1. 82139.958068
We report two experiments exploring the perception of how contemporary philosophy is often conducted. We find that (1) participants associate philosophy with the practice of conducting thought experiments and collating intuitions about them, and (2) that this form of inquiry is viewed much less favourably than the typical form of inquiry in psychology: research conducted by teams using controlled experiments and observation. We also found (3) an effect whereby relying on intuition is viewed more favorably in the context of team inquiry than in individual inquiry and (4) that greater prior exposure to philosophy lowered one’s opinion of inquiry driven by intuitions and thought experiments. Finally with respect to participant gender, we found that (5) women favored observation over intuition more than men did, and (6) tended to view a question pursued by a research team as more important than men viewed it.
Found 22 hours, 48 minutes ago on PhilPapers
2. 527923.958113
A counterpossible conditional is a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. Common sense delivers the view that some such conditionals are true, and some are false. In recent publications, Timothy Williamson has defended the view that all are true. In this paper we defend the common sense view against Williamson’s objections.
Found 6 days, 2 hours ago on David Ripley's site
3. 544991.95813
Wiggins’ (2012) argument against propositional accounts of knowing how is based on a development of some considerations taken from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle argued that the knowledge needed for participation in an ethos cannot be codified in propositional form so as to let it be imparted to someone who did not already have it. This is because any putative codification would be incomplete, and require that knowledge in order to extend it to novel cases. On a reasonable interpretation of his argument, Wiggins claims that the same goes for practical knowledge in general, and that this shows that a propositional view of knowing how is incorrect. This paper shows that this argument is unsound.
Found 6 days, 7 hours ago on PhilPapers
4. 735610.958165
I’m visiting the University of Genoa and talking to two category theorists: Marco Grandis and Giuseppe Rosolini. Grandis works on algebraic topology and higher categories, while Rosolini works on the categorical semantics of programming languages. …
Found 1 week, 1 day ago on Azimuth
5. 860016.958195
I'm working through Daniel Batson's latest book, What's Wrong with Morality? Batson distinguishes between four different types of motives for seemingly moral behavior, each with a different type of ultimate goal. …
Found 1 week, 2 days ago on The Splintered Mind
6. 1053812.958217
Co-speech gestures have been reported to give rise to so-called cosuppositional inferences (Schlenker 2015, 2016). For example, a sentence like “John will not [use the stairs] UP”, produced with an UP gesture (finger pointed upwards) co-occurring with the verb phrase is argued to give rise to the conditional presupposition that if John were to use the stairs, he would go up the stairs. Such a presuppositional treatment of the gestural inference predicts that it should project out of certain linguistic environments. We tested this prediction using an Inferential Judgment Task, in which participants had to rate the strength of inferences arising from the use of the co-speech gestures UP and DOWN, when produced with the predicate “use the stairs”, in six different linguistic environments: plain affirmative and negative sentences, modal sentences containing “might”, and quantified sentences involving “each”, “none”, and “exactly one”. The results provide evidence that the conditional inference projects from the scope of negation, and projects universally from the scope of “none” and “exactly one”. In addition, the data suggest that the cosupposition can also be locally accommodated in the scope of negation and “none”.
Found 1 week, 5 days ago on Philippe Schlenker's site
7. 1066128.958233
The intuitive notion of evidence has both semantic and syntactic features. In this paper, we develop an evidence logic for epistemic agents faced with possibly contradictory evidence from different sources. The logic is based on a neighborhood semantics, where a neighborhood N indicates that the agent has reason to believe that the true state of the world lies in N . Further notions of relative plausibility between worlds and beliefs based on the latter ordering are then defined in terms of this evidence structure, yielding our intended models for evidence-based beliefs. In addition, we also consider a second more general flavor, where belief and plausibility are modeled using additional primitive relations, and we prove a representation theorem showing that each such general model is a p-morphic image of an intended one. This semantics invites a number of natural special cases, depending on how uniform we make the evidence sets, and how coherent their total structure. We give a structural study of the resulting ‘uniform’ and ‘flat’ models. Our main result are sound and complete axiomatizations for the logics of all four major model classes with respect to the modal language of evidence, belief and safe belief. We conclude with an outlook toward logics for the dynamics of changing evidence, and the resulting language extensions and connections with logics of plausibility change.
