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9090.863772
On the mere difference view of disability, one isn’t worse off for being disabled as such, though one is worse off due to ableist arrangements in society. A standard observation is that the mere difference view doesn’t work for really big disabilities. …
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12737.864063
Consider contemporary injustices against Indigenous peoples in settler-colonies, such as the United States, Canada, and Australia. These injustices have a historical dimension: they can be traced to actions of invasion, dispossession, and genocide that occurred hundreds of years ago. The moral status of the ongoing injustices depends, in part, on their historical dimensions: it matters, morally, that the contemporary injustices are perpetrated against people whose ancestors were here first and whose sovereignty was violated. But who bears culpability for those historical wrongs? Is culpability borne merely by the individuals involved, who are now long-dead? Are those long-ago actions attributable to the ideology of the time, which persists in various ways but which seems to lack the agency necessary for culpability? Or are there presently-existing agents that bear culpability?
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72752.864094
Physiognomy(fromthelaterGreekphysiognōmia,which is a contraction of the classical form physiognōmonia)refers to the ancient science of determining someone’sinnatecharacteronthe basisoftheiroutward,andhenceobservable,bodilyfeatures.Forinstance,Socrates’famous snub nose was universally interpreted by ancient physio gnomistsasaphy siognomicalsign of hisinnatelustfulness,which he only overcame through philosophical training.Thediscipline in its technical form wit hit sown specialized practitioners first surface sin Greece in the fifth centuryBCE,possibly through connections with the Near East,wherebodilysignswere taken as indicators of someone’sf utureratherthan his character.Theshifttocharacter perhaps arises from the widespread cultural practice in the ancient Greek and Roman world oftreatingsomeone’sou twardappearance as indicative for his personality,whichisalready
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82261.864112
We argue that, in the predominant sense of the term, propaganda is a necessarily negative phenomenon. We follow Ross’s (2002) account and claim that, with some refinements, it is an explanatorily useful analysis of political propaganda. We then assess two prominent attempts that aim at classifying positive or legitimate cases of public communication as cases of propaganda, namely Ross’s (2013) revision of her previous model, and Stanley’s (2015) influential account. We show that some of the cases in contention are problematic and that no satisfactory reasons are provided to count other nonproblematic cases as propaganda. We also argue that the arguments these authors offer for their revisionary understanding of propaganda are inconclusive. In particular, the motivation for counting legitimate public communication as propaganda is lacking.
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82289.864125
This paper challenges the two aims of Michael Cholbi’s Rational Will View (RWV) which are to (1) offer an account of why paternalism is presumptively or pro tanto wrong and (2) relate the relative wrongness of paternalistic interventions to the rational powers that such interventions target (Sections 1 and 2). Some of a paternalizee’s choices harm their future selves in ways that would be wrong if they were done to others. I claim this challenges Cholbi’s second aim (2) because the cases his account deems particularly wrong turn out to be not to be as wrongful as expected (Section 3). When this second aim is challenged, it has knock-on effects on the capacity of the RWV to discern which cases of paternalism are generally more wrongful than others, which undermines Cholbi’s first aim (1). I consider responses on behalf of Cholbi’s view but conclude that the account is insufficient on its own to vindicate its two aims (Section 4). Finally, I draw on recent work that adopts ideas from the practical reasoning literature to help determine paternalism’s wrongness (Section 5). I argue this helps Cholbi’s view withstand my objections, but we must remain skeptical of why interceding with rational powers is particularly wrong.
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82311.864142
Here are some things we know about conflicts around the world in April 2024. On 7 October 2023 Hamas killed over 1200 people in Israel and took more than 240 hostage. In response Israel launched an assault on Gaza that has killed tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians and displaced millions. Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine continue; since 2022 Russia has repeatedly ignored international humanitarian law, tortured and murdered civilians, and destroyed basic infrastructure in civilian areas. Civil war continues in Sudan, and the country faces imminent famine. Approximately 25 million people in Sudan need humanitarian assistance.
