1. 26651.504744
    spective. As a consequence of the perspectival nature of perception, when we perceive, say, a circular coin from different angles, there is a respect in which the coin looks circular throughout, but also a respect in which the coin's appearance changes. More generally, perception of shape and size properties has both a constant aspect—an aspect that remains stable across changes in perspective—and a perspectival aspect—an aspect that changes depending on one's perspective on the object. How should we account for the perspectival aspect of spatial perception? We present a framework within which to discuss the perspectival aspect of perception and put forward three desiderata that any account of the perspectival aspect of perception should satisfy. We discuss views on which the perspectival aspect of perception is analyzed in terms of constitutively mind‐dependent appearance properties as well as views on which the perspectival aspect of perception is analyzed in terms of representations of mind‐independent perspectival properties.
    Found 7 hours, 24 minutes ago on PhilPapers
  2. 315441.504815
    I offer some responses to Prosser’s ‘Experiencing Time’, one of whose goals is to debunk a view of temporal experience somewhat prevalent in the metaphysics literature, which I call ‘Perceptualism’. According to Perceptualism: (1) it is part of the content of perceptual experience that time passes in a metaphysically strong sense: the present has a metaphysically privileged status, and time passes in virtue of changes in which events this ‘objective present’ highlights, and moreover (2) this gives us evidence in favor of strong passage. Prosser argues that perception cannot be sensitive to whether the strong passage obtains, and therefore cannot represent strong passage in a way that gives us evidence of its truth. Although I accept this conclusion, I argue that Prosser’s argument for it is problematic. It threatens to over-generalize to rule out uncontroversial cases of perceptual knowledge, such as our knowledge that we live in a spatial world. Furthermore, a successful argument ruling out perceptual evidence for strong passage would have to give constraints on the theory/observation distinction of a kind not provided by Prosser’s discussion. I also comment on several other parts of the book.
    Found 3 days, 15 hours ago on PhilPapers
  3. 423842.504856
    Philosophers spend a lot of time attempting to give analyses of philosophically interesting notions. Analyses have been proposed for knowledge, moral rightness, species- hood, object- hood, persistence, change, reference, and much more. It is therefore surprising that there isn’t more consensus among philosophers regarding what they are attempting to do in providing purported analyses. Philosophers don’t agree about the things that are being analyzed, nor what it is to analyze something. In what follows, we’ll see a sampling of views on what philosophical analysis is. The present work isn’t meant to be exhaustive and there is much work that will not be discussed. However, it does purport to illustrate the main lines of thinking about analysis in recent philosophy. The present work also makes no attempt to discuss the views about analysis of historical figures like Gottlob Frege, G. E. Moore, and Bertrand Russell. There is a rich literature on this topic and interested readers should consult it. Here, we focus on more contemporary views.
    Found 4 days, 21 hours ago on Jeffrey King's site
  4. 442144.504896
    This paper semantically analyzes “free perception” sequences in pictorial narratives such as comics, where one panel shows a character looking, and the next panel shows what they see. Pictorial contents are assumed to be viewpoint-centered propositions. A framework for the representation of pictorial narratives is used where indexing and embedding of certain panels is characterized by hidden operators. The resulting enriched pictorial narratives are interpreted in a dynamic framework. A possible worlds construction using action alternatives captures the epistemic effect of perceptual actions. Free perception sequences are implicitly anaphoric, as analyzed using cross-panel indexing. It is argued that some cases of free perception are truly intensional, and must involve embedding in the framework that is employed. Examples are drawn from comics and film.
    Found 5 days, 2 hours ago on Dorit Abusch's site
  5. 605486.504935
    The paper highlights how a popular version of epistemological disjunctivism (Pritchard 2012, 2016) labours under a kind of ‘internalist challenge’—a challenge that seems to have gone largely unacknowledged by disjunctivists. This is the challenge to vindicate the supposed ‘internalist insight’ that disjunctivists claim their view does well to protect (cf.
    Found 1 week ago on PhilPapers
  6. 608344.504972
    [Thanks to the Singularity Bros podcast for inspiring me to write this post. It was a conversation I had with the hosts of this podcast that prompted me to further elaborate on the idea of ethical behaviourism.] …
    Found 1 week ago on John Danaher's blog
  7. 670358.50501
    The idea that gauge theory has ‘surplus’ structure poses a puzzle: in one much discussed sense, this structure is redundant; but on the other hand, it is also widely held to play an essential role in the theory. In this paper, we employ category-theoretic tools to illuminate an aspect of this puzzle. We precisify what is meant by ‘surplus’ structure by means of functorial comparisons with equivalence classes of gauge fields, and then show that such structure is essential for any theory that represents a rich collection of physically relevant fields which are ‘local’ in nature.
