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635475.398821
Almost everyone believes that freedom from deprivation should have significant weight in specifying what justice between generations requires. Some theorists hold that it should always trump other distributive concerns. Other theorists hold that it should have some but not lexical priority. I argue instead that freedom from deprivation should have lexical priority in some cases, yet weighted priority in others. More specifically, I defend semi-strong sufficientarianism. This view posits a deprivation threshold at which people are free from deprivation, and an affluence threshold at which people can live an affluent life, even though their lives may be even further improved beyond that point. I argue that freedom from deprivation in one generation lexically outweighs providing affluence in another generation; in all other cases, freedom from deprivation does not have lexical priority.
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746056.399053
Here you are, just trying to eat your BLT in peace, and someone at your table starts going on about being a vegan. Your eyes roll as your blood pressure rises. You wish they would just shut up. It’s not that you don’t care about animal suffering. In other contexts, you actually care quite a bit – you would definitely do something if you thought a neighbor was mistreating their dog. You’re a good person—an animal lover even! But it’s hard to care that much about the ethics of meat-eating when these vegan types are just so preachy and annoying. This is, we suspect, a very common experience. When we’re told that something we see as ordinary— like eating meat—is actually wrong, our first reaction is to get irritated and dismissive. If it’s not about bacon, it’s about plastic straws. Or a phrase we’ve been using for years but that’s now considered offensive. Or having to share your pronouns.
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750904.39907
The paper argues against a commitment to metaphysical necessity, semantic modalities are enough. The best approaches to elucidate the semantic modalities are (still) versions of lingustic ersatzism and fictionalism, even if only developed in parts. Within these necessary properties and the difference between natural and semantic laws can be accounted for. The proper background theory for this is an updated version of Logical Empiricism, which is congenial to recent trends in Structural Realism. The anti-metaphysical attitude of Logical Empiricism deserves revitalization. Another target besides metaphysical necessity are substantial forms of iterated modalities, as used, for instance, in the philosophy of religion.
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750933.399091
According to the cognitive model of psychopathology, maladaptive beliefs about oneself, others, and the world are the main factors contributing to the development and persistence of various forms of mental suffering. Therefore, the key therapeutic process of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT)—a therapeutic approach rooted in the cognitive model—is cognitive restructuring, i.e., a process of revision of such maladaptive beliefs. In this paper, I examine the philosophical assumptions underlying CBT and offer theoretical reasons to think that the effectiveness of belief revision in psychotherapy is very limited. This is the case, I argue, because the cognitive model wrongly assumes that our body of beliefs is unified, while it is in fact fragmented.
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762700.399103
Suppose that you very quickly crush the head of a very long stretched-out serpent. Specifically, suppose your crushing takes less time than it takes for light to travel to the snake’s tail. Let t be a time just after the crushing of the head. …
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795521.399116
Work in philosophy of mind often engages in descriptive phenomenology, i.e., in attempts to characterize the phenomenal character of our experience. Nagel’s famous discussion of what it’s like to be a bat demonstrates the difficulty of this enterprise (1974). But while Nagel located the difficulty in our absence of an objective vocabulary for describing experience, I argue that the problem runs deeper than that: we also lack an adequate subjective vocabulary for describing phenomenology. We struggle to describe our own phenomenal states in terms we ourselves find adequately expressive. This paper aims to flesh out why our phenomenological vocabulary is so impoverished – what I call the impoverishment problem. As I suggest, this problem has both practical and philosophical import. After fleshing out the problem in more detail, I draw some suggestive morals from the discussion in an effort to point the way forward towards a solution.
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808640.399133
I distinguish five types of discrimination, three of which are personal-level and distinctively visual. I explain their implication relations. Then I argue that the plausibility of the claim that seeing something requires discriminating it, as opposed to simply attributing some properties to it, hinges on the type of discrimination under consideration. A weak form of discrimination trivializes the debate. Stronger notions of discrimination, however, cannot be understood without attribution. Attribution appears to form the fundamental level of personal-level representation.
