1. 10978.267188
    One of the most wonderful parts of the North American Summer School for Language, Logic and Information is the opportunity it a↵ords young scholars to discuss their work with experts. By the same token, it is often inspiring for established researchers to see the creative directions in which recent work is being taken.
    Found 3 hours, 2 minutes ago on Eric Swanson's site
  2. 69891.267259
    « Not the critic who counts The problem with Uber I just spent a wonderful and exhausting five days in the Bay Area: meeting friends, holding the first-ever combined SlateStarCodex/Shtetl-Optimized meetup, touring quantum computing startups PsiCorp and Rigetti Computing, meeting with Silicon Valley folks about quantum computing, and giving a public lecture for the Simons Institute in Berkeley. …
    Found 19 hours, 24 minutes ago on Scott Aaronson's blog
  3. 230346.267283
    According to the so-called strong variant of Composition as Identity (CAI), the Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals can be extended to composition, by resorting to broadly Fregean relativizations of cardinality ascriptions. In this paper we analyze various ways in which this relativization could be achieved. According to one broad variety of relativization, cardinality ascriptions are about objects, while concepts occupy an additional argument place. It should be possible to paraphrase the cardinality ascriptions in plural logic and, as a consequence, relative counting requires the relativization either of quantifiers, or of identity, or of the is one of relation. However, some of these relativizations do not deliver the expected results, and others rely on problematic assumptions. In another broad variety of relativization, cardinality ascriptions are about concepts or sets. The most promising development of this approach is prima facie connected with a violation of the so-called Coreferentiality Constraint, according to which an identity statement is true only if its terms have the same referent. Moreover – even provided that the problem with coreferentiality can be fixed – the resulting analysis of cardinality ascriptions meets several difficulties.
    Found 2 days, 15 hours ago on PhilPapers
  4. 232471.267315
    Chomsky (1957) offered prescient suggestions about how to formulate theories of understanding for the spoken languages that human children can naturally acquire. We can view his proposal as a prolegomenon to a theory of meaning that combines a layered theory of syntax with an account of how humans can naturally use expressions in acts of referring, asserting, querying, and so on; cp. Austin (1961); Davidson (1967); Dummett (1976); Higginbotham (1985). Though crucially, Chomsky’s (1957) conception of reference differed from more familiar conceptions of denotation, as in Frege (1892b) or Russell (1905, 1912, 1957); cp. Goodman (1949, 1953), Strawson (1950), Chomsky (1977, 1995b, 2000b, 2017). I think we should develop the kind of semantic theory towards which Chomsky has long been pointing; see Pietroski (2017abc). But in this essay, my aim is simply to articulate a sense in which Syntactic Structures outlined a program for semantics, well before Davidson (1967), Montague (1970), and Lewis (1970).
    Found 2 days, 16 hours ago on Paul M. Pietroski's site
  5. 241269.267333
    The topic of this paper is the notion of the first person (singular), namely the notion me. Let us begin by distinguishing it from a different notion which is often confused with it, namely the notion self. The notion me applies to me and me alone absolutely, whereas the notion self applies to me relative to me, applies to you relative to you, applies to Jill relative to Jill, applies to Jack relative to Jack, and so on. Everyone is the self relative to her/him; for every x, x is the self to x. But only I am me, period. Of course, you may assert correctly, “Only I am me.” But the content of your assertion when you say this does not deal in the notion me; for your word “me” does not express the notion me. Only my word “me” does. It is not even that your word “me” expresses the notion me to you. To you your word “me” expresses a certain notion, which you call “the notion me.” But what you call “the notion me” is not the notion me, any more than the person you call “me” is me.
    Found 2 days, 19 hours ago on Takashi Yagisawa's site
  6. 337290.267347
    This paper deals with two issues. First, it identifies structured propositions with logical procedures. Second, it considers various rigorous definitions of the granularity of procedures, hence also of structured propositions, and comes out in favour of one of them. As for the first point, structured propositions are explicated as algorithmically structured procedures. I show that these procedures are structured wholes that are assigned to expressions as their meanings, and their constituents are sub-procedures occurring in executed mode (as opposed to displayed mode). Moreover, procedures are not mere aggregates of their parts; rather, procedural constituents mutually interact. As for the second point, there is no universal criterion of the structural isomorphism of meanings, hence of cohyperintensionality, hence of synonymy for every kind of language. The positive result I present is an ordered set of rigorously defined criteria of fine-grained individuation in terms of the structure of procedures. Hence procedural semantics provides a solution to the problem of the granularity of cohyperintensionality.