    Found 1 week ago on PhilSci Archive
  8. 769965.505049
    Last time, I argued that there are substantive open questions about whether the theoretical constructs of formal linguistics play any role in the psychological processes underlying language use. Let’s now address those questions.When people talk about “the psychological reality of syntax”, there are (at least) two importantly different types of psychological state that they might have in mind. …
    Found 1 week, 1 day ago on The Brains Blog
  9. 849658.505087
    In this essay, I first consider a popular view of models and modeling, the similarity view. Second, I contend that arguments for it fail and it suffers from what I call “Hughes’ worry.” Third, I offer a deflationary approach to models and modeling that avoids Hughes’ worry and shows how scientific representations are of apiece with other types of representations. Finally, I consider an objection that the similarity view can deal with approximations better than the deflationary view and show that this is not so.
    Found 1 week, 2 days ago on Jay Odenbaugh's site
  10. 1073365.505128
    Most marriages begin with an agreement that the relationship be permanent: “till death do us part”, or various equivalents. It is widely recognised that such agreements are not always kept, and in societies where divorce is common, the partners may even reasonably suspect the arrangement will not last until one of the parties dies. Still, marriage until one of the partners dies is the norm.
    Found 1 week, 5 days ago on Daniel Nolan's site
  11. 1671302.505175
    Constitutive mechanistic explanations are said to refer to mechanisms that constitute the phenomenon-to-be-explained. The most prominent approach of how to understand this constitution relation is Carl Craver’s mutual manipulability approach to constitutive relevance. Recently, the mutual manipulability approach has come under attack (Leuridan 2012; Baumgartner and Gebharter 2015; Romero 2015; Harinen 2014; Casini and Baumgartner 2016). Roughly, it is argued that this approach is inconsistent because it is spelled out in terms of interventionism (which is an approach to causation), whereas constitutive relevance is said to be a non-causal relation. In this paper, I will discuss a strategy of how to resolve this inconsistency, so-called fat-handedness approaches (Baumgartner and Gebharter 2015; Casini and Baumgartner 2016; Romero 2015). I will argue that these approaches are problematic. I will present a novel suggestion of how to consistently define constitutive relevance in terms of interventionism. My approach is based on a causal interpretation of mutual manipulability, where manipulability is interpreted as a causal relation between the mechanism’s components and temporal parts of the phenomenon.
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on PhilPapers
  12. 2017546.505209
    According to Dominic Lopes, expressiveness in pictures should be analyzed solely in terms of “expression looks” of various sorts, namely the look of a figure, a scene and/or a design. But, according to this view, it seems puzzling that expressive pictures should have any emotional effect on their audiences. Yet Lopes explicitly ties his “contour theory” of expression in pictures to empathic responses in spectators. Thus, despite his deflationary account of pictorial expression, he claims that pictures can give us practice in various “empathic skills.” I argue that Lopes’s account of empathic responses to pictures, while interesting and enlightening, nevertheless ignores the most important way in which pictures exercise and enhance our empathic skills, namely, by giving us practice in taking the emotional perspective of another person.
    Found 3 weeks, 2 days ago on PhilPapers
  13. 2044629.505248
    I argue that the function attributed to episodic memory by Mahr & Csibra (that is, grounding one’s claims to epistemic authority over past events) fails to support the essentially autonoetic character of such memories. I suggest, in contrast, that episodic event-memories are sometimes purely first-order, sometimes autonoetic, depending on relevance in the context.
    Found 3 weeks, 2 days ago on Peter Carruthers's site
  14. 2065580.505283
    You aren’t supposed to talk about it. Not really. And certainly not in front of the kids. But that isn’t why you don’t remember it. That isn’t why you don’t remember the way it feels. You don’t remember the way it feels because it doesn’t leave a memory trace to begin with. The facts are retained, but the feeling disappears. What I’m alluding to is the pain of childbirth—hush, don’t let my kids read this, but it did hurt! Yet although I can remember that labor pains hurt, I can’t remember what they felt like. Although I can remember that they were too traumatic to sleep through and that while standing under the shower trying to alleviate the agony, I tore down the soap dish bolted into the wall, I can’t conjure up the sensory experience itself. Although my memory of the events leading up to the birth is pellucid—I remember how the nurses were impressed that I wanted to suffer through it unmedicated and how, when it came down to the wire, my obstetrician started humming Blue Moon—my memory of the bodily sensations is nonexistent. Introspection, here, reveals an utter blank. Contrary to the adage about experience being the best teacher, experience’s pedagogy was an utter failure.