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808716.399154
What is it to say, “they are my child?” The semantics of possessives such as ‘my’ are intriguing for a number of reasons, but here I wish to pick up on a particular ambiguity present in many uses of possessives. That is, an ambiguity between the sense of a possessive that merely indicates that the subject of an utterance stands in some relationship to the object of the utterance, and the sense of a possessive that indicates that the subject of the utterance owns the object of the utterance: that the object is the property of the subject. Call the former sense of such possessives the relational sense, and the latter the propertarian sense. This ambiguity is noted by Peters and Westerståhl, who write that in fact many possessive utterances actually have very little to do with ‘real’ possession or ownership (Peters and Westerståhl 2013 715). To give a couple of examples, take the following possessive utterances, which on their most natural reading are relational possessives:
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808742.399171
Conciliationism is the family of views that rationality requires agents to reduce confidence or suspend belief in p when acknowledged epistemic peers (i.e. agents who are (approximately) equally well-informed and intellectually capable) disagree about p. While Conciliationism is prima facie plausible, some have argued that Conciliationism is not an adequate theory of peer disagreement because it is self-undermining. Responses to this challenge can be put into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups: the Solution Responses which deny Conciliationism is self-undermining and attempt to provide arguments which demonstrate this; and the Skeptical Responses which accept that Conciliationism is self-undermining but attempt to mitigate this result by arguing this is either impermanent and/or not very worrisome. I argue that, by Conciliationism’s own lights, both kinds of responses (almost certainly) fail to save Conciliationism from being self-undermining. Thus, Conciliationism is (almost certainly) permanently self-undermining. This result is significant because it demonstrates that Conciliationism is likely hopeless: there is likely nothing that can save Conciliationism from this challenge. I further argue that Conciliationism, like any view, should be abandoned if it is (almost certainly) hopeless.
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808773.399182
In the Transcendental Aesthetic (TA), Kant is typically held to make negative assertations about “things in themselves,” namely that they are not spatial or temporal. These negative assertions stand behind the “neglected alternative” problem for Kant’s transcendental idealism. According to this problem, Kant may be entitled to assert that spatio-temporality is a subjective element of our cognition, but he cannot rule out that it may also be a feature of the objective world. In this paper, I show in a new way how Kant’s view (focusing on his conclusions about space) is not subject to this objection, by showing that he does not make the denial about mind-independent reality that he is typically held to make. The argument develops consequences of a new reading of Kant’s expression “an sich selbst” (‘in itself’; ‘in themselves’). I argue that “an sich selbst” or “per se” has a special, judgment-level role, so that this expression does not form new noun-terms adjectivally. It follows that the conceptual unit of Kant’s “Conclusions” in the TA is simply “things” (Dinge), since “things in themselves” is not a nominal expression; Kant adopts the Wolffian ontological use of “thing” as the basic kind-term for any existent. The arguments that things per se are not in space are arguments that space cannot be a necessary property or relations of things as a kind. I show that this does not involve the positive claim about mind-independent reality that inspires the neglected alternative objection.
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866557.399194
Current work in language models (LMs) helps us speed up or even skip thinking by accelerating and automating cognitive work. But can LMs help us with critical thinking – thinking in deeper, more reflective ways which challenge assumptions, clarify ideas, and engineer new concepts? We treat philosophy as a case study in critical thinking, and interview 21 professional philosophers about how they engage in critical thinking and on their experiences with LMs. We find that philosophers do not find LMs to be useful because they lack a sense of selfhood (memory, beliefs, consistency) and initiative (curiosity, proactivity). We propose the selfhood-initiative model for critical thinking tools to characterize this gap. Using the model, we formulate three roles LMs could play as critical thinking tools: the Interlocutor, the Monitor, and the Respondent. We hope that our work inspires LM researchers to further develop LMs as critical thinking tools and philosophers and other ‘critical thinkers’ to imagine intellectually substantive uses of LMs.