    Found 3 days, 21 hours ago on PhilSci Archive
  7. 595689.267361
    Matti Eklund (this volume) raises interesting and important issues for our account of metaphysical indeterminacy. Eklund’s criticisms are wide-ranging, and we’ll be unable to address them comprehensively. Instead, we’ll focus our reply on a few key points, taking the opportunity to remark on the background methodology and assumptions that inform our view and, where appropriate, indicating how these may differ from Eklund’s. We begin our account of metaphysical indeterminacy by defending the intelligibility of indeterminacy. Eklund finds this defence unpersuasive, so it seems fitting to begin our reply by addressing these criticisms. We’ll then move on to discuss Eklund’s remarks on vagueness and indeterminacy. We’ll close by briefly addressing the role of classical logic in our approach to indeterminacy.
    Found 6 days, 21 hours ago on Elizabeth Barnes's site
  8. 634290.267377
    When reading literature, we might have an emotional connection with the author, or at least what appears to be such, even when that literature is a work of fiction. But it is unclear how a work of fictional literature could supply the resources for such an experience. It is, after all, a work of fiction, not a report of the author’s experience, as with memoir or autobiography. The task of this paper is twofold: first, to explain the nature and value of this emotional experience; second, to argue that a fictional literary work can supply the resources for such an experience.
    Found 1 week ago on PhilPapers
  9. 636123.267393
    Vagueness is a double-edged sword in relation to lying and truthfulness. In situations of in which a cooperative speaker is uncertain about the world, vagueness offers a resource for truthfulness: it avoids committing oneself to more precise utterances that would be either false or unjustifiably true, and it is arguably an optimal solution to satisfy the Gricean maxims of Quality and Quantity. In situations in which a non-cooperative speaker is well-informed about the world, on the other hand, vagueness can be a deception mechanism. We distinguish two cases of that sort: cases in which the speaker is deliberately imprecise in order to hide information from the hearer; and cases in which the speaker exploits the semantic indeterminacy of vague predicates to produce utterances that are true in one sense, but false in another. Should such utterances, which we call half-truths, be considered lies? The answer, we argue, depends on the context: the lack of unequivocal truth is not always sufficient to declare falsity.
    Found 1 week ago on Paul Egré's site
  10. 642063.267408
    Herbert Paul Grice, universally known as Paul, was born on March 13, 1913 in Birmingham, England and died on August 28, 1988 in Berkeley CA. Grice received firsts in classical honours moderation (1933) and literae humaniores (1935) from Corpus Christi College, Oxford. After a year teaching in a public school, he returned to Oxford where, with a nearly five year interruption for service in the Royal Navy, he taught in various positions until 1967 when he moved to the University of California-Berkeley. He taught there past his official 1979 retirement until his death in 1988. He was philosophically active until his death—holding discussions at his home, giving lectures and editing a collection of his work that was posthumously published as Studies in the Way of Words.
  11. 646336.267421
    « Coming to Nerd Central Not the critic who counts There’s a website called Stop Timothy Gowers! !!! —yes, that’s the precise name, including the exclamation points. The site is run by a mathematician who for years went under the pseudonym “owl / sowa,” but who’s since outed himself as Nikolai Ivanov. …
    Found 1 week ago on Scott Aaronson's blog
  12. 1665934.267435
    Slurring is a kind of hate speech that has various effects. Notable among these is variable offence. Slurs vary in offence across words, uses, and the reactions of audience members. Patterns of offence aren’t adequately explained by current theories. We propose an explanation based on the unjust power imbalance that a slur seeks to achieve. Our starting observation is that in discourse participants take on discourse roles. These are typically inherited from social roles, but only exist during a discourse. A slurring act is a speech-act that alters the discourse roles of the target and speaker. By assigning discourse roles the speaker unjustly changes the power balance in the dialogue. This has a variety of effects on the target and audience. We show how these notions explain all three types of offence variation. We also briefly sketch how a role and power theory can help explain silencing and appropriation. Explanatory power lies in the fact that offence is correlated with the perceived unjustness of the power imbalance created.
