence that ‘temporal shaping’ is a sufficient low-level perceptual criterion for the visual individuation of events. In our study, temporal shaping is effected by the introduction of pauses into an otherwise continuous process. Future studies should address other visual mechanisms for introducing temporal shaping (e.g., color changes).
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3999547.291995
Trans philosophy is an emergent subfield of philosophy that concerns
trans experiences, histories, cultural production, and politics. Through the lens of trans lives, the field reconsiders questions
traditional to philosophy (e.g., questions of ontology, identity,
knowledge, and power) and generates new questions that expand
philosophy in multiple directions, especially enhancing our
understanding of gender in relation to abolitionist movements,
colonialism, disability, ecology, medicalization, law, misogyny, and
violence. As with any philosophical subfield tethered to a
marginalized community, trans philosophy offers a fundamental critique
of philosophy as it has been traditionally practiced and,
correlatively, offers new concepts and methods for the field.
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4008877.292008
The EA Forum is currently holding a “debate week” on whether it would be better to spend an extra $100m on animal welfare than on global health. Most responses so far seem to strongly favor animal welfare, on the grounds that it is (likely) vastly more cost-effective in terms of pure suffering-reduction. …
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4026755.29202
Landau and Peierls wrote down the Hamiltonian of a simplified version of quantum electrodynamics in the particle-position representation. We present a multi-time version of their Schrodinger equation, which bears several advantages over their original equation: the time evolution equations are simpler and more natural; they are more transparent with respect to choice of gauge; and, perhaps most importantly, they are manifestly Lorentz covariant. We discuss properties of the multi-time equations. Along the way, we also discuss the Lorentz covariant 3d Dirac delta distribution for spacelike surfaces and the inner product of photon wave functions on spacelike surfaces in an arbitrary gauge.
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4085214.292032
For weeks I agonized over what, if anything, this post should say. How does one commemorate a tragedy that isn’t over for millions of innocents on either side? How do I add to what friend-of-the-blog Boaz Barak and countless others have already written? …
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4085215.292044
Mark (10:11-12) and Luke (16:18) have rather simple and straightforward statements on divorce and remarriage: if you divorce and remarry, you’re in adultery. A standard interpretation is the Strict View:
- (SV) Divorce does not actually remove the marriage, and so if you remarry, you’re still married to the previous party, and hence are committing adultery. …
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4092701.292058
In this paper I will address three topics in the logic of conditionals. The first is the question whether the class of ‘reasonable’ probability functions must be closed under conditionalization. The second topic is the character of logical consequence when probabilities of conditionals come into play. The third is more specific: I want to present a challenge to the possible worlds approach in formal semantics, in favor of an algebraic approach. For this I will use as a case study Alan Hajek’s views on counterfactual conditionals, and its problems with infinity. Included in this will be reasons to expect algebras of propositions to be incomplete algebras. Throughout I will use as foil what is known variously as Stalnaker’s Thesis, or the Conditional Construal of Conditional Probability (CCCP). That is the thesis that the probability of a conditional A → B is the conditional probability of B given A, when defined. That the CCCP is tenable for a reasonable logic of conditionals I will presuppose in the body of the paper, but I will present its credentials in the Appendix. The CCCP is to be distinguished from the Extended Stalnaker’s Thesis, or Extended CCCP, that the conditional probability of A → B given C equals the conditional probability of B given A and C. That extended thesis has been demolished again and again, and will appear here only in a note, to be dismissed.
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4092728.292072
Some scientists produce explanations that seem to have a story-like, or narrative form. Such explanations are especially prominent in the historical sciences, including evolutionary history. To achieve an understanding of explanatory practice in historical science as well as a fuller understanding of the diversity of explanatory practices across the sciences, philosophers of science have proposed accounts of narrative explanation that seek to identify their unique explanatory features. However, such accounts neglect or misidentify the features that distinguish mere narratives from narrative explanations, and narrative explanations from other causal explanations. In this paper, I propose a novel account of narrative explanation that situates it within an interventionist account of causal explanation. Using my account, I propose three dimensions along which narrative explanations can be evaluated and draw several consequences for outstanding disagreements in the literature on narrative explanations. Ultimately, my account clarifies and justifies narrative explanation as a legitimate and distinct form of explanation.
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4092755.292086
I extend the literature on norms of assertion to the ubiquitous use of graphs in scientific papers and presentations, which I term “graphical testimony.” On my account, the testimonial presentation of a graph involves commitment to both (a) the in-context reliability of the graph’s framing devices and (b) the perspective-relative accuracy of the graph’s content. Despite apparent disagreements between my account and traditional accounts of assertion, the two are compatible and I argue that we should expect a similar pattern of commitments in a set of cases that extends beyond the graphical one. I end by demonstrating that the account resolves apparent tensions between the demands of honesty and the common scientific practice of presenting idealized or simplified graphs: these “distortions” can be honest so long as there’s the right kind of alignment between the distortion and the background beliefs and values of the audience.
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4092776.292106
What is the role of consciousness in nature? The science of consciousness has largely neglected the question through its emphasis on human experience. In this précis of A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness, I outline how we can move from a top-down approach that begins with investigations in humans to an evolutionary bottom-up approach that targets the adaptive origins of even the most minimal forms of subjective experience. I will also offer an introduction to the central thesis of the book, i.e. the pathological complexity thesis, according to which consciousness evolved in order to enable animals to adaptively respond to their life history challenges.
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4104949.292119
Last month, I reviewed Alexandre Lefebvre’s book Liberalism as a Way of Life. Regular readers may remember that I was surprised that, among the many features that constitute the liberal way of life, Lefebvre completely omits to mention the centrality of (private) property. …
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4114775.292132
Artificial agents create significant moral opportunities and challenges. Over the last two decades, discourse has largely focused on the concept of a ‘responsibility gap.’ We argue that this concept is incoherent, misguided, and diverts attention from the core issue of ‘control gaps.’ Control gaps arise when there is a discrepancy between the causal control an agent exercises and the moral control it should possess or emulate. Such gaps present moral risks, often leading to harm or ethical violations. We propose a second-order ‘duty of moral control’ that mandates closing these gaps to reduce risks within acceptable moral limits. Our analysis encompasses both autonomous machines and collective agents, acknowledging their similarities and key differences in constitution and moral status. We suggest four methods to close control gaps: ensuring artificial agents attain moral agency, providing meaningful human control, implementing safety engineering, and employing social control. These methods aim to responsibly integrate artificial agents into society. We conclude that a realistic approach, which addresses the practical problems posed by control gaps, is essential. This approach provides solutions to manage the risks posed by artificial agents while maintaining acceptable moral standards, ensuring we responsibly harness their potential and address the ethical challenges they present.
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4240551.292146
The other night I spoke at a quantum computing event and was asked—for the hundredth time? the thousandth?—whether I agreed that the quantum algorithm called QAOA was poised revolutionize industries by finding better solutions to NP-hard optimization problems. …