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95313.864155
In two recent posts (this and this) I argued that dignity does not arise from value. I think the general point here goes beyond value. Some entities are more apt for being morally concerned about than others. …
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95314.86417
A year ago, I wrote a post lamenting the lack of “cross-camp” engagement in philosophy, and highlighting the challenges I’d most like to see addressed (by non-consequentialists, opponents of effective altruism, and proponents of “neutrality” in population ethics). …
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154406.864183
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE – From the university campuses of Assyria to the thoroughfares of Ur to the palaces of the Hittite Empire, students across the Fertile Crescent have formed human chains, camel caravans, and even makeshift tent cities to protest the oppression of innocent Egyptians by the rogue proto-nation of “Israel” and its vengeful, warlike deity Yahweh. …
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186536.864196
It is widely held that if you do wrong in culpable ignorance (ignorance that you are blameworthy for), you are culpable for the wrong you do. I have long though think this is mistaken—instead we should frontload the guilt onto the acts and omissions that made one culpable for the ignorance. …
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197793.86421
Limited aggregationists argue that when deciding between competing claims to aid we are sometimes required and sometimes forbidden from aggregating weaker claims to outweigh stronger claims. Joe Horton presents a ‘fatal dilemma’ for these views. Views that land on the First Horn of his dilemma suggest that a previously losing group strengthened by fewer and weaker claims can be more choice-worthy than the previously winning group strengthened by more and stronger claims. Views that land on the Second Horn suggest that combining two losing groups together and two winning groups together can turn the losing groups into the winning groups and the winning groups into the losing groups. This paper demonstrates that the ‘fatal dilemma’ is neither fatal nor a dilemma. The First Horn is devastating but avoidable and the Second Horn is unavoidable but not devastating. Nevertheless, Horton’s argument does help to narrow down the acceptable range of views.
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206994.864222
Part One: A Powerful Problem ............................................................................................. 1 1. A Brief Look at Where We’re Going: The Problem of Horrific Suffering, Two Other Forms of the Problem of Evil, and the Place of Human Free Will in a World Governed by a Wholly Good God ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………1
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255542.864238
Epistemology has taken a zetetic turn from the study of belief towards the study of inquiry. Several decades ago, theories of bounded rationality took a procedural turn from attitudes towards the processes of inquiry that produce them. What is the relationship between the zetetic and procedural turns? In this paper, I argue that we should treat the zetetic turn in epistemology as part of a broader procedural turn in the study of bounded rationality. I use this claim to motivate and clarify the zetetic turn in epistemology, as well as to reveal the need for a second zetetic turn within practical philosophy.
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304890.86425
Metric poetry is rhythmic language laid above, and to some degree matching, an underlying pulse. If you do not know where in that pulse you are, you may mangle the verse. In iambic pentameter the pulse is easy: five strong beats, separated by weaker off-beats. …
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320429.864263
The quarantine model, recently proposed by Pereboom and Caruso, is one of the most influential models developed to date in the context of criminal justice. The quarantine model challenges the very idea of criminal punishment and asserts that nobody deserves punishment on a fundamental level. Instead, in order to deal with offenders, it proposes a series of incapacitation measures based on public safety concerns. In this article, we examine several objections to the quarantine model that demonstrate how, in our view, it can be improved. These mainly pertain to (2.1) the difficulty of reliably identifying dangerous individuals and consequently the need to base confinement decisions on probability, and (2.2) the potential for the quarantine model not to properly deter certain crimes. Three additional objections are raised with respect to (3.1) the rights that are potentially suppressed in the quarantine model; (3.2) the role of “genetic justice”; and (3.3) the difficulty it faces accommodating reasons-responsiveness. Whereas these objections do not constitute knock-down arguments against the quarantine model, they highlight issues that invite closer scrutiny, at least if it is to be considered as a credible framework for the development of viable policies in criminal justice.
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342488.864276
While effective altruists (EAs) spend a lot of time researching which ways to do good are the most effective, historically many have assumed, with relatively little argument, that the benchmark for membership in the movement is a commitment to donate 10% of your earnings. This points to an asymmetry between the two halves of effective altruism: EAs tend to have relatively restricted standards for effectiveness (where to give), but they have much looser standards for altruism (how much to give). I investigate explanations for this asymmetry. While some possible justifications may work (pending empirical support), others look flimsier. I conclude that this means EA likely is, or anyway ought to be, more demanding than some of its proponents currently claim.
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486532.864291
In my view, Stephen Sondheim’s Sweeney Todd is one of the very best works of modern musical theater. When I learn that it will be performed nearby, I begin to look into buying tickets. That is not to say that I always end up going: in many cases, the tickets are too expensive; in others, I learn something disappointing about the casting choice or announced changes to the book or the songs; in others, I have other plans that make it impossible to attend. However, whether or not I end up attending, my immediate response to learning that Sweeney Todd is being staged is to be moved to try to attend. By contrast, I do not think very highly of Lerner and Loewe’s Camelot. If I were to learn that Camelot was being staged near me, I would not bother to check ticket prices. I doubt I would see it even if it were free, unless there were some independent consideration moving me to do so, such as a desire to accompany a friend. It seems natural to explain the difference in my motivations in these two cases by pointing to the difference in my judgements of the merits of the two musicals. My high opinion of Sweeney Todd explains my motivation to see it again; my low opinion of Camelot explains my lack of motivation to revisit it.
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509525.864304
I’ve been thinking a bit about the relationship between dignity and value. Here are four plausible principles:
If x has dignity, then x has great non-instrumental value. If x has dignity, then x has great non-instrumental value because it has dignity. …
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544330.864318
The development of reasoning skills is often regarded as a central goal of ethics and philosophy classes in school education. In light of recent studies from the field of moral psychology, however, it could be objected that the promotion of such skills might fail to meet another important objective, namely the moral education of students. In this paper, I will argue against such pessimism by suggesting that the fostering of reasoning skills can still contribute to the aims of moral education. To do so, I will engage with the concept of moral education, point out different ways in which reasoning skills play an essential role in it, and support these considerations by appealing to further empirical studies. My conclusion will be that the promotion of ethical reasoning skills fulfils two important aims of moral education: First, it enables students to critically reflect on their ethical beliefs. Second, it allows them to explore ethical questions in a joint conversation with others. Lastly, I will refer to education in the field of sustainable development in order to exemplify the importance of these abilities.
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599404.864335
The main message of Neuroethics is that neuroscience forces us to reconceptualize human agency as marvelously diverse and flexible. Free will can arise from unconscious brain processes. Individuals with mental disorders, including addiction and psychopathy, exhibit more agency than is often recognized. Brain interventions should be embraced with cautious optimism. Our moral intuitions, which arise from entangled reason and emotion, can generally be trusted. Nevertheless, we can and should safely enhance our brain chemistry, partly because motivated reasoning crops up in everyday life and in the practice of neuroscience itself. Despite serious limitations, brain science can be useful in the courtroom and marketplace. Recognizing all this nuance leaves little room for anxious alarmism or overhype and urges an emphasis on neurodiversity. The result is a highly opinionated tour of neuroethics as an exciting field full of implications for philosophy, science, medicine, law, and public policy.
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614465.864348
In 2005, I debated my then-colleague Larry Iannaccone on the economics of religion. The turnout — around 300 people at GMU back when it was clearly a commuter school — surprised me and totally shocked Larry. …
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659890.864361
At several key points throughout his Treatise, Hume refers to certain “general rules” which, he claims, we are “mightily addicted to”, and which frequently make us “carry our maxims beyond those reasons, which first induc’d us to establish them” (T 3.2.9.3). As Michael Gill (2006, 221) observes, Hume typically italicizes the term ‘general rules’, thus seemingly referring to “a specific, well-defined piece of his technical apparatus”. Unfortunately, Hume never explains what he means by the term. Nevertheless, he clearly thinks that general rules influence many of our beliefs, passions, and moral judgments. It is therefore important to understand exactly how Hume understands them. This is my aim in this paper.
