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3428.491992
We show that the dynamical common core of the recently-discovered non-relativistic geometric trinity of gravity is Maxwell gravitation. Moreover, we explain why no analogous distinct dynamical common core exists in the case of the better-known relativistic geometric trinity of gravity.
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3448.492244
Chapter 12 of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is called “The Resolution of Revolutions”. It deals with the post-revolutionary period in which a rival paradigm has been proposed and now the proponents of the new paradigm must persuade the holdouts supporting the dominant paradigm. Kuhn is frank that the skeptics may never be persuaded. What follows is an interpretation of his account of the resolution of revolutions in Chapter 12. Kuhn’s position begins from the claim that experimental falsification is not the motivation for the proposal of a new paradigm. Instead, novel paradigms are developed to solve new problems in cases where doing so requires a new way of looking at and understanding the phenomena: an interlocked set of non-empirical assumptions (SSR, 147) all change at once. As a result, persuading adherents to the former paradigm is not a matter of presenting evidence, but of changing how they see and understand science. It may even mean persuading them to adopt new ways of doing and understanding science itself.
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3473.492268
David Wallace’s ‘Dennett’s Criterion’ plays a key part in establishing realist claims about the existence of a multiverse emerging from the mathematical formalism of quantum physics, even after decoherence is fully appreciated. Although the philosophical preconditions of this criterion are not neutral, they are rarely explicitly addressed conceptually. I tease apart three: (I) a rejection of conceptual bridge laws even in cases of inhomogeneous reduction; (II) a reliance on the pragmatic notion of usefulness to highlight quasi-classical patterns, as seen in a decoherence basis, over others; and (III) a structural realist or ‘functional realist’ point of view that leads to individuating those patterns as real macroscopic objects at the coarse-grained level, as they are seen from the Classical Stance (analogous to Dennett’s Intentional Stance). I conclude that the justification of Dennett’s Criterion will be intimately tied up with the fate of strong forms of naturalism, and in particular that Wallacian quantum mechanics is a key case study for concretely evaluating his ‘math-first’ structural realism (Wallace 2022).
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3500.492289
In the Preface to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Kuhn (1922-1996) provides some useful background to understanding what he sought to accomplish in the book. Kuhn begins by explaining his own starting point for writing the book. He explains that his exposure to the history of science “radically undermined some of [his] basic conceptions about the nature of science” (Kuhn 1962/2012, xxxix). In fact, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is a presentation of the new conception of science that he developed in light of this experience. Ultimately, as Kuhn makes clear, he is interested in developing a philosophy of science. In his words, in Structure he is addressing “the more philosophical concerns that had initially led [him] to history” (Kuhn 1962/2012, xxxix-xl). Indeed, his principal concerns are epistemological: understanding the relationship between data and theory, understanding how scientific knowledge grows, and understanding the nature of progress in science. The history of science functions as a source of data about science.
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14334.492308
A normative power is supposed to be a power to directly change normative reality. We can, of course, indirectly change normative reality by affecting the antecedents of conditional norms: By unfairly insulting you, I get myself to have a duty to apologize, but that is simply due to a pre-existing duty to apologize for all unfair insults. …
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23467.492321
The news these days feels apocalyptic to me—as if we’re living through, if not the last days of humanity, then surely the last days of liberal democracy on earth. All the more reason to ignore all of that, then, and blog instead about the notorious Busy Beaver function! …
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26233.492334
The idea that diverse groups of ordinary citizens will “outperform” expert panels has become something of a totemic conviction in democratic theory. The “diversity trumps ability” (DTA) theorem, first formulated by the economists Lu Hong and Scott E. Page (2004), asserts that under certain conditions, diverse assemblies will find better solutions to complex problems than homogeneous groups of the best experts. This result has been taken up with much enthusiasm by political theorists, some of whom have taken it to prove the epistemic supremacy of democratic decision-making over its competitors (Landemore 2013). In debates with defenders of expertocratic and epistocratic, let alone autocratic, modes of decision-making,
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37787.492347
What does it mean to theorize about bounded rationality? Today’s post situates theories of bounded rationality against a competing Standard Picture that came to prominence during the middle of the twentieth century. …
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45663.492372
The fields of social neuroscience and neuroeconomics have experienced rapid growth over the past decade, yet little research has focused on issues related to midlife or older age. In light of the profound demographic changes occurring in our society, this is an important research gap. The past century witnessed a near doubling of life expectancy, and it is projected that in <50 years, there will be close to 90 million Americans aged 65 years (Federal Interagency Forum on Aging-Related Statistics, 2010). We are on the brink of profound demographic changes both in the USA and the world at large (see: http://www.prb.org/Articles/2011/agingpopulationclocks.aspx).