    Found 3 weeks, 2 days ago on Barbara Gail Montero's site
  15. 2069185.505319
    What is the role of affective experience in explaining how our desires provide us with reasons for action? When we desire that p, we are thereby disposed to feel attracted to the prospect that p, or to feel averse to the prospect that not-p. In this paper, we argue that affective experiences – including feelings of attraction and aversion – provide us with reasons for action in virtue of their phenomenal character. Moreover, we argue that desires provide us with reasons for action only insofar as they are dispositions to have affective experiences. On this account, affective experience has a central role to play in explaining how desires provide reasons for action.
    Found 3 weeks, 2 days ago on Declan Smithies's site
  16. 2725857.505366
    There are various equivalent formulations of the Church-Turing thesis. A common one is that every effective computation can be carried out by a Turing machine. The Church-Turing thesis is often misunderstood, particularly in recent writing in the philosophy of mind.
    Found 1 month ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  17. 2783580.505401
    After a brief presentation of Feynman diagrams, we criticizise the idea that Feynman diagrams can be considered to be pictures or depictions of actual physical processes. We then show that the best interpretation of the role they play in quantum field theory and quantum electrodynamics is captured by Hughes' Denotation, Deduction and Interpretation theory of models (DDI), where “models” are to be interpreted as inferential, non-representational devices constructed in given social contexts by the community of physicists.
    Found 1 month ago on PhilSci Archive
  18. 2937978.505454
    As Feynman (1982) observed, “we always have had a great deal of difficulty in understanding the world view that quantum mechanics represents” (471). Among the perplexing aspects of quantum mechanics is its seeming, on a wide variety of presently live realist interpretations (including but not limited to the so-called ‘orthodox’ interpretation), to violate the classical supposition of ‘value definiteness’, according to which the properties—a.k.a. ‘observables’—of a given particle or system have precise values at all times. Indeed, value indefiniteness lies at the heart of what is supposed to be distinctive about quantum phenomena, as per the following classic cases:
    Found 1 month ago on Jessica Wilson's site
  19. 3112110.505493
    Parthood is used widely in ontologies across subject domains. Some modelling guidance can be gleaned from Ontology, yet it offers multiple mereological theories, and even more when combined with topology, i.e., mereotopology. To complicate the landscape, decidable languages put restrictions on the language features, so that only fragments of the mereo(topo)logical theories can be represented, yet during modelling, those full features may be needed to check correctness. We address these issues by specifying a structured network of theories formulated in multiple logics that are glued together by the various linking constructs of the Distributed Ontology Language, DOL. For the KGEMT mereotopological theory and five sub-theories, together with the DL-based OWL species and first- and second-order logic, this network in DOL orchestrates 28 ontologies. Further, we propose automated steps toward resolution of language feature conflicts when combining modules, availing of the new ‘OWL classifier’ tool that pinpoints profile violations.
    Found 1 month ago on C. Maria Keet's site
  20. 3292880.505527
    This paper is a contribution to a book symposium on my book Experiencing Time. I reply to comments on the book by Natalja Deng, Geoffrey Lee and Bradford Skow. Although several chapters of the book are discussed, the main focus of my reply is on chapters 2 and 6. In chapter 2 I argue that the putative mind-independent passage of time could not be experienced, and from this I develop an argument against the A-theory of time. In chapter 6 I offer one part of an explanation of why we are disposed to think that time passes, relating to the supposedly ‘dynamic’ quality of experienced change. Deng, Lee, and Skow’s comments help me to clarify several issues, add some new thoughts, and make a new distinction that was needed, and I acknowledge, as I did in the book, that certain arguments in chapter 6 are not conclusive; but I otherwise concede very little regarding the main claims and arguments defended in the book.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Simon Prosser's site
  21. 3343471.50556
    The attempt to model the structure of consciousness in split-brain subjects is on-going. This paper concerns the recently proposed switch model of split-brain consciousness, according to which a split-brain subject possesses only a single stream of consciousness, unified at and across time, that shifts from one hemisphere to the other from moment to moment. The paper argues that while the central explanatory element of the switch model may account for some aspects of split-brain consciousness, the best general picture of split-brain consciousness is still offered by some version of the conscious duality model.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Elizabeth Schechter's site
  22. 3388744.505598
    Goldman tells us that the "theory theory" and the "simulation theory" are different theories concerning "how ordinary people go about the business of attributing mental states." This phrase is ambiguous in ways that may make a difference, I think, both to the controversy between the theory theorists and the simulation theorists and to the question what imitation might have to do with mind reading.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Ruth G. Millikan's site
  23. 3388749.505647
    For a philosopher to speculate about animal cognition is implicitly to engage in theoretical psychology or theoretical neurology at a very high level of abstraction. As with all sciences, research in psychology and neurology need to be guided by speculative hypotheses, in these particular cases, by hypotheses about what kinds of functions, hence structures, it would be sensible to look for. We philosophers may be in a position to help, but we can't expect armchair argument to go very far. In the end, all the questions are rock-bottom empirical.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Ruth G. Millikan's site