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875289.399205
I propose a novel (interpretation of) quantum theory, which I will call Environmental Determinacy-based or EnD Quantum Theory (EnDQT). In contrast to the well-known quantum theories, EnDQT has the benefit of not adding hidden variables, and it is not in tension with relativistic causality by providing a local causal explanation of quantum correlations without measurement outcomes varying according to, for example, systems or worlds. It is conservative, and so unlike theories such as spontaneous collapse theories, no modifications of the fundamental equations of quantum theory are required to establish when determinate values arise, and in principle, arbitrary systems can be in a superposition for an arbitrary amount of time. According to EnDQT, at some point, some systems acquired the capacity to have and give rise to other systems having determinate values, and where this capacity propagates via local interactions between systems. When systems are isolated from the systems that belong to these chains of interactions, they can, in principle, evolve unitarily indefinitely. EnDQT provides novel empirical posits that may distinguish it from other quantum theories. Furthermore, via the features of the systems that start the chains of interactions, it may provide payoffs to other areas of physics and their foundations, such as cosmology.
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875315.399218
Reconstructions of quantum theory are a novel research program in theoretical physics which aims to uncover the unique physical features of quantum theory via axiomatization. I focus on Hardy’s “Quantum Theory from Five Reasonable Axioms” (2001), arguing that reconstructions represent a modern usage of axiomatization with significant points of continuity to von Neumann’s axiomatizations in quantum mechanics. In particular, I show that Hardy and von Neumann share similar methodological ordering, have a common operational framing, and insist on the empirical basis of axioms. In the reconstruction programme, interesting points of discontinuity with historical axiomatizations include the stipulation of a generalized space of theories represented by a framework and the stipulation of analytic machinery at two levels of generality (first by establishing a generalized mathematical framework and then by positing specific formulations of axioms). In light of the reconstruction programme, I show that we should understand axiomatization attempts as being context–dependent, context which is contingent upon the goals of inquiry and the maturity of both mathematical formalism and theoretical underpinnings within the area of inquiry. Drawing on Mitsch (2022)’s account of axiomatization, I conclude that reconstructions should best be understood as provisional, practical, representations of quantum theory that are well suited for theory development and exploration. However, I propose my context–dependent re–framing of axiomatization as a means of enriching Mitsch’s account.
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924278.39923
Optimality Justifications is the triumphant culmination of a research programme pursued by Gerhard Schurz for a little over fifteen years. At its heart is a mathematical result that Schurz proves, building on a tradition of related results from the computational theory of learning. I’ll describe this result below. Upon this result, Schurz wishes to build a novel a posteriori justification of inductive inference as a rational method by which to form empirical beliefs. And around this justification, he wishes to construct a comprehensive internalist foundationalist epistemology. The basic beliefs of this foundationalist system are certain analytic truths and certain of those beliefs formed by introspection; and the inferences by which we are justified in forming new beliefs on the basis of ones already justified are classical logical deduction, induction, and abduction (or inference to the best explanation).
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924304.399241
In Plato’s Philebus, Socrates’ second account of ‘false’ pleasure (41d-42c) outlines a form of illusion: pleasures that appear greater than they are. I argue that these pleasures are perceptual misrepresentations. I then show that they are the grounds for a methodological critique of hedonism. Socrates identifies hedonism as a judgment about the value of pleasure based on a perceptual misrepresentation of size, witnessed paradigmatically in the ‘greatest pleasures’.