Found 1 week, 5 days ago on Eric Pacuit's site
8. 1066149.958247
Building on the work of [20] and [6], Savage showed that any agent with a preference ordering satisfying certain intuitive axioms can be represented as an expected utility maximizer [21]. The idea behind Savage’s result is to take as primitive an agent’s (state-based) preference over a set of prizes and define the agent’s beliefs and utilities from its preference. Thus properties of an agent’s beliefs, represented as subjective probability distributions, are derived from properties of the agent’s preferences. See, for example, Chapter 1 of [17] for a discussion of the literature on the axiomatic foundations of decision theory. Building on Savage’s work and the fundamental contribution by Anscombe and Aumann [1], a number of different belief operators have been proposed in the literature. Ansheim and Sovik provide an excellent survey of these contributions [3].
Found 1 week, 5 days ago on Eric Pacuit's site
9. 1066253.95826
A rational belief must be grounded in the evidence available to an agent. However, this relation is delicate, and it raises interesting philosophical and technical issues. Modeling evidence requires richer structures than found in standard epistemic semantics where the accessible worlds aggregate all reliable evidence gathered so far. Even recent more finely-grained plausibility models ordering the epistemic ranges identify too much: belief is indistinguishable from aggregated best evidence. At the opposite extreme, one might model evidence syntactically as “formulas received”, but this seems overly detailed, and we we lose the intuition that evidence can be semantic in nature, zooming in on some actual world.
Found 1 week, 5 days ago on Eric Pacuit's site
10. 1066284.958272
A recurring issue in any formal model representing agents’ (changing) informational attitudes is how to account for the fact that the agents are limited in their access to the available inference steps, possible observations and available messages. This may be because the agents are not logically omniscient and so do not have unlimited reasoning ability. But it can also be because the agents are following a predefined protocol that explicitly limits statements available for observation and/or communication. Within the broad literature on epistemic logic, there are a variety of accounts that make precise a notion of an agent’s “limited access” (for example, Awareness Logics, Justification Logics, and Inference Logics). This paper interprets the agents’ access set of formulas as a constraint on the agents’ information gathering process limiting which formulas can be observed.
Found 1 week, 5 days ago on Eric Pacuit's site
11. 1066418.958285
This is the second paper in a two-part series introducing logics for reasoning about the dynamics of knowledge and beliefs. Part I introduced different logical systems that can be used to reason about the knowledge and beliefs of a group of agents. In this second paper, I show how to adapt these logical systems to reason about the knowledge and beliefs of a group of agents during the course of a social interaction or rational inquiry. Inference, communication and observation are typical examples of informative events, which have been subjected to a logical analysis. The main goal of this article is to introduce the key conceptual and technical issues that drive much of the research in this area.
Found 1 week, 5 days ago on Eric Pacuit's site
12. 1066734.958298
We introduce and study a PDL-style logic for reasoning about protocols, or plans, under imperfect information. Our paper touches on a number of issues surrounding the relationship between an agent’s abilities, available choices, and information in an interactive situation. The main question we address is under what circumstances can the agent commit to a protocol or plan, and what can she achieve by doing so?
Found 1 week, 5 days ago on Eric Pacuit's site
13. 1066821.958311
We conclude by introducing general first order neighborhood frames with constant domains and we offer a general completeness result for the entire family of classical first order modal systems in terms of them, circumventing some well-known problems of propositional and first order neighborhood semantics (mainly the fact that many classical modal logics are incomplete with respect to an unmodified version of either neighborhood or relational frames). We argue that the semantical program that thus arises offers the first complete semantic unification of the family of classical first order modal logics.
Found 1 week, 5 days ago on Eric Pacuit's site
14. 1238491.958324
This paper targets a series of potential issues for the discussion of, and modal resolution to, the alethic paradoxes advanced by Scharp (2013). I aim, then, to provide a novel, epistemicist treatment of the alethic paradoxes. In response to Curry’s paradox, the epistemicist solution that I advance enables the retention of both classical logic and the traditional rules for the alethic predicate: truth-elimination and truth-introduction. By availing of epistemic modal logic, the epistemicist approach permits, further, of a descriptively adequate explanation of the indeterminacy that is exhibited by epistemic states concerning liar-paradoxical sentences.
Found 2 weeks ago on PhilPapers
15. 1240543.958336
Discussions of reference in philosophy and linguistics are often framed as investigations into a semantic relation between linguistic forms and things. Proper names, pronouns, indexicals (e.g. ‘I’ or ‘today’), demonstratives (e.g. ‘this’ and ‘that’), and (perhaps) definite descriptions all refer, in some of their instances and often only in context, to objects. Let’s call this kind of reference linguistic reference. There is, however, a more fundamental relation of reference that holds between people and objects. People refer to things, and their doing so makes it possible for expressions to refer. Linguistic expressions, after all, are just collections of sounds or marks, with no intrinsic ability to stand for anything else. It is because of the way people use these sounds and marks that they come to refer to things outside themselves.