  24. 3525572.505678
    In this paper we address the question of what determines the content of our conscious episodes of thinking, considering recent claims that phenomenal character individuates thought contents. We present one prominent way for defenders of phenomenal intentionality to develop that view and then examine ‘sensory inner speech views’, which provide an alternative way of accounting for thought-content determinacy. We argue that such views fare well with inner speech thinking but have problems accounting for unsymbolized thinking. Within this dialectic, we present an account of the nature of unsymbolized thinking that accords with and can be seen as a continuation of the activity of inner speech, while offering a way of explaining thought-content determinacy in terms of linguistic structures and representations.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on PhilPapers
  25. 3540869.505693
    Reflection on talk of reasons for action or belief suggests that reasons serve both normative and explanatory purposes. After all, reasons are cited in answer both to “why should he do it?” and “why is he doing it?”, as well as in answer both to “why should he believe it?” and “why does he believe it?”. These normative and explanatory functions are not distinct. To explain by citing someone’s reason is to state a factor in virtue of whose support the action was performed or the proposition believed. One might think that this normative-explanatory nexus, as Joseph Raz has labeled it, is at the heart of rationality. That will, in any case, be our working hypothesis in this paper. We argue that the aesthetic domain falls inside the scope of rationality and, furthermore, that it does so in its own way.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Eric Marcus's site
  26. 3571002.505706
    Davidson’s brilliant account of adverbial modification quantified over events. Here is a sketch of the problem it solved. “John buttered the toast with a knife at midnight” clearly entails “John buttered the toast with something,” “John did something with a knife,” and a variety of other things. If the prepositional clauses are treated as arguments of a single buttering-predicate, there would be two choices: a) An all-purpose buttering predicate would have to have every possible variety of prepositional phrase, so that “John buttered the bread” would actually use the same six-place predicate as in “John buttered the bread with butter, with a knife, in the closet, after midnight” but with three of the places existentially quantified. The inference from “John buttered the bread with fresh butter, with a knife, in the closet, after midnight” to “John buttered the bread,” would then be existential generalization, from B(John, bread, butter, knife, closet, midnight) to ExEyEzEw(John, bread,x,y,z,w).
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Samuel C. Wheeler III's site
  27. 3583401.505721
    Callard (2007) argues that it is metaphysically possible that a mathematical object, although abstract, causally affects the brain. I raise the following objections. First, a successful defence of mathematical realism requires not merely the metaphysical possibility but rather the actuality that a mathematical object affects the brain. Second, mathematical realists need to confront a set of three pertinent issues: why a mathematical object does not affect other concrete objects and other mathematical objects, what counts as a mathematical object, and how we can have knowledge about an unchanging object.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on PhilPapers
  28. 3641140.505734
    Researchers in the cognitive sciences often seek neural correlates of psychological constructs. In this paper, I argue that even when these correlates are discovered, they do not always lead to reductive outcomes. To this end, I examine the psychological construct of a critical period and briefly describe research identifying its neural correlates. Although the critical period is correlated with certain neural mechanisms, this does not imply that there is a reductionist relationship between this psychological construct and its neural correlates. Instead, this case study suggests that there may be many-to-many psychological-neural mappings, not just one-to-one or even one-to-many relations between psychological kinds and types of neural mechanisms.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on PhilPapers
  29. 3929558.505746
    In Sight and Sensibility Dominic Lopes argues that expressiveness in pictures should be analyzed on the model of the “contour” theory of musical expressiveness, according to which an “expression” need not express anything about the inner psychological states of a person. According to his “contour theory of pictorial expression,” expression by scenes and designs requires “no being to whom the expressed emotion is attributable” (the “missing person problem”). However, on this account expression has lost its fundamental raison d’être, that of manifesting somebody’s actual emotional states. By contrast, I argue that successful works of pictorial expression depict the way the world appears to someone (the artist or his/her persona) when in some emotional state. Moreover, the emotional attitude thus expressed by the work is an important unifying principle for pictures, and hence an important artistic value.
    Found 1 month, 2 weeks ago on PhilPapers
  30. 3994273.505782
    What is the Problem of Universals? In this paper we take up the classic question and proceed as follows. In Sect. 1 we consid er three problem solving settings and define the notion of problem solving accordingly. Basically I say that to solve problems is to eliminate undesirable, unspecified, or apparently incoherent scenarios. In Sect. 2 we apply the general observations from Sect. 1 to the Problem of Universals . M ore specifically, we single out two accounts of the problem w hich are based on the idea of eliminating apparently incoherent scenarios, and then propose mod ifications of those two accounts which, by contrast, are based on the idea of eliminating unspecified scenarios. In Sect. 3 we spell out two interesting ramifications.
    Found 1 month, 2 weeks ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy