1. 775.55573
    Is there a sense in which we exercise direct volitional control over our beliefs? Most agree that there is not, but discussions tend to focus on control in forming a belief. The focus here is on sustaining a belief over time in the face of ‘epistemic temptation’ to abandon it. It is argued that we do have a capacity for ‘doxastic self-control’ over time that is partly volitional in nature, and that its exercise is rationally permissible.
    Found 12 minutes ago on Sarah Paul's site
  2. 1934.555774
    Thomas Paine was a pamphleteer, controversialist and international revolutionary. His Common Sense (1776) was a central text behind the call for American independence from Britain; his Rights of Man (1791–2) was the most widely read pamphlet in the movement for reform in Britain in the 1790s and for the opening decades of the nineteenth century; he was active in the French Revolution and was a member of the French National Convention between 1792 and 1795; he is seen by many as a key figure in the emergence of claims for the state’s responsibilities for welfare and educational provision, and his Age of Reason provided a popular deist text that remained influential throughout the 19th century.
    Found 32 minutes ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  3. 51461.555791
    Questions about the value of the humanities and the relationship between the sciences and humanities have been very much in the news recently. Just a brief review in the public press shows scientists and humanists weighing in and responding to one another. Public opinion is shifting in favor of science and technological education. There are two related challenges that have been leveled about the value of the humanities.
    Found 14 hours, 17 minutes ago on Jenann Ismael's site
  4. 52206.555804
    In this essay, I describe and defend an inclusive anti-canonical approach to the study of the history of philosophy. My proposal, based on an analysis of the nature of the history of philosophy and the value of engaging in the practice, is this: The history of philosophy is the history of rationally justified, systematic answers to philosophical questions; studying this subject is both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable; these benefits do not derive from the imposition of a canon, and indeed, there should be no canon; the absence of a canon leaves room for a thousand courses on a thousand different topics with a thousand different narrative structures; but a good syllabus should be relevantly diverse in a way that fits the thematic arc of the course; and this prescription for the discipline is inclusive, in ways that can only strengthen and enliven it for future generations.
    Found 14 hours, 30 minutes ago on Samuel Rickless's site
  5. 52218.555821
    In 1827, Lady Mary Shepherd published Essays on the Perception of an External Universe, which offers both an argument for the existence of a world of external bodies existing outside our minds and a criticism of Berkeley’s argument for idealism in A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. In this paper, I evaluate Margaret Atherton’s criticisms of Shepherd’s case against Berkeley, and provide reasons for thinking that, although Shepherd’s particular criticisms of Berkeley do not succeed, she correctly identifies an important problem to which Berkeley’s reasoning is subject.
    Found 14 hours, 30 minutes ago on Samuel Rickless's site
  6. 52423.555837
    Russellians can have a no proposition view of empty names. I will defend this theory against the problem of meaningfulness, and show that the theory is in general well motivated. My solution to the problem of meaningfulness is that speakers’ judgements about meaningfulness are tracking grammaticality, and not propositional content.
    Found 14 hours, 33 minutes ago on PhilPapers
  7. 56926.555852
    There is variation in how people perceive colors and other secondary qualities. The challenge of perceptual variation is to say whose perceptions are accurate. A natural and influential response is that, whenever there’s variation in two people’s perceptions, at most one of their perceptions is accurate. I will argue that this leads to an unacceptable kind of ignorance.
    Found 15 hours, 48 minutes ago on John Morrison's site
  8. 56941.555867
    Descartes and Spinoza claim that a person’s body can be numerically identical over time, despite changes in its size, shape, and speed. How can we reconcile this with the Indiscernibility of Identicals, the principle that numerical identity implies indiscernibility? I believe that Descartes and Spinoza are working in a medieval Aristotelian tradition that links a person’s identity over time to her essence, rather than to her properties. In this tradition, identity over time does not imply indiscernibility. While Descartes and Spinoza reject many aspects of this tradition, their views about identity over time still preserve its general structure.
    Found 15 hours, 49 minutes ago on John Morrison's site
  9. 56981.555883
    Spinoza claims that the mind and body are one and the same. But he also claims that the mind thinks and does not move, whereas the body moves and does not think. How can we reconcile these claims? I believe that Spinoza is building on a traditional view about identity over time. According to this view, identity over time is linked to essence, rather than indiscernibility, so that a thing is identical over time, even if it is discernibly different at different times. I believe that Spinoza has a similar view about identity across attributes. In particular, I believe that he links identity across attributes to essence, rather than indiscernibility, so that a thing is identical across attributes, even if it is discernibly different in different attributes. In that case, the mind and body are one and the same thing, despite their differences, because they share the same essence.
    Found 15 hours, 49 minutes ago on John Morrison's site
  10. 57076.555898
    There is variation in how people perceive colors and other secondary qualities. The challenge of perceptual variation is to say whose perceptions are accurate. According to Sextus, Protagoras’s response is that all of our perceptions might be accurate. As this response is traditionally developed, it is difficult to explain color illusion and color constancy. I will argue that this difficulty is due to a widespread assumption that I call perceptual atomism. I will conclude that, if we want to develop Protagoras’s response, we need to give up perceptual atomism. I will end with a brief sketch of my preferred alternative, perceptual structuralism.
    Found 15 hours, 51 minutes ago on John Morrison's site
  11. 57194.555913
    Aquinas, Ockham, and Burdan all claim that a person can be numerically identical over time, despite changes in her size, shape, and color. How can we reconcile this with the Indiscernibility of Identicals, the principle that numerical identity implies indiscernibility? I believe that these philosophers link a person’s identity over time to her substantial form, rather than to her properties. For them, identity over time does not imply indiscernibility. They would thus reject the Indiscernibility of Identicals, perhaps in favor of a principle restricted to indiscernibility at a time.
    Found 15 hours, 53 minutes ago on John Morrison's site
  12. 58296.555928
    Kripke’s Wittgenstein is standardly understood as a non-factualist about meaning ascription. Non-factualism about meaning ascription is the idea that sentences like “Joe means addition by ‘plus’” are not used to state facts about the world. Byrne and Kusch have argued that Kripke’s Wittgenstein is not a nonfactualist about meaning ascription. They are aware that their interpretation is non-standard, but cite arguments from Boghossian and Wright to support their view. Boghossian argues that non-factualism about meaning ascription is incompatible with a deflationary theory of truth. Wright argues that non-factualism about meaning ascription is incoherent. To support the standard interpretation, I’ll respond to each argument in turn. To the degree that my responses are successful, Byrne and Kusch have an unmotivated interpretation of Kripke’s Wittgenstein. Wilson provides a factualist interpretation that is not based on Boghossian and Wright’s arguments. Miller argues for a non-factualist interpretation against Wilson, but I’ll show that Miller’s interpretation faces a dilemma. Miller’s argument cannot be maintained if a coherent interpretation of the skeptical solution is to be provided. I’ll show how this dilemma can be avoided and provide an independent argument against Wilson so that a non-factualist interpretation of the skeptical solution can be maintained.
    Found 16 hours, 11 minutes ago on Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy
  13. 59575.555942
    We believe that we have free will and this belief is so firmly entrenched in our daily lives that it is almost impossible to take seriously the thought that it might be mistaken. We deliberate and make choices, for instance, and in so doing we assume that there is more than one choice we can make, more than one action we are able to perform. When we look back and regret a foolish choice, or blame ourselves for not doing something we should have done, we assume that we could have chosen and done otherwise. When we look forward and make plans for the future, we assume that we have at least some control over our actions and the course of our lives; we think it is at least sometimes up to us what we choose and try to do.
    Found 16 hours, 32 minutes ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  14. 59624.555954
    In this paper we intend to discuss the importance of providing a physical representation of quantum superpositions which goes beyond the mere reference to mathematical structures and measurement outcomes. This proposal goes in the opposite direction to the project present in orthodox contemporary philosophy of physics which attempts to “bridge the gap” between the quantum formalism and common sense “classical reality” —precluding, right from the start, the possibility of interpreting quantum superpositions through non-classical notions. We will argue that in order to restate the problem of interpretation of quantum mechanics in truly ontological terms we require a radical revision of the problems and definitions addressed within the orthodox literature. On the one hand, we will discuss the need of providing a formal redefinition of superpositions which captures explicitly their contextual character. On the other hand, we will attempt to replace the focus on the measurement problem, which concentrates on the justification of measurement outcomes from “weird” superposed states, and introduce the superposition problem which focuses instead on the conceptual representation of superpositions themselves.