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63507.492394
Human Technology Interaction
Eindhoven University of Technology
*[Some earlier posts by D. Lakens on this topic are listed at the end of part 2, forthcoming this week]
How were we supposed to move beyond p < .05, and why didn’t we? …
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68642.492422
Assume naturalism and suppose that digital electronic systems can be significantly conscious. Suppose Alice is a deterministic significantly conscious digital electronic system. Imagine we duplicated Alice to make another such system, Bob, and fed them both the same inputs. …
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117652.49256
In the course of presenting his own solution to the insolubles (logical paradoxes such as the Liar), Marsilius of Inghen criticises four earlier theories, which appear to be those of Albert of Saxony, (the early) Buridan, Roger Swyneshed and a modification of William Heytesbury’s solution which we find in many textbooks and anonymous treatises known as presentations of the Logica Oxoniensis. Marsilius’s solution bears interesting resemblances to all four, but has its own distinctive features. The core idea of his solution is that all propositions have a two-fold signification, a material signification and a formal one. The material signification, also called the primary or direct signification, is what most would call the proposition’s usual signification; e.g., the material signification of ‘This proposition is false’ is that that proposition is false. Its formal, aka indirect or reflexive, signification is, in the case of affirmative propositions, that the subject and predicate supposit for the same thing, and in the case of negative propositions, that they do not. This reflexive signification derives from the meaning of the (affirmative resp. negative) copula. Thus the reflexive signification of ‘This proposition is false’ is that ‘this proposition’ and ‘false’ supposit for the same thing, that is, that it is false that that proposition is false. Presenting Marsilius’s formal signification in such cases as stating of that proposition’s being false, for example (which is the material signification of ‘This proposition is false’), that it is false (that is, falls under the supposition of ‘false’) suggested to Paul Spade that Marsilius’s solution was a development of Gregory of Rimini’s account. I will argue that any resemblance here is, in the absence of any external evidence, superficial and coincidental, and that Marsilius’s view is much closer to the Oxford solutions and Albert’s—Albert and Marsilius being, after all, members of the English Nation at Paris. Marsilius’s arguments in favour of his theory, and his application of the solution to a range of insolubles, are well worth looking at in detail, which I will do, though not at the length which Marsilius devotes to it.
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117674.49258
Paul Vincent Spade contrasts the calm and measured reaction of medieval thinkers to the “insolubles” (logical paradoxes such as the Liar) with the troubled response of philosophers and mathematical logicians more recently to the semantic antinomies in modern logic and set theory. The latter is often described as a crisis in the foundations of mathematics. But there was a comparable crisis in medieval philosophy and theology, namely over the apparent incompatibility of the newly rediscovered Aristotelian logic and Christian theology, specifically in the latter’s doctrine of the Trinity. According to that doctrine, codified at the fourth Lateran Council in 1215, God is undivided in his essence but distinct according to the properties of the three persons. This appears to open the faithful to heresy through the following expository syllogism: Haec essentia est filius Haec essentia est pater Ergo pater est filius, contradicting the distinctness of the Son and the Father. The paralogism can also be formulated as a first-figure syllogism in Darii as follows: Omnis deus est pater Filius in divinis est deus Igitur Filius in divinis est pater.
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118491.492594
This is the first in a five-part series introducing my book, Inquiry under bounds. The book is available here under an open access model from Oxford University Press. 2. My project
Humans are bounded agents. …
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209376.492607
The scaling hypothesis in artificial intelligence claims that a model’s cognitive ability scales with increased compute. This hypothesis has two interpretations: a weak version where model error rates decrease as a power law function of compute, and a strong version where as error rates decrease new cognitive abilities unexpectedly emerge. We argue that the first is falsifiable but the second is not because it fails to make exact predictions about which abilities emerge and when. This points to the difficulty of measuring cognitive abilities in algorithms since we lack good ecologically valid measurements of those abilities.
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209379.492621
Science makes extensive use of models, i.e. simplified or idealized representations of the systems found in the physical world. Models fall into at least two categories: mathematical and physical models. In this paper, we focus attention mainly on the latter, trying to show that they are essential tools not only of the scientific description of the world ‘out there’, but of man’s cognition of things, especially things not directly accessible to the senses. The spring-and-ball (SB) model of chemistry is a most instructive example of a physical model. In other disciplines, from cosmology to physiology, models are used that are of the same kind or play the same role. It is concluded that physical models are objects which belong to the world accessible to man’s direct experience, often constructed ad hoc and possibly idealized. They serve as referents for analogies, which appear to be indispensable in most aspects of scientific theorizing, especially for the understanding of the submicroscopic levels of reality.
