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22230.662967
Today’s essay is about “normalization,” a concept that appears repeatedly (though sometimes called differently) in many different contexts in social sciences and political discussions. An approximative definition is a social process through which individuals increasingly conform to a set of norms and patterns, making their behavior more predictable and uniform. …
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23004.663234
This paper sets forward a novel theory of temporal binding, a mechanism that integrates the temporal properties of sensory features into coherent perceptual experiences. Specifying a theory of temporal binding remains a widespread problem. The popular ‘brain time theory’ suggests that the temporal content of perceptual experiences is determined by when sensory features complete processing. However, this theory struggles to explain how perceptual experiences can accurately reflect the relative timing of sensory features processed at discrepant times. In contrast, ‘event time theories’ suggest that the temporal content of perceptual experiences reflects the relative event time of external sensory features and that the brain accommodates differential processing times. We can formulate retrodictive and predictive versions of this theory. Retrodictive event time theories propose that we accommodate desynchronised processing retrodictively. Predictive event time theories propose that we accommodate desynchronised processing by predictively modelling the event time of sensory features. I argue that both views have strengths and weaknesses.
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23033.663263
Human computers and scanners were scientific workers who performed calculations or reduced and analysed data before the advent of electronic computers. They were a staple of big science during the 19th century and early to mid 20th century. Yet, despite their prevalence within big science their epistemic roles remain virtually unexamined. This paper investigates the epistemic roles of the Harvard Human Computers at the Harvard College Observatory 1880-1920 and of the Bristol Scanners at the Bristol Nuclear Research Group 1935-1955.
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23062.663278
Relativistic quantum field theory (QFT) is ostensibly a quantum mechanical theory of fields, but determining exactly what these are is a thorny metaphysical task in the face of no-go arguments given by Baker (2009). This paper explores three possible answers according to which quantum fields are (I) superpositions of classical fields, (II) fields of expectation values for local observables, or (III) fields of local quantum states. I argue that each of these ontologies has resources available to respond to Baker’s challenge, though all three face residual puzzles.
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23096.663293
I extend the literature on norms of assertion to the ubiquitous use of graphs in scientific papers and presentations, which I term “graphical testimony.” On my account, the testimonial presentation of a graph involves commitment to both (a) the in-context reliability of the graph’s framing devices and (b) the perspective-relative accuracy of the graph’s content. Despite apparent disagreements between my account and traditional accounts of assertion, the two are compatible and I argue that we should expect a similar pattern of commitments in a set of cases that extends beyond the graphical one. I end by demonstrating that the account resolves apparent tensions between the demands of honesty and the common scientific practice of presenting idealized or simplified graphs: these “distortions” can be honest so long as there’s the right kind of alignment between the distortion and the background beliefs and values of the audience.
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23131.663305
This paper is an exploration of the nuanced realm of reference frames within the framework of General Relativity. Our analysis exposes a violation of Earman’s SP1 principle in scenarios involving fields that are dynamically uncoupled, a common assumption for reference frames. Unlike other violations, we cannot foreclose it by eliminating background spacetime structure. Our analysis also leads us to challenge the conventional notion of partial observables as quantities that are associated with a measuring instrument and expressed within a coordinate system. Instead, we argue that a partial observable is inherently relational, even if gauge-variant, and needs dynamical coupling with other partial observables to form a bona-fide, gauge-invariant complete observables. This perspective allows us to distinguish between being relational and being gauge-invariant, two properties that are often conflated.
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23164.663317
We attempt to reconstruct Hans Reichenbach’s arguments for a macroscopic causal definition of the direction of time. Our analysis reveals that Reichenbach’s formulation of “screening off” is equivocal between the now common notion of conditional independence of two variables given others and a weaker notion that requires the conditional independence only for specific values of the variables. We also find that on the now common notion of screening off his own conditions for the “usual…conjunctive forks” are mathematically impossible for binary variables. Finally, we note that as a corollary to his familiar Principle of the Common Cause, Reichenbach’s argument embraces a No Fatalism principle that forbids explaining earlier probabilistic associations by values of later variables.
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23230.663333
In general relativity, the strong equivalence principle is underpinned by a geometrical account of fields on spacetime, by which all fields and bodies probe the same geometry. This geometric account implies that the parallel transport of all spacetime tensors and spinors is dictated by a single affine connection. No similar account of gauge theory is put forward by standard textbooks, which use principal bundles to coordinate the parallel transport of different, interacting particles. Nonetheless, here I argue that gauge theory does afford such a geometric account, obviating the need for principal bundles.
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45720.663346
While Locke is remembered for his numerous contributions to a wide
range of fields—philosophy, political theory, economics,
religious exegesis, education and psychology—and while he took
on numerous roles in his career—academic, diplomat, secretary,
tutor, advisor and civil servant—it is easy to forget that he
was a trained and qualified professional. Locke spent a good part of
his career—at least a decade—studying, training, writing,
apprenticing and eventually practicing as a physician. He worked
closely with a number of leading researchers on a range of
contemporary medical, physiological and related subjects, taking
hundred of notes, and authoring several extended reflections on
medical matters.
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64842.663357
Works by (Humberstone 1981, 2011), van Benthem (1981, 2016), Holliday 2014, forthcoming, and Ding & Holliday 2020 attempt to develop a semantics of modal logic in terms of “possibilities”, i.e., “less determinate entities than possible worlds” (Edgington 1985). These works take possibilities as semantically primitive entities, stipulate a number of semantic principles that govern these entities (namely, Ordering, Persistence, Refinement, Cofinality, Negation, and Conjunction), and then interpret a modal language via this semantic structure. In this paper, we define possibilities in object theory (OT), and derive, as theorems, the semantic principles stipulated in the works cited. We then raise a concern for the semantic investigation of possibilities without a modal operator, and show that no such concerns the metaphysics of possibilities as developed in OT.
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68249.663369
David Hume is perhaps most celebrated for his analysis of causation and of inductive causal reasoning. Moreover, his quest to understand causal power and necessity played a central role in his philosophy and was arguably the primary stimulus behind his Treatise of Human Nature (Millican 2016, 86–93).
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68405.663381
Since the influential work of Norman Kemp Smith, it has become standard to interpret and debate Hume’s philosophy in terms of the broad themes of “scepticism” and “naturalism”. This has been particularly popular with scholars – notably Peter Strawson – who favour a relatively consistent narrative, whereby Hume’s “naturalism” is understood as providing some general response – or even a resolution – to the sceptical problems (and some related issues) that he raises. My aim here is to challenge this sort of narrative, by drawing distinctions within both scepticism and naturalism, and showing how Hume’s attitudes and responses to his most prominent philosophical challenges are importantly different, while the idea that he employs a broadly consistent “naturalist” strategy to address them is also misguided when examined in detail.
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68424.663393
Hume’s argument against the credibility of testimony for miracles – in Section 10 of his Enquiry concerning Human Understanding – is one of the most famous in the philosophical canon. Yet both its interpretation and its assessment are highly controversial. I have discussed the most common interpretative issues elsewhere, and will mainly pass over these here (with references to those previous discussions in case readers wish to follow them up). My main aim now is to focus instead on the cogency and force of Hume’s argument, and how it relates to his more general scepticism about theism as manifested in his Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. So this is primarily a philosophical rather than interpretative investigation.
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69080.663406
This article attempts to identify certain shortcomings in analytic philosophy as practised today. First, it identifies a disconnect between the darker aspects of the human condition and philosophers’ inability to engage with them. Second, it locates this inability in a certain logic of detachment, explored by Peter Strawson. Third, it points out problems with Strawson’s analysis, which it then tries to overcome, using Constantin Noica’s account of the Platonising attitude philosophers are perennially tempted by – one of several ways in which humans try to overcome their fallen condition. This is contrasted with Thomas Nagel’s valuable but still deficient discussion of the “cosmic question”. This brings us, finally, to a reconsideration of an older tradition in philosophy, which focused more explicitly on human fallenness. Petrarch’s Secretum meum is used as an example to show that while the failure of analytic philosophers has deep existential roots, it is not commendable. Philosophers must learn, again, to reflect on the darkness of the human soul – their own darkness.
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76098.663417
Paraphrase is relevant to the existence of properties because there are apparently true claims that apparently entail the existence of properties. This gives us good reason to think there are properties, unless it can be plausibly argued that at least one of those appearances is misleading. In typical (perhaps all) cases, this will involve giving a paraphrase of the apparently true claims—a less misleading restatement—that plausibly doesn’t entail the existence of properties (see, e.g., Jackson 1977 and Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 2005).
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85079.663427
Some people think that simplicity of laws of nature is a guide to truth, and some think beauty of laws of nature is. One might ask: Is the beauty of laws of nature a guide that goes beyond simplicity? …
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85080.66344
Suppose we have a full conditional probability P(A∣B) defined for all pairs of events (stipulating that P(A∣⌀) = 1 if we wish). Two methods have been proposed for defining a probability comparison using conditional probabilities:
Pruss: A ⪅ B iff P(A∣A∪B) ≤ P(B∣A∪B). …
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122107.663452
There is now extensive discussion in normative philosophy about personal relationships— from older debates about their nature and value, to more recent discussions of their implications for institutional design and freedom of association. The literature is primarily focused on dyads: close relationships between two people, such as romantic partnerships, two-person friendships, or parent-child relationships, and their perhaps distinctive contributions to our lives.
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123057.663466
Last time, I wrote, somewhat despairingly, about finding a black tie dress to wear to the National Book Award ceremony where Unshrinking is a finalist in non-fiction. Talk about champagne problems, especially given my current levels of body privilege as a small fat or perhaps even borderline fat woman. …
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162254.663478
In nearly twenty years of blogging, I’ve unfortunately felt more and more isolated and embattled. It now feels like anything I post earns severe blowback, from ridicule on Twitter, to pseudonymous comment trolls, to scary and aggressive email bullying campaigns. …
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171761.663488
[I posted this before, but Substack didn’t send out notifications for some reason, so I am trying again. —mh]
Here, I continue my discussion of ethical vegetarianism. *
[ *Based on: “Dialogues on Ethical Vegetarianism,” Between the Species 22 (2018): 20-135. …
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173103.6635
It has been suggested that the following three theses are incompatible: Moral Realism, Epistemicism about vagueness, and the claim that moral terms are vague. If this is so, (at least) one these three must be rejected. This paper explores the possibility of resolving this trilemma by rejecting Moral Vagueness.
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196251.663514
In this article I introduce a distinction between two types of reparametrization invariant models and I argue that while both suffer from a problem of time at the time of applying canonical quantization methods to quantize them, its severity depends greatly on the type of model. Deparametrizable models are models that have time as a configuration or phase space variable and this makes it the case that the problem of time can be solved. In the case of non-deparametrizable models, we cannot find time in the configuration or phase space of the model, and hence the techniques that allow solving the problem in the deparametrizable case do not apply. This seems to signal that the canonical quantization techniques fail to give a satisfactory quantization of non-deparametrizable models. As I argue that general relativity is nondeparametrizable, this implies that the canonical quantization of this theory may fail to provide a successful theory of quantum gravity.
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196273.663525
This paper examines the development of causal perturbation theory, a reformulation of perturbative quantum field theory (QFT) starting from a causality condition rather than a time-evolution equation. We situate this program alongside other causality-based reformulations of relativistic quantum theory which flourished in the post-war period, contrasting it in particular with axiomatic QFT. Whereas the axiomatic QFT tradition tried to move beyond the perturbative expansion, causal perturbation theory can be thought of as a foundational investigation of this approximation method itself. Unearthing this largely forgotten research program helps clarify questions of contemporary philosophical interest, for instance about the interpretative significance of the ultraviolet divergences which appear in the series expansion, but also help us understand why causality conditions became so ubiquitous in post-war high-energy theory.
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196295.663537
This paper aims to map the different theoretical options related to the Precautionary Principle (PP). Great part of the literature on it can be systematized by answering to three different questions: is there a basic structure in the PP? If so, in which interpretation of the PP does this structure express itself? Finally, are its damage or knowledge conditions fixed or adjustable? The first question separates realist from non-realist approaches. The second question allows us to discriminate monist, dualist, or pluralist positions in relation to the three interpretations of the PP: decision rule, procedural requirement, or epistemic rule. Finally, the third question distinguishes rigid from non-rigid formulations of the principle. Based on this mapping, one can not only navigate through the different formulations of the PP present both in official documents and in specialized literature, but also deflect some of its common objections, and understand Hans Jonas’ eventual connection with PP. Notwithstanding, this mapping does not capture other important themes attached to PP, which motivates a final distinction between narrow and broader forms of PP.
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196317.663548
We propose an explication of conceptual coherence in terms of the covariational structure of concepts or how clusters of properties systematically co-occur across category exemplars. Using the theory of conceptual spaces combined with ideas from Principal Component Analysis, we show that a concept’s perceived coherence relates to how easily its attribute structure can be reduced to simpler representations. Our approach contrasts with previous accounts that ground coherence in similarity or intuitive theories. We discuss the relationship between coherence, uncertainty, and induction and apply our framework to the conjunction fallacy.
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225296.66356
Active inference, then, effectively appears to be an exercise in self-fulfilling prophesying. Crudely speaking, agents keep sampling until they acquire evidence for their beliefs about their expected states. If you ‘prophesy’ that you will be drinking coffee, then the possession of that prophecy induces a prediction error since you are not currently drinking coffee, and you then cast around sampling until the prediction error is quashed by observations of a hot cup of coffee in your hand.
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234638.663575
Readers: I gave the Neyman Seminar at Berkeley last Wednesday, October 9, and had been so busy preparing it that I did not update my leisurely cruise for October. This is the second stop. I will shortly post remarks on the the panel discussion that followed my Neyman talk (with panelists, Ben Recht, Philip Stark, Bin Yu, and Snow Zhang), which was quite illuminating. …
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234638.663587
Expertise slows the progress of knowledge, some say. First, it delays arrival at the cutting edge: if you must master everything that came before, you may not begin original research until your 30s, when your brain is a rigid fossil and retirement is already near. …
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310212.6636
Disciplinary manifestos typically propose grand reconceptions or reorientations of the field. The work is not what we believe it to be; or if it is, it should be radically transformed. I tend to be impatient with philosophers who operate in this mode. …