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931716.399253
Some philosophers think that notwithstanding Special Relativity, there is a True Absolute Reference Frame. Suppose this is so. This reference frame, surely, is not our reference frame. We are on a spinning planet rotating around a sun orbiting the center of our galaxy. …
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935762.399269
Broadcasting Versus Narrowcasting
Some weeks ago, while lazily scrolling on Substack Notes, I noticed an interesting comment made by someone (I don’t remember who) about an essay on Noah Smith’s blog. …
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982027.399281
Pragmatic vindicatory genealogies provide both a cause and a rationale and can thus affect the space of reasons. But how far is the space of reasons affected by this kind of genealogical argument? What normative and evaluative implications do these arguments have? In this paper, I unpack this issue into three different sub-questions and explain what kinds of reasons they provide, for whom are these reasons, and for what. In relation to this final sub-question I argue, most importantly, that these arguments are ambiguous about what they give us reasons for, meaning that they can be interpreted both as justifications for recognizing the normative standing of certain norms, values, and practices - and thus for living by them - and as excuses for those that do so. I illustrate this point by reference to the genealogical vindication of honour cultures, showing how the vindicatory argument can illuminate such case as one of excusing moral ignorance. Drawing on legal theory and moral philosophy, I show that different evaluative and normative implications hang on the result of the interpretation as either justification or excuse, and show that this ambiguity is a virtue rather than a limitation.
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982049.399293
Consider the project of using one’s time, money, and/or other resources to help others, and specifically to help them the most—or, as some like to call it, effective altruism (following the definition in MacAskill, 2019). Do we have moral reason to engage in that project? Are we, in many practical circumstances, morally required to do so?
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1025435.399305
I often talk about how philosophy needs better discovery systems, and try to find ways to clearly communicate my own work (e.g. summarizing My Big Ideas, and my main “myth-busting” updates to our disciplinary conventional wisdom)—while inviting others to do likewise. …
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1048300.399317
In the framework of Presentism, we introduce a novel interpretation of time as a quantum memory, evolving in atomic instants, and show its compatibility with relativistic time dilations. First, we clarify our postulates on time, causality, and information, and define our ontology in terms of entanglement in a spatial lattice encoded in the Present memory. Then, we introduce our observer as an elementary massive particle, and describe its wave function from the entanglement in the lattice and across the instants. Finally, we derive the proper time of such particle from the information of entanglement in its causal cone. We conclude suggesting a more comprehensive theory of Quantum Gravity and a relation between the concept of memory and the emergence of complexity.
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1105990.399329
The developmental properties of organisms play important roles in the generation of variation necessary for evolutionary change. But how can individual development steer the course of evolution? To answer this question, we introduce developmental channeling as a disposition of individual organisms that shapes their possible developmental trajectories and evolutionary dappling as an evolutionary outcome in which the space of possible organismic forms is dappled—it is only partially filled. We then trace out the implications of the channeling-dappling framework for contemporary debates in the philosophy of evolution, including evolvability, reciprocal causation, and the extended evolutionary synthesis.
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1106018.399347
The chin, a distinguishing feature of Homo sapiens, has sparked ongoing debates regarding its evolutionary origins and adaptive significance. We contend that these controversies stem from a fundamental disagreement about what constitutes a well‐defined biological trait, a problem that has received insufficient attention despite its recognized importance in biology. In this paper, we leverage paleoanthropological research on the human chin to investigate the general issue of character or trait identification. First, we examine four accounts of the human chin from the existing literature: the mandibular differential growth byproduct, the bony prominence, the inverted T‐relief, and the symphyseal angle. We then generalize from these accounts and propose a three‐stage framework for the process of character identification: description, detection, and justification. We use this framework to reinterpret the four accounts, elucidating key points of contention surrounding the chin as well as other morphological characters. We show that debates over the chin carry broad and important biological implications that extend beyond this trait and that are not mere semantic issues of definition.
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1106048.399365
Over the past decade, the physics literature on torsionful non-relativistic gravity has burgeoned; more recently, philosophers have also begin to explore this topic. As of yet, however, the connections between the writings of physicists and philosophers on torsionful non-relativistic gravity remain unclear. In this article, we seek to bridge the gap, in particular by situating within the context of the existing physics literature a recent theory of non-relativistic torsionful gravity developed by philosophers Meskhidze and Weatherall (2023); we also discuss the philosophical significance of that theory.