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215283.492633
Confirmation bias has been widely studied for its role in failures of reasoning. Individuals exhibiting confirmation bias fail to engage with information that contradicts their current beliefs, and, as a result, can fail to abandon inaccurate beliefs. But although most investigations of confirmation bias focus on individual learning, human knowledge is typically developed within a social structure. We use network models to show that moderate confirmation bias often improves group learning. However, a downside is that a stronger form of confirmation bias can hurt the knowledge-producing capacity of the community.
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231313.492652
Being low status is unpleasant. Sometimes it’s only that, and barely so: when it comes to sports, my athletic abilities mark me as inferior, and won’t get me attention from professional recruiters, but I don’t care. …
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234134.492665
According to a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics, the causal role of human consciousness in the measuring process is called upon to solve a foundational problem called the “measurement problem.” Traditionally, this interpretation is tied up with the metaphysics of substance dualism. As such, this interpretation of quantum mechanics inherits the dualist’s mind-body problem. Our working hypothesis is that a process-based approach to the consciousness causes collapse interpretation (CCCI) —leaning on Whitehead’s solution to the mind-body problem— offers a better metaphysical understanding of consciousness and its role in interpreting quantum mechanics. This article is the kickoff for such a research program in the metaphysics of science.
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234157.492678
This chapter examines the history of philosophy of psychology and philosophy of psychiatry as subfields of philosophy of science that emerged in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. The chapter also surveys related literatures that developed in psychology and psychiatry. Philosophy of psychology (or philosophy of cognitive science) has been a well-established subfield of philosophy of mind since the 1990s and 2000s. This field of philosophy of psychology is narrowly focused on issues in cognitive psychology and cognitive science. Compared to the thriving subfield of philosophy of cognitive science, there has been a lack of corresponding interest among philosophers of science in broader methodological questions about different paradigms and fields of study in psychology. These broader methodological questions about psychology have been addressed in the field of theoretical psychology, which is a subfield of psychology that materialized in the 1980s and 1990s. Philosophy of psychiatry emerged as a subfield of philosophy of science in the mid-2000s. Compared to philosophy of psychology, the philosophy of psychiatry literature in philosophy of science engaged with issues examined in an older and more interdisciplinary tradition of philosophy of psychiatry that developed after the 1960s. The participation of philosophers of science in the literature on theoretical psychology, by contrast, has been limited.
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282351.492693
One of my recurring themes is that people underrate epistemic discipline: doing the most basic legwork of good thinking. Both critical thinking books and rationalist writings often focus on fallacies involving subtleties like the Monty Hall problem and Bayes’ Theorem. …
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291848.492706
The Good Regulator Theorem and the Internal Model Principle are sometimes cited as mathematical proofs that an agent needs an internal model of the world in order to have an optimal policy. However, these principles rely on a definition of “internal model” that is far too permissive, applying even to cases of systems that do not use an internal model. As a result, these principles do not provide evidence (let alone a proof) that internal models are necessary. The paper also diagnoses what is missing in the GRT and IMP definitions of internal model, which is that models need to make predictions that represent variables in the target system (and these representations need to be usable by an agent so as to guide behavior).
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291878.492721
This chapter reviews empirical research on the rules governing assertion and retraction, with a focus on the normative role of truth. It examines whether truth is required for an assertion to be considered permissible, and whether there is an expectation that speakers retract statements that turn out to be false. Contrary to factive norms (such as the influential “knowledge norm”), empirical data suggests that there is no expectation that speakers only make true assertions. Additionally, contrary to truth-relativist accounts, there is no requirement for speakers to retract statements that are false at the context of assessment. We conclude by suggesting that truth still plays a crucial role in the evaluation of assertions: as a standard for evaluating their success, rather than permissibility.
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291909.492734
Sex is often thought of as a straightforwardly binary categorical variable. Yet there is considerable variation in would-be sex traits; from genitals and hormones to morphology, neurology and behaviour, there is rarely if ever a categorical binary. We introduce a strategy that researchers use to deal with this variation: Individualising Variation (IV). IV involves treating non-binary and gradual variation as idiosyncratic, as individual differences rather than sex-based differences. Using the contrasting cases of sex identification in field ornithology and the debate about sex differences in neuroscience, we illustrate IV and investigate its epistemic and conceptual consequences. We argue that IV stabilises the ontological picture of sex as categorical and binary. While IV can be an epistemically benign research strategy in some cases, we argue that it can also be epistemically detrimental. This is because of its ability to mask evidence that would otherwise challenge related assumptions about the phenomenon of interest, such as what sexes are and what they look like. We also identify an alternative strategy, De-individualising Variation, which works against IV and helps life scientists recognise variation beyond categorical binaries.