    Found 16 hours, 33 minutes ago on PhilSci Archive
  15. 59804.555969
    john byrd I think Polya had a better way with words than Popper, but expressed the same general thoughts, as in this 1954 quote: “Both the common man and the scientist are led to conjectures by a few observations and they are both paying attention to later cases which could be in agreement or not with the conjecture. …
    Found 16 hours, 36 minutes ago on D. G. Mayo's blog
  16. 59807.555983
    The contest for leadership of the Scottish Labour party has re-opened an old debate: is it acceptable for egalitarians to send their children to private school? One candidate, Anas Sarwar, has come under criticism for sending his son to the £8,000 a year Hutchesons’ Grammar school in Glasgow. …
    Found 16 hours, 36 minutes ago on Justice Everywhere
  17. 59830.555998
    J. D. Hamkins and J. Reitz, “The set-theoretic universe $V$ is not necessarily a class-forcing extension of HOD,” ArXiv e-prints, 2017. (manuscript under review)   Citation arχiv @ARTICLE{HamkinsReitz:The-set-theoretic-universe-is-not-necessarily-a-forcing-extension-of-HOD, author = {Joel David Hamkins and Jonas Reitz}, title = {The set-theoretic universe $V$ is not necessarily a class-forcing extension of HOD}, journal = {ArXiv e-prints}, year = {2017}, volume = {}, number = {}, pages = {}, month = {September}, note = {manuscript under review}, abstract = {}, keywords = {}, source = {}, doi = {}, eprint = {1709.06062}, archivePrefix = {arXiv}, primaryClass = {math.LO}, url = {http://jdh.hamkins.org/the-universe-need-not-be-a-class-forcing-extension-of-hod}, } Abstract. …
    Found 16 hours, 37 minutes ago on Joel David Hamkins's blog
  18. 59832.556011
    Many of the times when Hitler made a wrong decision, his character thereby deteriorated and he became more vicious. Let’s imagine that Hitler was a decent young man at age 19. Now imagine Schmitler, who lived a life externally just like Hitler’s, but on Twin Earth. …
    Found 16 hours, 37 minutes ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  19. 59833.556024
    This argument is valid: If no good theodicy can be given, some virtuous people’s lives are worthless. No virtuous person’s life is worthless. So, a good theodicy can be given. The thought behind 1 is that unless we accept the sorts of claims that theodicists make about the value of virtue or the value of existence or about an afterlife, some virtuous people live lives of such great suffering, and are so far ignored or worse by others, that their lives are worthless. …
    Found 16 hours, 37 minutes ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  20. 59834.556037
    Since we clearly can attribute moral terms to angels and God that are, in the human case, clearly virtue terms, mutatis mutandis, and presumably also to aliens who are more like us than those in the case at hand, differences of nature do not seem necessarily to create a wall for moral terms. …
    Found 16 hours, 37 minutes ago on Alexander Pruss's Blog
  21. 141279.556051
    Recent work has suggested that conservation efforts such as restoration ecology and invasive species eradication are largely value-driven pursuits. Concurrently, changes to global climate are forcing ecologists to consider if and how collections of species will migrate, and whether or not we should be assisting such movements. Herein, we propose a philosophical framework which addresses these issues by utilizing ecological and evolutionary interrelationships to delineate individual ecological communities. Specifically, our Evolutionary Community Concept (ECC) recognizes unique collections of species that interact and have co-evolved in a given geographic area. We argue this concept has implications for a number of contemporary global conservation issues. Specifically, our framework allows us to establish a biological and science-driven context for making decisions regarding the restoration of systems and the removal of exotic species. The ECC also has implications for how we view shifts in species assemblages due to climate change and it advances our understanding of various ecological concepts, such as resilience.
    Found 1 day, 15 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  22. 251608.556066
    An action is something that takes place in the world, and that makes a difference to what the world looks like. Thus, actions are maps from states of the world to new states of the world. Actions can be of various kinds. The action of spilling coffee changes the state of your trousers. The action of telling a lie to your friend changes your friends state of mind (and maybe the state of your soul). The action of multiplying two numbers changes the state of certain registers in your computer. Despite the differences between these various kinds of actions, we will see that they can all be covered under the same logical umbrella.
    Found 2 days, 21 hours ago on Jan van Eijck's site
  23. 317253.556079
    Medieval theories of analogy were a response to problems in three areas: logic, theology, and metaphysics. Logicians were concerned with the use of words having more than one sense, whether completely different, or related in some way. Theologians were concerned with language about God. How can we speak about a transcendent, totally simple spiritual being without altering the sense of the words we use? Metaphysicians were concerned with talk about reality. How can we say that both substances (e.g., Socrates) and accidents (e.g., the beardedness of Socrates) exist when one is dependent on the other; how can we say that both God and creatures exist, when one is created by the other?