Found 2 weeks ago on Peter Hanks's site
16. 1288076.958357
Lean as a Programming Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.2
Found 2 weeks ago on Jeremy Avigad's site
17. 1288082.95837
Found 2 weeks ago on Jeremy Avigad's site
18. 1288091.958383
Lean is an implementation of a logical foundation known as dependent type theory. Specifically, it implements a version of dependent type theory known as the Calculus of Inductive Constructions. The CIC is a formal language with a small and precise set of rules that governs the formation of expressions. In this formal system, moreover, every expression has a type. The type of expression indicates what sort of object the expression denotes. For example, an expression may denote a mathematical object like a natural number, a data type, an assertion, or a proof.
Found 2 weeks ago on Jeremy Avigad's site
19. 1483284.958396
This paper is about a question that many readers will think has already been settled: are there different sizes of infinity? That is, are there infinite sets of different sizes? This is one of the most natural questions that one can ask about the infinite. But it is of course generally taken to be settled by mathematical results, such as Cantor’s theorem, to the effect that there are infinite sets without bijections between them. An answer to our question is entailed by these results (which I of course do not dispute), given the following almost universally accepted principle relating size to the existence of functions.
Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on Bruno Whittle's site
20. 1528743.958412
Intention Cognitivism – the doctrine that intending to V entails, or even consists in, believing that one will V – is an important position with potentially wide-ranging implications, such as a revisionary understanding of practical reason, and a vindicating explanation of 'Practical Knowledge'. In this paper, I critically examine the standard arguments adduced in support of IC, including arguments from the parity of expression of intention and belief; from the ability to plan around one's intention; and from the explanation provided by the thesis for our knowledge of our intentional acts. I conclude that none of these arguments are compelling, and therefore that no good reason has been given to accept IC.
Found 2 weeks, 3 days ago on PhilPapers
21. 1724637.958425
This paper investigates conjoined imperatives and declaratives (IaDs). It argues that some IaDs are best explained in terms of true conjunction and anaphora between conjuncts, despite challenges posed by von Fintel and Iatridou (2017). The key to addressing these challenges is a dynamic, non-modal analysis of imperatives building on Starr (to appear). The other IaDs are explained by appeal to a semantically related use of and, e.g. ‘left-subordinating and LSand)’ (Culicover and Jackendoff 1997). These other IaDs neutralize the directive meaning of the imperative, and this paper offers a new account of this building on ‘parameter-change conjunction’ (Klinedinst and Rothschild 2012). New data is presented that helps distinguish between the varieties of IaD, and it is shown that the proposed analysis captures it.
Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on William Starr's site
22. 1724672.958439
Declaration. The work included here is my own. This thesis is an annotated compilation of published papers, none of which was co-authored. Acknowledgement of assistance received will be found in each paper, and these acknowledgements are also collected together at the end of Chapter 0.
Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on Lloyd Humberstone's site
23. 1738811.958454
We propose a coherence account of the conjunction fallacy applicable to both of its two paradigms (the M-A paradigm and the A-B paradigm). We compare our account with a recent proposal by Tentori, Crupi and Russo (2013) that attempts to generalize earlier confirmation accounts. Their model works better than its predecessors in some respects, but it exhibits only a shallow form of generality and is unsatisfactory in other ways as well: it is strained, complex, and untestable as it stands. Our coherence account inherits the strength of the confirmation account, but in addition to being applicable to both paradigms, it is natural, simple, and readily testable. It thus constitutes the next natural step for Bayesian theorizing about the conjunction fallacy.
Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on Tomoji Shogenji's site
24. 1758905.958467
The degrees of unsolvability were introduced in the ground-breaking papers of Post [20] and Kleene and Post [7] as an attempt to measure the information content of sets of natural numbers. Kleene and Post were interested in the relative complexity of decision problems arising naturally in mathematics; in particular, they wished to know when a solution to one decision problem contained the information necessary to solve a second decision problem. As decision problems can be coded by sets of natural numbers, this question is equivalent to: Given a computer with access to an oracle which will answer membership questions about a set A, can a program (allowing questions to the oracle) be written which will correctly compute the answers to all membership questions about a set B? If the answer is yes, then we say that B is Turing reducible to A and write BT A. We say that BT A if BT A and AT B. ≡T is an equivalence relation, and ≤T induces a partial ordering on the corresponding equivalence classes; the poset obtained in this way is called the degrees of unsolvability, and elements of this poset are called degrees.
Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on PhilPapers
25. 1766446.95848
Depiction or pictorial representation was studied less intensively by philosophers than linguistic meaning until the 1960s. The traditional doctrine that pictures represent objects by copying their appearance had been challenged by art theorists since the first quarter of the twentieth century, when what were thought of as illusionistic styles of painting lost favour, due to the growing prestige of so-called “primitive” artistic styles, and the fauvist and cubist experiments of artists at that time. But it took several decades before philosophers became interested in these debates. When they did so, it was largely due to the impact of two books: Ernst Gombrich’s Art and Illusion (1960), and Nelson Goodman’s Languages of Art (1968).
Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
26. 1766536.958493
In the Foundations of Arithmetic Frege advances the thesis that numbers are objects. Specifically he claims that they are the extensions of equinumerosity concepts, knowledge about which may be obtained by logical means alone. Yet the first example of a number term he offers when clarifying his account of the relationship between numbers and their associated concept is striking, ‘the number of the moons of Jupiter’[Frege, 1950, 69e]. This is noteworthy because ‘the moons of Jupiter’ doesn’t look like a noun phrase denoting a concept at all, but rather a plural noun phrase denoting some physical objects, the moons taken together. Moreover when latter day neo-Fregeans offer a natural language interpretation of Hume’s Principle,
Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on PhilSci Archive
27. 1769170.958506
Lepore & Stone (2014) focus on two theoretically useful notions of meaning: conventional meaning and speaker meaning. For Lepore & Stone (2014: Ch.14), the former consists of our mutual expectations about how language is used — conventions — to make ideas public. The later consists in ideas that are made public in virtue of the speaker’s basic intentions in speaking (Lepore & Stone 2014: Ch.13). This paper argues that there is a third, more basic notion of meaning I call significance. The significance of an utterance is not reducible to the content it makes mutual, because it is partly based on the private commmitments speakers have when they make utterances and the private commmitments hearers form on the basis of utterances. More specifically, significance is the private speaker commitments and hearer effects which explain why utterances of a given type are repoduced in a population of agents (Millikan 2005). This leads to an approach that differs from Lepore & Stone (2014) in the treatment of non-conventional interpretive effects, speech acts and deception.
Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on William Starr's site
28. 1771461.958519
Traditionally, pronouns are treated as ambiguous between bound and demonstrative uses. Bound uses are non-referential and function as bound variables, and demonstrative uses are referential and take as a semantic value their referent, an object picked out jointly by linguistic meaning and a further cue—an accompanying demonstration, an appropriate and adequately transparent speaker?s intention, or both. In this paper, we challenge tradition and argue that both demonstrative and bound pronouns are dependent on, and co-vary with, antecedent expressions. Moreover, the semantic value of a pronoun is never determined, even partly, by extra-linguistic cues; it is fixed, invariably and unambiguously, by features of its context of use governed entirely by linguistic rules. We exploit the mechanisms of Centering and Coherence theories to develop a precise and general meta-semantics for pronouns, according to which the semantic value of a pronoun is determined by what is at the center of attention in a coherent discourse. Since the notions of attention and coherence are, we argue, governed by linguistic rules, we can give a uniform analysis of pronoun resolution that covers bound, demonstrative, and even discourse bound (“E-type”) readings. Just as the semantic value of the first-person pronoun ‘I’ is conventionally set by a particular feature of its context of use— namely, the speaker—so too, we will argue, the semantic values of other pronouns, including ‘he’, are conventionally set by particular features of the context of use.
Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on Matthew Stone's site
29. 1810529.958532
V. Gitman and J. D. Hamkins, “A model of the generic Vop\v enka principle in which the ordinals are not $\Delta_2$-Mahlo.” (manuscript under review)   Citation arχiv @ARTICLE{GitmanHamkins:A-model-of-the-generic-Vopenka-principle-in-which-the-ordinals-are-not-delta_2-Mahlo, author = {Victoria Gitman and Joel David Hamkins}, title = {A model of the generic Vop\v enka principle in which the ordinals are not $\Delta_2$-Mahlo}, journal = {}, year = {}, volume = {}, number = {}, pages = {}, month = {}, note = {manuscript under review}, abstract = {}, keywords = {}, source = {}, doi = {}, eprint = {1706.00843}, archivePrefix = {arXiv}, primaryClass = {math.LO}, url = {http://jdh.hamkins.org/generic-vopenka-ord-not-mahlo}, } Abstract. …
Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on Joel David Hamkins's blog
30. 1810530.958547
In set theory, we have the phenomenon of the universal definition. This is a property $\phi(x)$, first-order expressible in the language of set theory, that necessarily holds of exactly one set, but which can in principle define any particular desired set that you like, if one should simply interpret the definition in the right set-theoretic universe. …
Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on Joel David Hamkins's blog