    Found 2 weeks, 5 days ago on PhilPapers
  13. 1782570.267448
    Salience-sensitivity is a form of anti-intellectualism that says the following: whether a true belief amounts to knowledge depends on which error-possibilities are salient to the believer. I will investigate whether salience-sensitivity can be motivated by appeal to bank case intuitions. I will suggest that so-called third-person bank cases threaten to sever the connection between bank case intuitions and salience-sensitivity. I will go on to argue that salience-sensitivists can overcome this worry if they appeal to egocentric bias, a general tendency to project our own mental states onto others. I will then suggest that a similar strategy is unavailable to stakes-sensitivists, who hold that whether a true belief amounts to knowledge depends on what is at stake for the believer. Bank case intuitions motivate salience- but not stakes-sensitivity.
    Found 2 weeks, 6 days ago on PhilPapers
  14. 2336333.267462
    G.A. Barnard: 23 Sept.1915 – 9 Aug.2002 Today is George Barnard’s birthday. I met him in the 1980s and we corresponded off and on until 1999. Here’s a snippet of his discussion with Savage (1962) (link below [i]) that connects to issues often taken up on this blog: stopping rules and the likelihood principle. …
    Found 3 weeks, 6 days ago on D. G. Mayo's blog
  15. 2359665.267477
    Although most work in contemporary Anglophone philosophical action theory understands Elizabeth Anscombe’s monograph on Intention as the work that inaugurates the field, action theory often operates by setting out to understand intentional action by investigating the psychological antecedents of intention action. Now, Anscombe has no quarrel with moral psychology. Intention is a work of moral psychology, but it is a kind of moral psychology in which we attend to the act of deliberately making something the case in order to understand having a mind to make something the case. The more usual approach takes things the other way around. Anscombe attempted to ward off such approaches in Intention. If the arguments of §19 are any good, for example, they ought to tell against the mind-first approach in contemporary Anglophone ethics and action theory. If the arguments of §20 work, then they ought to dispel any sense that Anscombe is prone to behaviorism. Together, the arguments in §§19 and 20 are meant to clear the ground necessary for work on practical knowledge. In this essay, I give a reading of these difficult, crucial sections of Anscombe’s monograph in order to explore her arguments.
    Found 3 weeks, 6 days ago on Candace Vogler's site
  16. 2467331.267491
    I wrote the following dialogue as an antidote to the dogmatism I felt myself falling into when trying to write a paper about a priori propositions. The characters A and B are present-day analytic philosophers. …
    Found 4 weeks ago on Tristan Haze's blog
  17. 2477329.267505
    As a new foundational language for mathematics with its very different idea as to the status of logic, we should expect homotopy type theory to shed new light on some of the problems of philosophy which have been treated by logic. In this article, definite description, and in particular its employment within mathematics, is formulated within the type theory. Homotopy type theory has been proposed as an inherently structuralist foundational language for mathematics. Using the new formulation of definite descriptions, opportunities to express ‘the structure of’ within homotopy type theory are explored, and it is shown there is little or no need for this expression.
    Found 4 weeks ago on PhilSci Archive
  18. 2700729.267519
    Russellians can have a no proposition view of empty names. I will defend this theory against the problem of meaningfulness, and show that the theory is in general well motivated. My solution to the problem of meaningfulness is that speakers’ judgements about meaningfulness are tracking grammaticality, and not propositional content.
