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7380.499143
Here’s a way to think about presentism. We have a three-dimensional reality and temporal modal operators, such as Prior’s P, F, H and G (pastly, futurely, always-pastly and always-futurely), with appropriate logical rules. …
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69471.499322
For various reasons, it has become common wisdom in science that there exists a principled epistemic distinction between direct and indirect observation. In this paper, I present a twofold argument. First, I argue against such a principled epistemic distinction. Second, I highlight a pervasive incongruence between the methodological and epistemological distinctions between direct and indirect observations. My arguments revolve around the idea that it is one thing to make a methodological distinction between observations and another to ascribe epistemic significance to them. I begin by unfolding the historical and philosophical foundations of the distinction, identifying three tenets that have served to sustain the distinction to the present day. I then provide a detailed analysis of two recent philosophical efforts to preserve the epistemic distinction in astrophysics and specific areas of astrophysics, ultimately suggesting that these approaches face significant challenges.
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69494.499353
This paper addresses the accelerating crisis of ethical governance in an age of complex socio-technical change, particularly in the domain of Artificial Intelligence. It poses a foundational philosophical question: when, if ever, is AI assistance in ethical deliberation legitimate? An answer is developed through three theses: i) the Ethical No-Free-Lunch (ENFL) principle, which establishes the indispensability of human normative intervention and accountability; ii) the Discovery/Justification Separation inspired by Reichenbach’s work, which restricts AI use to the exploratory “context of discovery”; iii) the Algorithmic Mediated Control Framework (AMCF), which mandates that only scrutable, human-vetted deterministic algorithms generated with AI assistance, and not the AI itself, be entrusted with critical societal processes. From these theses, five legitimacy criteria for AI-assisted ethical deliberation are derived. Finally, the paper proposes the “AI-assisted Iterative Method for Ethical Deliberation” (AIMED), an actionable multi-stage workflow that fulfills the exposed criteria for ethical AI-assisted deliberation. This method integrates digital literature analysis, structured human–AI dialogue, human-only verification, and continuous feedback. The paper explicitly addresses several potential objections. It is shown how the AIMED framework aligns with and provides a concrete implementation for major international regulatory guidelines, such as the EU AI Act and the NIST AI Risk Management Framework. By situating the AIMED within traditions of proceduralism, the governance of inductive risk, and human–AI collaboration, the paper argues that this framework offers a philosophically justified, practically implementable model of AI-assisted ethical governance, that can be seen as an actionable instance of Digital Humanism.
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69520.499366
The current landscape of views on chance in the Everett interpretation is rocky. Everettians (Wallace 2012, Sebens and Carroll 2018, McQueen and Vaidman 2019) agree that chance should be derived using principles governing uncertain or partial belief, but they cannot agree on how. Critics (Baker 2007, Dawid and Thébault 2015, Mandolesi 2019) maintain that any such approach is circular. We smooth the landscape by shifting focus from what Everettians take to be uncertain to what they should think is certain: namely, the conditions under which branches are isolated. Our approach to isolation resolves the main tensions among the different Everettian chance derivations while clarifying how they avoid circularity.
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69542.499378
Philosophical study of the foundations of quantum information theory finds its apogee in the masterly book-length study of Timpson (2013). Among the many views and arguments considered and assessed in that book is the position of ‘informational immaterialism’, which begins with the thought that “perhaps information itself should be recognized as the fundamental constituent of the world, rather than those putative constituents provided by the more foundational story of a mechanics of particles and fields: the story of a mind-independent world of material things” (Timpson 2013, p. 70). I take this position to have been rebutted decisively by Timpson, who argues (quite famously) among other things that pieces of [information] are abstracta. To be realized they will need to be instantiated by some particular token or other; and what will such tokens be? Unless one is already committed to immaterialism for some reason (and let me not be coy: there can be no good reason why one would be), these tokens will be material physical things. So even if one’s fundamental (quantum) theory makes a great deal of [information], it will not thereby dispense with the material world.