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659922.864373
Maximize Expected Choiceworthiness (MEC) is a theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty. It says that we ought to handle moral uncertainty in the way that Expected Value Theory (EVT) handles descriptive uncertainty. MEC inherits from EVT the problem of fanaticism. Roughly, a decision theory is fanatical when it requires our decision-making to be dominated by low-probability, high-payo options. Proponents of MEC have o ered two main lines of response. The rst is that MEC should simply import whatever are the best solutions to fanaticism on o er in decision theory. The second is to propose statistical normalization as a novel solution on behalf of MEC. This paper argues that the rst response is open to serious doubt and that the second response fails. As a result, MEC appears signi cantly less plausible when compared to competing accounts of decision-making under moral uncertainty, which are not fanatical.
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663328.864385
GeneBcally complete yet authorless artworks seem possible, yet it’s hard to understand how they might really be possible. A natural way to try to resolve this puzzle is by construcBng an account of artwork compleBon on the model of accounts of artwork meaning that are compaBble with meaningful yet authorless artworks. I argue, however, that such an account of artwork compleBon is implausible. So, I leave the puzzle unresolved.
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701478.864398
Years ago, I read a clever argument against physician assisted suicide that held that medical procedures need informed consent, and informed consent requires that one be given relevant scientific data on what will happen to one after a procedure. …
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728174.864412
The culture of the Akan people of West Africa dates from before the
13th century. Like other long-established cultures the world over, the
Akan have developed a rich conceptual system complete with
metaphysical, moral, and epistemological aspects. Of particular
interest is the Akan conception of persons, a conception that
informs a variety of social institutions, practices, and judgments
about personal identity, moral responsibility, and the proper
relationship both among individuals and between individuals and
community. This overview presents the Akan conception of persons as seen by two
major contemporary Akan philosophers, Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye.
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769003.864425
It turns out I’ve blogged rather a lot of philosophy over the years! I like to find ways to categorize and refer back to the more valuable of those old posts, so they aren’t entirely lost to the ages. …
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775358.864438
Emotional hardcore and other music genres featuring screamed vocals are puzzling for the appreciator. The typical fan attaches appreciative value to musical screams of emotional pain all the while acknowledging it would be inappropriate to hold similar attitudes towards their sonically similar everyday counterpart: actual human screaming. Call this the screamed vocals problem. To solve the problem, I argue we must attend to the anti-sublimating aims that get expressed in the emotional hardcore vocalist’s choice to scream the lyrics. Screamed vocals help us see the value in rejecting (a) restrictive social norms of emotional expressiveness and (b) restrictive artistic norms about how one ought to express or represent pain in art, namely that if one is going to do so they must ensure the pain has been ‘beautified’. In developing this second point I argue that emotional hardcore is well-suited (though not individually so) for putting pressure on longstanding views in the history of aesthetics about the formal relationship between art and human pain.
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787327.864451
Welcome to our newest PEA Soup Blog Ethics discussion! This discussion focuses on David Estlund‘s recent paper ‘What’s Unjust About Structural Injustice?‘. To begin, we will pass things over to Peter de Marneffe for a critical précis. …
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795514.864467
A typical feature that is singled out in characterizations of the “open society” or the “great society” is its impersonal nature. Karl Popper characterizes the relationships taking place in the open society as “abstract” and “depersonalized”:
“As a consequence of its loss of organic character, an open society may become, by degrees, what I should like to term an ‘abstract society.’ It may, to a considerable extent, lose the character of a concrete or real group of men, or of a system of such real groups. …