1. 6386.121032
    Philosophy in Al-Andalus developed later than in the East; it grew among Muslims and Jews, since both communities were nurtured by a common Arabic. The Muslim community was much larger and it defined the cultural space, a significant part of which was made by Arabic translations of Greek scientifical and philosophical works. By the midst of the 10th century CE, materials related to the circle of the Brethren of Purity were known in al-Andalus probably brought in by Maslama Ibn Qasim al-Qurtubi (d. 353/964). But philosophy in its proper sense is first found in Shelomo Ibn Gabirol or Avicebron (1021–1058).
    Found 1 hour, 46 minutes ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  2. 6392.121106
    An axiomatic theory of truth is a deductive theory of truth as a primitive undefined predicate. Because of the liar and other paradoxes, the axioms and rules have to be chosen carefully in order to avoid inconsistency. Many axiom systems for the truth predicate have been discussed in the literature and their respective properties been analysed. Several philosophers, including many deflationists, have endorsed axiomatic theories of truth in their accounts of truth. The logical properties of the formal theories are relevant to various philosophical questions, such as questions about the ontological status of properties, Gödel’s theorems, truth-theoretic deflationism, eliminability of semantic notions and the theory of meaning.
    Found 1 hour, 46 minutes ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  3. 6405.121131
    Georg (György) Lukács (1885–1971) was a literary theorist and philosopher who is widely viewed as one of the founders of “Western Marxism”. Lukács is best known for his pre-World War II writings in literary theory, aesthetic theory and Marxist philosophy. Today, his most widely read works are the Theory of the Novel of 1916 and History and Class Consciousness of 1923. In History and Class Consciousness, Lukács laid out a wide-ranging critique of the phenomenon of “reification” in capitalism and formulated a vision of Marxism as a self-conscious transformation of society. This text became an important reference point both for critical social theory and for many currents of countercultural thought.
    Found 1 hour, 46 minutes ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  4. 6451.121147
    We discuss some recent work by Tim Maudlin concerning Black Hole Information Loss. We argue, contra Maudlin, that there is a paradox, in the straightforward sense that there are propositions that appear true, but which are incompatible with one another. We discuss the significance of the paradox and Maudlin’s response to it.
    Found 1 hour, 47 minutes ago on PhilSci Archive
  5. 14165.121167
    Judicial punishment is the curious idea that individuals deserve to be punished by the state for breaking its laws. Intellectually this is rather counter-intuitive. If crime is so terrible because it is a social trauma then deliberately hurting more people would seem to amplify that trauma rather than heal it. …
    Found 3 hours, 56 minutes ago on The Philosopher's Beard
  6. 45009.121185
    In this paper, we provide a Bayesian analysis of the well-known surprise exam paradox. Central to our analysis is a probabilistic account of what it means for the student to accept the teacher’s announcement that he will receive a surprise exam. According to this account, the student can be said to have accepted the teacher’s announcement provided he adopts a subjective probability distribution relative to which he expects to receive the exam on a day on which he expects not to receive it. We show that as long as expectation is not equated with subjective certainty there will be contexts in which it is possible for the student to accept the teacher’s announcement, in this sense. In addition, we show how a Bayesian modeling of the scenario can yield plausible explanations of the following three intuitive claims: (1) the teacher’s announcement becomes easier to accept the more days there are in class; (2) a strict interpretation of the teacher’s announcement does not provide the student with any categorical information as to the date of the exam; and (3) the teacher’s announcement contains less information about the date of the exam the more days there are in class. To conclude, we show how the surprise exam paradox can be seen as one among the larger class of paradoxes of doxastic fallibilism, foremost among which is the paradox of the preface.
    Found 12 hours, 30 minutes ago on PhilPapers
  7. 53953.121199
    One well-known objection to the principle of maximum entropy is the so-called Judy Benjamin problem, first introduced by van Fraassen ([1981]). The problem turns on the apparently puzzling fact that, on the basis of information relating an event’s conditional probability, the maximum entropy distribution will almost always assign to the event conditionalized on a probability strictly less than that assigned to it by the uniform distribution. In this paper, I present an analysis of the Judy Benjamin problem that can help to make sense of this seemingly odd feature of maximum entropy inference. My analysis is based on the claim that, in applying the principle of maximum entropy, Judy Benjamin is not acting out of a concern to maximize uncertainty in the face of new evidence, but is rather exercising a certain brand of epistemic charity towards her informant. This epistemic charity takes the form of an assumption on the part of Judy Benjamin that her informant’s evidential report leaves out no relevant information. Such a reconceptualization of the motives underlying Judy Benjamin’s appeal to the principle of maximum entropy can help to further our understanding of the true epistemological grounds of this principle and, in particular, can shed light on the nature of the relationship between the principle of maximum entropy and the Laplacean principle of insufficient reason.
    Found 14 hours, 59 minutes ago on PhilPapers
  8. 55231.121216
    There is a subjective way you experience the world. This is way it is like for you to listen to Jazz, to look around curiously, or to taste dark chocolate. It is hard to know about what it is like for you to experience these things simply by observing your behavior. …
    Found 15 hours, 20 minutes ago on The Brains Blog
  9. 106040.12123
    Utterances within the context of telling fictional tales that appear to be assertions are nevertheless not to be taken at face value. The present paper attempts to explain exactly what such ‘pseudo-assertions’ are, and how they behave. Many pseudo-assertions can take on multiple roles, both within fictions and in what I call ‘participatory criticism’ of a fiction, especially when they occur discourse-initially. This fact, taken together with problems for replacement accounts of pseudo-assertion based on the implicit prefixing of an ‘in the fiction’ operator, suggest that pseudo-assertion is best understood as a kind of make-believe. This proposal is elaborated and defended, and some applications to fictionalism are tentatively explored.
    Found 1 day, 5 hours ago on Antony Eagle's site
  10. 106064.121243
    I will discuss two arguments in favor of perdurance. The first is Sider’s argument from vagueness. Sider regards this argument as “one of the most powerful” in favor of perdurantism. I make the observation – obvious once made, but I am unable to find it elsewhere in the literature – that endurantists have principled grounds to claim that the argument is unsound (§§I–III). Having made this observation, I use it to emphasize a somewhat neglected difference between endurantists and perdurantists with respect to their views on material objects (§IV). These views, in the case of endurantists, lead to a further, less than conclusive but nevertheless interesting argument against endurantism – the anti-fundamentality argument – which I discuss in the second half of the paper (§§V–VI).
    Found 1 day, 5 hours ago on Antony Eagle's site
  11. 106144.121263
    A previously unrecognised argument against deterministic chance is introduced. The argument rests on the twin ideas that determined outcomes are settled, while chancy outcomes are unsettled, thus making cases of determined but chancy outcomes impossible. Closer attention to tacit assumptions about settledness makes available some principled lines of resistance to the argument for compatibilists about chance and determinism. Yet the costs of maintaining compatibilism may be higher with respect to this argument than with respect to existing incompatibilist arguments.
    Found 1 day, 5 hours ago on Antony Eagle's site
  12. 106272.121276
    A well-known objection to replacing the zero probability of some events—such as getting heads infinitely many times in a row—with an infinitesimal is arbitrariness. Infinitesimals are usually taken to be hyperreals and there are infinitely many hyperreal extensions of the reals. …
    Found 1 day, 5 hours ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  13. 106297.121289
    Earlier today, I fell down one of those Internet rabbit holes reading reflections about the Aziz Ansari story. (I confess to having previously had no idea who he was.) In truth, I jumped in myself, once I realized what was really at stake here, since it's something in which I've been increasingly interested myself over the last couple years. …
    Found 1 day, 5 hours ago on Richard Heck's blog
  14. 109382.121303
    Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
    Found 1 day, 6 hours ago on Oisín Deery's site
  15. 109403.121319
    Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
    Found 1 day, 6 hours ago on Oisín Deery's site
  16. 112930.121334
    An increasingly popular account of logic, Anti-Exceptionalism, views logic as similar to, and continuous with, other scientific theories. It thus treats revision of logic analogously to revision of scientific theories, applying familiar abductive standards of scientific theory choice to the case of logic. We should, that is, move from one logical theory L to another L when L does “better” than L in terms of theoretical virtues like: ...simplicity, ontological leanness (Occam’s razor), explanatory power, a low degree of ad hocness, unity, [and] fruitfulness. (Priest 2006: 135) It’s intended to explain rational change of logic; nothing so detailed is needed to explain vacillating flirtations we might have with one logic or another. Abductive methodology is supposed to provide justification for moving from one logic to another. One whole body of logic, that is: the particular and common version of this methodology I’m here interested in isn’t aimed at settling whether we should revise any particular logical principle.
    Found 1 day, 7 hours ago on PhilPapers
  17. 113184.121347
    We give a probabilistic justification of the shape of one of the probability weighting functions used in Prospect Theory. To do so, we use an idea recently introduced by Herzog and Hertwig (2014). Along the way we also suggest a new method for the aggregation of probabilities using statistical distances.
    Found 1 day, 7 hours ago on PhilPapers
  18. 113208.12136
    An influential tradition holds that thoughts are public: different thinkers share many of their thoughts, and the same applies to a single subject at different times. This ‘publicity principle’ has recently come under attack. Arguments by Mark Crimmins, Richard Heck and Brian Loar seem to show that publicity is inconsistent with the widely accepted principle that someone who is ignorant or mistaken about certain identity facts will have distinct thoughts about the relevant object—for instance, the astronomer who does not know that Hesperus is Phosphorus will have two distinct thoughts Hesperus is bright and Phosphorus is bright. In this paper, I argue that publicity can be defended if we adopt a relational account on which thoughts are individuated by their mutual relations. I then go on to develop a specific relational theory—the ‘linking account’—and contrast it with other relational views.
    Found 1 day, 7 hours ago on PhilPapers
  19. 115995.121373
    This symposium in the overlap of philosophy and decision theory is described well by its title “Beliefs in Groups”. Each word in the title matters, with one intended ambiguity. The symposium is about beliefs rather than other attitudes such as preferences; these beliefs take the form of probabilities in the first three contributions, binary yes/no beliefs (‘judgments’) in the fourth contribution, and qualitative probabilities (‘probability grades’) in the fifth contribution. The beliefs occur in groups, which is ambiguous between beliefs of groups as a whole and beliefs of group members. The five contributions – all of them interesting, we believe – address several aspects of this general theme.
    Found 1 day, 8 hours ago on Franz Dietrich's site
  20. 121691.121387
    The term ‘sociobiology’ was introduced in E. O. Wilson’s Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975) as the “systematic study of the biological basis of all social behavior” (Wilson, 1975, 4). Wilson seems to intend “the biological basis of behavior” to refer to the social and ecological causes driving the evolution of behavior in animal populations, rather than the neurological or psychological causes of behavior in individuals; however, Wilson clearly thought sociobiology and neuroscience would have important theoretical interactions (Wilson, 1975, 5). Wilson’s references to evolution are also usually references to evolution by natural selection, although he does accept that the action of selection on animal societies can result in maladaptive outcomes at the level of populations (see, for example Wilson, 1975, Chapter 4).
    Found 1 day, 9 hours ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  21. 121707.121399
    Plausibly, there is some function from the strengths of my motivations (reasons, desires, etc.) to my chances of decision, so that I am more likely to choose that towards which I am more strongly motivated. …
    Found 1 day, 9 hours ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  22. 121820.121413
    Traditionally, empiricism has relied on the specialness of human observation, yet science is rife with sophisticated instrumentation and techniques. The present paper advances a conception of empirical evidence applicable to actual scientific practice. I argue that this conception elucidates how the results of scientific research can be repurposed across diverse epistemic contexts—it helps to make sense of how evidence accumulates across theory change, how different evidence can be amalgamated and used jointly, and how the same evidence can be used to constrain competing theories in the service of breaking local underdetermination.
    Found 1 day, 9 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  23. 121921.121426
    This paper reviews the structure of standard quantum mechanics, introducing the basics of the von Neumann-Dirac axiomatic formulation as well as the well-known Copenhagen interpretation. We review also the major conceptual difficulties arising from this theory, first and foremost, the well-known measurement problem. The main aim of this essay is to show the possibility to solve the conundrums affecting quantum mechanics via the methodology provided by the primitive ontology approach. Using Bohmian mechanics as an example, the paper argues for a realist attitude towards quantum theory. In the second place, it discusses the Quinean criterion for ontology and its limits when it comes to quantum physics, arguing that the primitive ontology programme should be considered as an improvement on Quine’s method in determining the ontological commitments of a theory.
    Found 1 day, 9 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  24. 129386.121439
    Yesterday, I sketched the priority structure framework: attention consists in the activity of regulating priority structures, which order the parts of the subject’s on-going mental life by their relative priority. …
    Found 1 day, 11 hours ago on The Brains Blog
  25. 133911.121455
    Yesterday, Philosophy Bites released a brief podcast interview of me on skepticism. Listening to the interview now, I feel that I didn't frame my project as well as I might have, so I'll add a few remarks here. …
    Found 1 day, 13 hours ago on The Splintered Mind
  26. 133921.121477
    The mereological predicate ‘is part of’ can be used to define the predicate ‘is identical with’. I argue that this entails that mereological theories can be ideologically simpler than nihilistic theories that do not use the notion of parthood—contrary to what has been argued by Ted Sider. Moreover, if one accepts an extensional mereology, there are good philosophical reasons apart from ideological simplicity to give a mereological definition of identity.
    Found 1 day, 13 hours ago on PhilPapers
  27. 282905.121492
    In this post I want to argue for this: If a computer can non-accidentally have free will, compatibilism is true. Compatibilism here is the thesis that free will and determinism can both obtain. My interest in (1) is that I think the compatibilism is false, and hence I conclude from (1) that computers cannot non-accidentally have free will. …
    Found 3 days, 6 hours ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  28. 297306.121505
    Choices are transitions from an undecided to a decided state. Suppose choices are a natural kind of event. Then only the right sort of transition from an undecided to a decided state will be a choice. …
    Found 3 days, 10 hours ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  29. 376507.121519
    This article is very interesting: • Ed Yong, Brain cells share information with virus-like capsules, Atlantic, January 12, 2018. Your brain needs a protein called Arc. If you have trouble making this protein, you’ll have trouble forming new memories. …
    Found 4 days, 8 hours ago on Azimuth
  30. 426906.121532
    . Stephen Senn Head of  Competence Center for Methodology and Statistics (CCMS) Luxembourg Institute of Health Twitter @stephensenn Being a statistician means never having to say you are certain A recent discussion of randomised controlled trials[1] by Angus Deaton and Nancy Cartwright (D&C) contains much interesting analysis but also, in my opinion, does not escape rehashing some of the invalid criticisms of randomisation with which the literatures seems to be littered. …
    Found 4 days, 22 hours ago on D. G. Mayo's blog