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69566.499388
The paper examines the nature of scientific progress through the lens of the history of modern cosmology (i.e. from Einstein’s 1917 static universe to the present-day Standard (ΛCDM) model of cosmology). We distil three novel lessons, germane to the debate between the two main accounts of scientific progress (the noetic and the epistemic one, respectively). First, it’s difficult to sharply locate— to precisely pinpoint the locus of—the epistemic content of scientific knowledge. Cosmology displays stark epistemic holism: epistemic content and evidence are typically inextricably distributed over a wider “web of beliefs”. Secondly, cosmologists employ a variety of justificatory practices and modes of reasoning. More often than not, they fall short of the fastidious standards of traditional epistemology. Thirdly, cosmological claims typically defy easy and unambiguous characterisation in terms of truth. These three lessons are shown to pose grave challenges to the epistemic account of scientific progress (on which progress consists in the accumulation of knowledge). By contrast, the rivalling noetic account (which characterises progress in terms of improved understanding) can naturally accommodate those lessons.
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69597.499401
We investigate the epistemic role of coherence in scientific reasoning, focusing on its use as a heuristic for filtering evidence. Using a novel computational model based on Bayesian networks, we simulate agents who update their beliefs under varying levels of noise and bias. Some agents treat reductions in coherence as higher-order evidence and interpret such drops as signals that something has gone epistemically awry, even when the source of error is unclear. Our results show that this strategy can improve belief accuracy in noisy environments but tends to mislead when evidence is systematically biased. We explore the implications for the rationality of coherence-based reasoning in science.
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79258.499413
On always-false open-futurism, reports of future contingents are always false. Now, imagine that it is contingent whether the time continues past t1. Perhaps God sustains the world in existence, and has promised to sustain it until t1 inclusive, but is free to stop sustaining it right then. …
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85721.499424
This paper discusses the problem of Hell, defending the Aquinas-Anselm-Edwards response that any immoral act deserves eternal punishment because it offends against God. I argue that the response is more defensible than one might at first think, but nevertheless faces a serious objection. If we differentiate two different problems of Hell—the logical problem and the evidential problem—we see that, in light of this objection, the Aquinas-Anselm-Edwards response only solves the logical problem of Hell.
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93637.499435
The Principle of Proportionate Causality (PPC) defended by Aquinas and other scholastics says that a perfection P can only be caused by something that has P either formally or eminently. To have P formally is to have P. Roughly, to have P eminently is to have a perfection greater than P.
(Some add: “has P virtually” to the list of options. …
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96786.499446
Very short summary: This essay examines the extension of marginalism to morality and politics. The marginalist reasoning principle holds that past decisions are irrelevant when assessing the rationality of current and future choices. …
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99321.499456
Here the question arises whether the problem does not express its own absurdity, and hence whether the impossibility of a solution does not lie already in the conditions set by the problem. The answer can often consist only in the critique of the question, can often be provided only by denying the question itself
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155885.49947
The success of AlphaFold, an AI that predicts protein structures, poses a challenge for traditional understanding of scientific knowledge. It generates predictions that are not empirically tested, without revealing the principles behind its predictive success. The paper presents an epistemological trilemma, forcing us to reject one of 3 claims: (1) AlphaFold produces scientific knowledge; (2) Predictions alone are not scientific knowledge unless derivable from established scientific principles; and (3) Scientific knowledge cannot be strongly opaque. The paper defends (1) and (2) and draws on Alexander Bird's functionalist, anti-individualist account of scientific knowledge, to accommodate AlphaFold's production of strongly opaque knowledge in science.
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155913.499481
A problem exists about the nature of what we are doing when, as philosophers of science, we argue about, say, the structure of scientific theories or the fundamental assumptions of particular sciences. If these topics demand philosophical concern, then so too does the philosophy of science itself. You may think that you, as a practising philosopher of science, know what the philosophy of science is. But do you—any more than the ordinary practising scientist knows reflectively and self-consciously what science is? You may think you know how the structure and methods of the philosophy of science differ from one type of issue to another. But do you—any more than the ordinary practising scientist can articulate just how scientific reasoning differs from one area of science to another? Or, just as some practising scientists regard the philosophy of science as worthless and unproductive activity, so too you, as a practising philosopher of science, may despise the metaphilosophy of science.
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180287.499495
The stereotypical drug user is a life-long addict. While stereotypes are usually good statistical approximations of the truth, I’ve long had the sense that this particular stereotype is false. The infamous heroin study, for example, found that the vast majority of U.S. soldiers who used heroin in Vietnam quit when they came home. …
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240183.499506
Using the philosophical writings of Ernst Mach as a backdrop, I explore how concepts and classifications partly constitute the phenomena studied in the science of emotion by selecting features from a larger population of features. This process of selection is a matter of decision and is not inevitable, but it promotes populating concepts with empirical content. The openness of empirical concepts suggests that this selectionist constituting does not characterise only the early stages in the development of a science because background and foreground shifts are potentially ongoing. The theory of psychological construction, which contends that emotional episodes are constructed on the fly out of shifting sets of components, exemplifies this selectionist sense of constituting to the extent that it advocates for a resemblance nominalism, similar to that of Locke, in which selection is involved in naming kinds. Examples of constituting can be seen in changing definitions of whether animals experience emotion and in the choice of causal models.
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240205.499516
Gijsbers (2025) has recently proposed an original theory of ‘presentist velocities’: the instantaneous relative positions and relative velocities of all bodies at the present instant are metaphysically fundamental, and their positions and velocities at both past and future times metaphysically depend on them. If physics is deterministic, then present such facts fully determine future such facts; if physics is indeterministic, then some past and future facts are indeterminate. For simplicity, I will focus on the deterministic case. e theory of presentist velocities (henceforth: TPV) solves some pernicious problems faced by other theories of velocity, such as the at-at theory (present velocities supervene on positions at different times). But Gijsbers’ presentation only considers classical mechanics, and does so in a relatively non-technical manner. If TPV is to succeed, it should also work for more realistic physical theories. e aim of this letter is to show that TPV falls short in this respect: once we look at the details of classical, statistical and relativistic mechanics, presentist velocities face serious obstacles.
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256570.499526
According to the causal theory of reference, the references of (some) natural kind terms are fixed in baptisms. To wit, a so-baptized kind term refers to those things that share a certain inner constitution with the sample used in the baptism. I argue that this is incompatible with the claim that natural kind terms are open textured, i.e. that semantics can underdetermine reference. The two views, fixed reference and open textured reference, entail competing claims about the course of science. By examining an episode from the history of science, the discovery of isotopes, I conclude in favor of open texture for natural kind terms.
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266563.499536
A correspondent asked me how a simple God can choose. I've thought much about this, never quite happy with what I have to say. I am still not happy (nor is it surprising if "how God functions" is beyond us!) …
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349449.499546
Things are about to get really (I mean really) busy for me and so I probably won’t be doing much besides running around frantically until August 2026 (seriously even by my standards it’s going to be a rough ride for a while). …
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356148.499564
“Poetic expression,” says the sugar-coated-pill theory, “is the honey that makes palatable the medicine of content, be it philosophical, moral, or scientific.” It’s an old theory. It’s there even in Ancient Greek and Roman theory and practice: Lucretius dipped De rerum natura, his scientific/philosophical treatise about atoms swerving in the void, in the rhythms of dactylic hexameter. …
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415930.499575
This paper reconstructs the derivations underlying the kinematical part of Einstein’s 1905 special relativity paper, emphasizing their operational clarity and minimalist use of mathematics. Einstein employed modest tools—algebraic manipulations, Taylor expansions, partial differentials, and functional arguments—yet his method was guided by principles of linearity, symmetry, and invariance rather than the elaborate frameworks of electron theory. The published text in Annalen der Physik concealed much of the algebraic scaffolding, presenting instead a streamlined sequence of essential equations. Far from reflecting a lack of sophistication, this economy of means was a deliberate rhetorical and philosophical choice: to demonstrate that relativity arises from two simple postulates and basic operational definitions, not from the complexities of electron theory. The reconstruction highlights how Einstein’s strategy subordinated mathematics to principle, advancing a new mode of reasoning in which physical insight, rather than computational elaboration, held decisive authority. In this respect, I show that Einstein’s presentation diverges sharply from Poincare’s. This paper is in memory of John Stachel, whose life’s work was devoted to illuminating Einstein’s special and general relativity.
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415955.499586
Jean-Marc Ginoux’s recent book, Poincare, Einstein and the Discovery of Special Relativity: An End to the Controversy (2024), seeks to close the debate over the respective roles of Poincare and Einstein. Yet what is presented as an “end” may instead invite a more careful analysis of how similar equations can conceal divergent conceptions. The aim here is not to rehearse priority disputes but to show how Einstein’s ether-free, principle-based kinematics marked out a path that, unlike its contemporaries, became the canonical form of special relativity. To this end, I reconstruct side by side the 1905 derivations of Poincare and Einstein, tracing their similarities and, more importantly, their differences. This paper reconstructs, in a novel way, the 1905 derivations of Einstein and Poincare, highlighting their contrasting paths.
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415978.499596
Mature scientific hypotheses are confirmed by large amounts of independent evidence. How could anyone be an anti-realist under these conditions? A classic response appeals to confirmational holism and underdetermination, but it is unclear whether traditional arguments succeed. I offer a new line of argument: If holism is interpreted as saying that the confirmation of every part of a hypothesis depends on the confirmation of the whole hypothesis, we must formulate conditions under which the confirmation received by the whole can be transferred to its parts. However, underdetermination suggests that relevant conditions are typically not met. If this is true, the confirmation received by the whole remains bounded by the priors for the parts, and we lack compelling reasons to believe substantive hypotheses based on evidence beyond the degree to which the posits involved in them are antecedently believed. A rejoinder comes from selective realism: If some posit is preserved throughout theory change, it is confirmed beyond the degree to which the containing hypothesis is. However, the variant of holism considered here exactly implies that we cannot confirm such posits in isolation. As I will show, the realist is thus forced into a dilemma: Either she succumbs to the holistic challenge, or she must embrace meta-empirical facts, such as the posit’s recurrence, as confirmatory.
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416008.499606
Many scientists and philosophers characterize aging as a disease. In this article, I argue against doing so. Characterizing aging as a disease would likely exacerbate age-based discrimination, perpetuate beliefs that undermine our health, and embolden medical professionals to treat their patients unjustly. It would risk these harms without promising any benefits that would be substantial enough to make up for them. If we aim to avoid risking harms unnecessarily, we should not characterize aging as a disease.
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441967.499616
A recent exchange in the New Left Review asks an unusual question: Why is there the amount of art that there is? More specifically, provoked by the $6.2 million sale of Maurizio Cattelan’s Comedian—a banana duct-taped to a wall—Malcolm Bull wants to know why there aren’t more “readymades,” a seeming font of money from nothing. …
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499911.499626
This paper investigates histories in Branching Space-Time (BST) structures. We start by identifying necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of free histories, and then we turn to the intangibility problem, and we show that the existence of histories in BST structures is equivalent to the axiom of choice, yielding the punchline “history gives us choice”.
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499994.499635
This paper draws an analogy between the value-free ideal (VFI) found in the domains of science and law, and argues that appreciating the similarities between these misplaced ideals mutually reinforces the arguments against the VFI in each domain, and can open up new conceptual space within debates about the proper role(s) of values within the practices of science and law alike. Although a jurisprudential philosophy of science is not mutually exclusive with the development of a political philosophy of science, we believe philosophers of science would do well to consider drawing on law and jurisprudence, as opposed to moral and political philosophy, in thinking about ways forward within these debates.
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500016.499649
We present a conceptual framework in which quantum probabilities arise from discrete events generated by real-valued alignments of inner products between two dynamically evolving wavefunctions. In this perspective, discreteness and probabilistic behavior emerge from the temporal structure of such events rather than being imposed axiomatically. Illustrative calculations show that the Born rule can appear as the limiting frequency of these events, without invoking wavefunction collapse, many-worlds branching, or decision-theoretic postulates. A two-state example demonstrates consistency with standard quantum predictions and suggests how outcome frequencies track Born weights. Extensions to interference scenarios, quantization heuristics, and multidimensional systems indicate that this proposal provides a fresh conceptual angle on the origin of quantum probabilities. This work is exploratory and aims to highlight the underlying idea rather than provide a completed alternative theory; questions concerning dynamical equations, general proofs, and experimental signatures remain open for future research.
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528094.499661
I’m thrilled that our paper entitled Demonstrating an unconditional separation between quantum and classical information resources, based on a collaboration between UT Austin and Quantinuum, is finally up on the arXiv. …