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373888.492749
Problems in moral philosophy and philosophy of religion can take on new forms in light of contemporary physical theories. Here we discuss how the problem of evil is transformed by the Everettian “Many-Worlds” theory of quantum mechanics. We first present an Everettian version of the problem and contrast it to the problem in single-universe physical theories such as Newtonian mechanics and Bohmian mechanics. We argue that, pace Turner (2016) and Zimmerman (2017), the Everettian problem of evil is no more extreme than the Bohmian one. The existence and multiplicity of (morally) terrible branches in the Everettian multiverse in contrast to the mere possibility of them in the Bohmian universe does not entail there is “more evil” in the former than in the latter. Low probability in the Bohmian case and low branch weight in the Everettian case should modulate how we respond to them in exactly the same way. We suggest that the same applies to the divine decision of creating an Everettian multiverse. For an empirically adequate Everettian quantum mechanics that justifies the Born rule, there is no special problem of evil. In order for there to be a special Everettian problem of evil, the Everettian interpretation must already have been exposed to decisive refutation. In the process, we hope to show how attention to the details of physical and metaphysical theories can and should impact the way we think about problems in moral philosophy and philosophy of religion.
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390263.492764
Among the various proposals for quantum ontology, both wavefunction realists and the primitive ontologists have argued that their approach is to be preferred because it relies on intuitive notions: locality, separability and spatiotemporality. As such, these proposals should be seen as normative frameworks asserting that one should choose the fundamental ontology which preserves these intuitions, even if they disagree about their relative importance: wavefunction realists favor preserving locality and separability, while primitive ontologists advocate for spatiotemporality. In this paper, first I clarify the main tenets of wavefunction realism and the primitive ontology approach, arguing that seeing the latter as favoring constructive explanation makes sense of their requirement of a spatiotemporal ontology. Then I show how the aforementioned intuitive notions cannot all be kept in the quantum domain. Consequently, wavefunction realists rank locality and separability higher than spatiotemporality, while primitive ontologists do the opposite. I conclude that however, the choice of which notions to favor is not as arbitrary as it might seem. In fact, they are not independent: requiring locality and separability can soundly be justified by requiring spatiotemporality, and not the other way around. If so, the primitive ontology approach has a better justification of its intuitions than its rival wavefunction realist framework.
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407238.492777
I review a counterexample to the frequent claim that discrepancies among observers resulting from conventional quantum theory’s inability to define “measurement,” such as those arising in the Wigner’s Friend thought experiment, remain private and incom-mensurable. I consider the implications for a recent attempt to shield Relational Quantum Mechanics from such inconsistencies and conclude that it is not successful.
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407401.49279
Niche construction theory (NCT) aims to transform and unite evolutionary biology and ecology. Much of the debate about NCT has focused on construction. Less attention has been accorded to the niche: what is it, exactly, that organisms are constructing? In this paper I compare and contrast the definition of the niche used in NCT with ecological niche definitions. NCT’s concept of the evolutionary niche is defined as the sum of selection pressures affecting a population. So defined, the evolutionary niche is narrower than the ecological niche. Moreover, when contrasted with a more restricted ecological niche concept, it has a slightly different extension. I point out three kinds of cases in which the evolutionary niche does not coincide with realized ecological niches: extreme habitat degradation, commensalism, and non-limiting or super-abundant resources. These conceptual differences affect the role of NCT in unifying ecology and evolutionary biology.
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407422.492803
Adrian Bardon has produced a new version of his historical introduction to the philosophy of time. Originally published in 2013, the second edition of 2024 is partly rewritten and supplemented with a more extensive discussion on our disposition to project the passage of time. The historical exposition contains standard figures in Western philosophy, covering antiquity, the early modern era, and the 20th century. This edition also references some schools and figures not typically included in the canon, such as very early Indian sources, Émilie du Châtelet and al-Ghazali. Although the book’s title emphasizes history, most of the chapters are directed at issues in systematic philosophy of time: the realism/antirealism debate, temporal passage, temporal experience, spacetime, direction, time travel, time and free will, and the temporal boundaries of the universe. The book is pedagogically well-designed. The chosen topics are well-balanced and the text flows smoothly from beginning to end. The perennial questions about time are presented to the reader in an accessible way.
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407445.492816
In the 1960s, the demonstration of interference effects using two laser-beams raised the question: can two photons interfere? Its plausibility contested Dirac’s dictum, “Interference between two different photons never occurs”. Disagreements about this conflict led to a controversy. This paper will chart the controversy’s contour and show that it evolved over two phases. Subsequently, I investigate the reasons for its perpetuation. The controversy was initiated and fuelled by several misinterpretations of the dictum. I also argue that Dirac’s dictum is not applicable to two photon interference as they belong to different contexts of interference. Recognising this resolves the controversy.