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1147318.399376
Part I treated Romantic ideas about reality, and knowledge, and virtue (as understood by Isaiah Berlin), but wasn’t Romanticism primarily a movement in the arts? Yes and here also is effected a revaluation of values. …
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1155145.399388
In this paper, I examine Max Deutsch’s dilemma for the implementation of newly engineered concepts. In the debate over this dilemma, the goal of conceptual engineering tends to be set either too high or too low. As a result, implementation tends to be seen as either very unlikely to succeed or too easily achievable. This paper aims to offer a way out of this dilemma. I argue that the success conditions for implementation can be better understood if we distinguish between different stages in the implementation process. Implementation is a complex process involving several stages, each of which can be evaluated as a success or a failure. I argue that even if an implementation does not reach the final stage in which a new concept is widely used in the society at large, it may not be a complete failure: conceptual engineers may not even aim for a new concept to be widely used in the society at large; or even if they do and a new concept only circulates in a smaller subgroup, this can still be a significant achievement. The upshot is that we should take more seriously the possibility that conceptual engineering can be implemented locally at the subgroup level.
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1155170.3994
There are two tensions in Smith’s system of ideas: the first is between the postulate of an invisible “noumenal” order of the Universe and the imaginary principles through which we connect the phenomena; the second is between a hypothetical noumenal order of the world where “is” and “ought” converge and the partial and imperfect normative order issued by our sympathetic judgements and a never perfectly impartial spectator. These tensions, which gave occasion to old misrepresentations and recent ones, are tensions in a unitary (though rhapsodically completed) system of ideas where the final unanswered question was the problem of evil. Against a widespread belief, Smith was no secularist but a fideist who took Bayle’s question seriously: why is man wicked and unhappy? The private ethics of prudence, justice, benevolence and the public ethics of liberty, justice, and equality were modest proposals for coping with the problem of social evil, of a “practical” kind, the only one available after Smith’s refutation of natural theology, his last word on the causes for evil.
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1155203.399411
The weaponizing of scientific expertise to oppose regulation has been extensively studied. However, the relevant studies, belonging to the emerging discipline of agnotology, remain focused on the analysis of empirical corruption: of misinformation, doubt mongering, and other practices that cynically deploy expertise to render audiences ignorant of empirical facts. This paper explores the wrongful deployment of expertise beyond empirical corruption. To do so, I develop a broader framework of morally subversive expertise, building on recent work in political philosophy (Howard, 2016). Expertise is subversive if it sets up its audience to fail morally, either intentionally or negligently. I distinguish three modes of subversive expertise: empirical subversion (the focus of agnotology), normative subversion and motivational subversion. Drawing on these distinctions, I offer a revisionary account of the Trump Administration’s regulatory science as a case study. I show that the Trump Administration’s use of expertise to dismantle climate regulation, contra the standard charge, cannot be explained using the resources of agnotology alone: the Administration produced highly reliable climate assessments, detailing the risks of climate change, candidly admitting the harms of its proposed policies, and still successfully deployed these findings to justify massive climate deregulation. The lesson of the analysis is that dismissing the expertise that underpins climate deregulation as empirically corrupt ‘anti-science’ both obscures its actual role in the politics of climate change and understates its wrongfulness: it misses the breadth of the assault on moral agency that sustains climate injustice.
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1164982.399422
Feminist philosophers of biology bring the tools of feminist theory,
and in particular the tools of feminist philosophy of science, to
investigations of the life sciences. While the critical examination of
the categories of sex and gender (which will be explained below) takes
a central place, the methods, ontological assumptions, and
foundational concepts of biology more generally have also enjoyed
considerable feminist scrutiny. Through such investigations, feminist
philosophers of biology reveal the extent to which the theory and
practice of particular scientific disciplines and research programs
(and, indeed, their philosophical study) are intertwined with both
value judgments and social hierarchies.
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1171842.399434
[For this post, I’ll assume some familiarity with the concept of moral trade and the distinction between consequentialist and deontological values.] In earlier work, I claimed that (in the specific context of ECL) if you are trying to benefit someone’s moral view as part of some cooperative arrangement, only the consequentialist aspects of their moral values are relevant to you. …