    Found 1 month ago on PhilPapers
  19. 2706602.267534
    Kripke’s Wittgenstein is standardly understood as a non-factualist about meaning ascription. Non-factualism about meaning ascription is the idea that sentences like “Joe means addition by ‘plus’” are not used to state facts about the world. Byrne and Kusch have argued that Kripke’s Wittgenstein is not a nonfactualist about meaning ascription. They are aware that their interpretation is non-standard, but cite arguments from Boghossian and Wright to support their view. Boghossian argues that non-factualism about meaning ascription is incompatible with a deflationary theory of truth. Wright argues that non-factualism about meaning ascription is incoherent. To support the standard interpretation, I’ll respond to each argument in turn. To the degree that my responses are successful, Byrne and Kusch have an unmotivated interpretation of Kripke’s Wittgenstein. Wilson provides a factualist interpretation that is not based on Boghossian and Wright’s arguments. Miller argues for a non-factualist interpretation against Wilson, but I’ll show that Miller’s interpretation faces a dilemma. Miller’s argument cannot be maintained if a coherent interpretation of the skeptical solution is to be provided. I’ll show how this dilemma can be avoided and provide an independent argument against Wilson so that a non-factualist interpretation of the skeptical solution can be maintained.
  20. 2708136.267548
    J. D. Hamkins and J. Reitz, “The set-theoretic universe $V$ is not necessarily a class-forcing extension of HOD,” ArXiv e-prints, 2017. (manuscript under review)   Citation arχiv @ARTICLE{HamkinsReitz:The-set-theoretic-universe-is-not-necessarily-a-forcing-extension-of-HOD, author = {Joel David Hamkins and Jonas Reitz}, title = {The set-theoretic universe $V$ is not necessarily a class-forcing extension of HOD}, journal = {ArXiv e-prints}, year = {2017}, volume = {}, number = {}, pages = {}, month = {September}, note = {manuscript under review}, abstract = {}, keywords = {}, source = {}, doi = {}, eprint = {1709.06062}, archivePrefix = {arXiv}, primaryClass = {math.LO}, url = {http://jdh.hamkins.org/the-universe-need-not-be-a-class-forcing-extension-of-hod}, } Abstract. …
    Found 1 month ago on Joel David Hamkins's blog
  21. 2899914.267562
    An action is something that takes place in the world, and that makes a difference to what the world looks like. Thus, actions are maps from states of the world to new states of the world. Actions can be of various kinds. The action of spilling coffee changes the state of your trousers. The action of telling a lie to your friend changes your friends state of mind (and maybe the state of your soul). The action of multiplying two numbers changes the state of certain registers in your computer. Despite the differences between these various kinds of actions, we will see that they can all be covered under the same logical umbrella.
    Found 1 month ago on Jan van Eijck's site
  22. 2979830.267575
    Within the last few years there has been some interest in investigating the relationship between the truthlikeness (verisimilitude) and belief revision programs [2, 6] . One prominent result of this investigation is that given any plausible account of truthlikeness and rational account of belief revision, expansions (+) and revisions (*) of a database (or belief state) D with true input A are not guaranteed to increase the database’s truthlikeness. D here is a belief set (i.e. D = Cn(D)) and D stands for its propositional formula representation.
    Found 1 month ago on PhilPapers
  23. 2980398.267591
    In the early-to-mid 19305, Wittgenstein investigated solipsism via the philosophy of language. In this paper, I want to reopen Wittgenstein’s ‘grammatical’ examination of solipsism. Wittgenstein begins by considering the thesis that only I can feel my pains. Whilst this thesis may tempt us towards solipsism, Wittgenstein points out that this temptation rests on a grammatical confusion concerning the phrase ‘my pains’. In $1, I unpack and vindicate his thinking. Wittgenstein then moves from his discussion of ‘my pains’ to his famous suggestion that the word ‘I’ has two distinct uses: a subject-use and an object-use. The purpose of Wittgenstein’s suggestion has, however, been widely misunderstood. I unpack it in $2, explaining how the subject-use connects with a phenomenological language, and so again tempts us into solipsism. In §§3—4, I consider various stages of Wittgenstein’s engagement with this kind of solipsism, culminating in a rebuttal of solipsism (and of subject-uses of ‘1’) via reflections on private languages.
    Found 1 month ago on Tim Button's site
  24. 3015257.267605
    In this tutorial, the meaning of natural language is analysed along the lines proposed by Gottlob Frege and Richard Montague. In building meaning representations, we assume that the meaning of a complex expression derives from the meanings of its components. Typed logic is a convenient tool to make this process of composition explicit. Typed logic allows for the building of semantic representations for formal languages and fragments of natural language in a compositional way. The tutorial ends with the discussion of an example fragment, implemented in the functional programming language Haskell Haskell Team; Jones [2003].
    Found 1 month ago on Jan van Eijck's site
  25. 3196227.267619
    By “alternative set theories” we mean systems of set theory differing significantly from the dominant ZF (Zermelo-Frankel set theory) and its close relatives (though we will review these systems in the article). Among the systems we will review are typed theories of sets, Zermelo set theory and its variations, New Foundations and related systems, positive set theories, and constructive set theories. An interest in the range of alternative set theories does not presuppose an interest in replacing the dominant set theory with one of the alternatives; acquainting ourselves with foundations of mathematics formulated in terms of an alternative system can be instructive as showing us what any set theory (including the usual one) is supposed to do for us.
    Found 1 month ago on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  26. 3317986.267632
    The previous posts were quite raw and had me wrestling with new data. In this post, I try to be clearer and more accessible, and give a first outline of a new account of necessity that has emerged from my research on these topics. …
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Tristan Haze's blog
  27. 3547390.267646
    The relations between intentions, linguistic meaning, and normativity have been explored with subtlety and analytical power by Crispin Wright in a number of essays that have focused on Wittgenstein’s and Kripke’s discussion of the nature of rule-following. This essay will present an argument—an essentially Fregean argument—to put into doubt a fairly widespread assumption about the normative nature of linguistic meaning by looking at the relation that linguistic meaning bears to an agent’s linguistic intentions.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on Akeel Bilgrami's site
  28. 3547654.26766
    This paper describes a decision procedure for disjunctions of conjunctions of anti-prenex normal forms of pure first-order logic (FOLDNFs) that do not contain ∨ within the scope of quantifiers. The disjuncts of these FOLDNFs are equivalent to prenex normal forms whose quantifier-free parts are conjunctions of atomic and negated atomic formulae (= Herbrand formulae). In contrast to the usual algorithms for Herbrand formulae, neither skolemization nor unification algorithms with function symbols are applied. Instead, a procedure is described that rests on nothing but equivalence transformations within pure first-order logic (FOL). This procedure involves the application of a calculus for negative normal forms (the NNF-calculus) with A ⊣⊢ A ∧ A (= ∧I) as the sole rule that increases the complexity of given FOLDNFs. The described algorithm illustrates how, in the case of Herbrand formulae, decision problems can be solved through a systematic search for proofs that reduce the number of applications of the rule ∧I to a minimum in the NNF-calculus. In the case of Herbrand formulae, it is even possible to entirely abstain from applying ∧I. Finally, it is shown how the described procedure can be used within an optimized general search for proofs of contradiction and what kind of questions arise for a ∧I-minimal proof strategy in the case of a general search for proofs of contradiction.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on PhilPapers
  29. 3589608.267674
    A mainstay assumption in natural-language semantics is that if - clauses bind indexical argument-places in then-clauses. Unfortunately, recent work (compare Santorio 2012) suggests that if -clauses can somehow act to ‘shift the context’. On the framework of Kaplan’s ‘Demonstratives’ (Kaplan 1977), that would be ‘monstrous’ and somehow impossible ‘in English’. The superseding framework of Lewis’s ‘Index, context, and content’ (Lewis 1980) instead maintains that an indexical argument-place is just one that is bindable (compare Stalnaker 2014, ch. 1), but maintains that these are rare—whereas the lesson of recent work is that they are pervasive.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on PhilPapers
  30. 3596662.267687
    This paper reveals two fallacies in Turing’s undecidability proof of first-order logic (FOL), namely, (i) an “extensional fallacy”: from the fact that a sentence is an instance of a provable FOL formula, it is inferred that a meaningful sentence is proven, and (ii) a “fallacy of substitution”: from the fact that a sentence is an instance of a provable FOL formula, it is inferred that a true sentence is proven. The first fallacy erroneously suggests that Turing’s proof of the non-existence of a circle-free machine that decides whether an arbitrary machine is circular proves a significant proposition. The second fallacy suggests that FOL is undecidable.
    Found 1 month, 1 week ago on PhilSci Archive