    Found 3 days, 16 hours ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  24. 331509.556092
    In this paper, we study the conditions under which existence of interpolants (for quantifier-free formulae) is modular, in the sense that it can be transferred from two first-order theories T1, T2 to their combination T1∪T2. We generalize to the non-disjoint signatures case the results from [3]. As a surprising application, we relate the Horn combinability criterion of this paper to superamalgamability conditions known from propositional logic and we use this fact to derive old and new results concerning fusions transfer of interpolation properties in modal logic.
    Found 3 days, 20 hours ago on Silvio Ghilardi's site
  25. 331524.556105
    Within the last few years there has been some interest in investigating the relationship between the truthlikeness (verisimilitude) and belief revision programs [2, 6] . One prominent result of this investigation is that given any plausible account of truthlikeness and rational account of belief revision, expansions (+) and revisions (*) of a database (or belief state) D with true input A are not guaranteed to increase the database’s truthlikeness. D here is a belief set (i.e. D = Cn(D)) and D stands for its propositional formula representation.
    Found 3 days, 20 hours ago on PhilPapers
  26. 331667.55612
    James Hansen and others have argued that climate scientists are often reluctant to speak out about extreme outcomes of anthropogenic carbonization. According to Hansen, such reticence lessens the chance of effective responses to these threats. With the collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) as a case study, reasons for scientific reticence are reviewed. The challenges faced by scientists in finding the right balance between reticence and speaking out are both ethical and methodological. Scientists need a framework within which to find this balance. Such a framework can be found in the long-established practices of professional ethics.
    Found 3 days, 20 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  27. 331718.556133
    Kant said that we were never be able to know about the true nature of matter. The things in themselves would remain unknown to us. There is a similar problem in quantum mechanics. You cannot provide directly any property to a physical state represented by a ray in a Hilbert space. The general theory of relativity teaches time and space were not how they appear to us, but claims to know that in fact space and time would belong to a curved space-time. It turned out in the last decades that it is extraordinary difficulty to combine both theories. Based on quantum mechanics I argue in this paper that the things in themselves remain unknown. There is probably no substance which we can call spacetime.
    Found 3 days, 20 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  28. 331721.556146
    Hume lacks the materials necessary to distinguish epistemically proper and improper forms of inference. Elsewhere, I’ve discussed my preferred response to this epistemological question — which involves a distinctively Humean form of virtue epistemology — so I will not focus on this here.
    Found 3 days, 20 hours ago on Karl Schafer's site
  29. 331740.55616
    Disjunctivists (Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1990, Martin 2002, 2006) often motivate their approach to perceptual experience by appealing in part to the claim that in cases of veridical perception the subject is directly in contact with the perceivedobject. When I perceive a table, for example, there is no table-like sense-impression that stands as an intermediary between the table and me. Nor am I relatedto the table as I am to a deer when I see its footprint in the snow. I do not experience the table by experiencing something else over andabove the table andits facing surface. I see the facing surface of the table directly. This, of course, is the view of naïve realism. Andit seems as gooda starting point as any for further theorizing about the nature of perception. Some disjunctivists have suggested that to do proper justice to the above thought, we needto suppose that the objects we perceive are components of the contents of our perceptual experiences in veridical cases. This supposition is supported further by the simple observation that if I see an object, it must look some way to me. But if an object looks some way to me, then intuitively it must be experienced as being some way. Andhow can the object be experiencedas being some way unless the object itself figures in the content of the experience, assuming that experience is representational at all?
    Found 3 days, 20 hours ago on PhilPapers
  30. 331841.556172
    Causal overdetermination worries arise in a number of domains, but most notably in the philosophy of mind. In discussions of such worries, alleged examples of causal overdetermination are uniformly Viewed as primafozm problematic. While all alleged cases of overdetermination might (or might not) be problematic, I aim to show that they are so for different reasons. Examples of causal overdetermination neatly diVide into three varieties, corresponding to the connections between the mechanisms and the properties of the causes. Future debates over overdetermination, and mental causation in particular, should pay heed to this distinction.
    Found 3 days, 20 hours ago on Eric Funkhouser's site